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Abstract 
Lamont and Frazzini (2007) document that a trading strategy consisting of buying every 
stock expected to announce within the coming month and selling short every stock not 
expected to announce the coming month generates a large and statistically significant 
earnings announcement premium in the U.S. stock market between 1972 and 2004. Lamont 
and Frazzini (2007) claim that the main explanation for the earnings announcement premium 
is uninformed or irrational demand by individual investors, coupled with imperfect arbitrage 
by sophisticated investors. Their results are not in accordance with weak-form market 
efficiency in the U.S. stock market in the sense that historical information can be used to 
predict future stock prices. This thesis will test if related trading strategies based on 
predicted quarterly earnings announcement dates generates an earnings announcement 
premium at the Oslo Stock Exchange in the period between 1999 and 2007. 
Contrasting with the results of Lamont and Frazzini (2007) the results presented in this 
thesis, that are not statistically significant, show that various versions of the trading strategy 
based on predicted earnings announcement dates seem to generate negative monthly average 
excess returns. Further, a L/S portfolio trading strategy based on actual announcement dates 
does not generate average monthly returns statistically significantly larger than zero. This 
indicates that improved methods for predicting earnings announcement dates would not 
assist in forming L/S portfolios generating positive excess returns over the sample period. 
Consequently, it seems there was no earnings announcement premium at the Oslo Stock 
Exchange in the sample period between 1999 and 2007. The results presented in this thesis 
can therefore not reject market efficiency at the Oslo Stock Exchange. 
The main reasons for the presented results, which are differing from the results of Lamont 
and Frazzini (2007), are the following: Firstly, there is a possibility that the dataset of 
earnings announcement dates utilised in this analysis is not representative for the sample 
period regarding the real coverage of earnings announcement dates. Moreover, there is a 
possibility that the patterns found by Lamont and Frazzini (2007) are random, and caused by 
for example data-mining, and that in reality there is no earnings announcement premium. 
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1. Introduction 
Lamont and Frazzini (2007) found that a trading strategy holding a zero-cost portfolio of 
expected announcers while selling short a portfolio of expected non-announcers generated 
yearly excess returns of between 7 and 18 percent. The positive excess returns, they claim, 
can not be explained by the factors included in the Carhart (1997) four-factor model, and are 
hence “abnormal”. According to market efficiency theory, it is not possible to earn returns 
greater than a risk-free rate plus a compensation for the risk related to investing in risky 
assets. The results of Lamont and Frazzini (2007), which are not in accordance with weak-
form market efficiency in the U.S. stock market, are therefore relatively interesting since 
they are indicating that it is possible for a market participant to earn excess returns without 
having to take on excess risk. Given that the U.S. stock market is one of the largest in the 
world, and regarded as relatively efficient, it is interesting to examine if the same earnings 
announcement premium exists in the much smaller Norwegian stock market. 
In this thesis, I test if various trading strategies, similar to the earnings announcement 
premium strategy of Lamont and Frazzini (2007), generates excess returns over the 
Norwegian Government three month Treasury bill at the Oslo Stock Exchange over the 
sample period between 1999 and 2007. At the last day of month t-1, the monthly trading 
strategy buys a value-weighted portfolio of stocks that are expected to announce their 
quarterly earnings the coming month and sells short a value-weighted portfolio of stocks that 
are not expected to announce their quarterly earnings the coming month. Combined, this 
trading strategy creates a value-weighted zero cost L/S portfolio. 
In other words, in this thesis, I test for the existence and the robustness of an eventual 
earnings announcement premium at the Oslo Stock Exchange between 1999 and 2007. This 
is tested with the following zero-hypothesis: 
A) H0: Average monthly excess returns L/S portfolio = 0 
H1: Average monthly excess returns L/S portfolio > 0 
With zero-hypothesis A, this thesis tests if various versions of the L/S portfolio trading 
strategy generates positive average monthly excess returns that are statistically significant. 
Clearly, if the value-weighted portfolio that sells short expected non announcers generates 
average monthly excess return that are more negative than the value-weighted monthly 
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average excess return of the portfolio that buys expected announcers, the combination of 
these two portfolios, the zero cost L/S portfolio, would earn positive monthly average excess 
returns. In this case, one would earn larger returns by only selling short the portfolio of 
expected non-announcers. I limit my approach to focus on whether or not a trading strategy 
combining the two portfolios each month generates statistically significant positive returns 
over the Norwegian Government three month Treasury bill. 
If zero-hypothesis A is rejected, I further test whether the above zero average excess returns 
generated by the L/S portfolio strategy are abnormal by regressing the returns on the four 
risk factors from Carhart (1997) with the following zero hypothesis: 
B)  H0: Average monthly abnormal returns L/S portfolio = 0 
H1: Average monthly abnormal returns L/S portfolio > 0 
If zero-hypothesis B is rejected, this indicates that there is an earnings announcement 
premium at the Oslo Stock Exchange. This means that a monthly trading strategy taking a 
long position in portfolios of stocks expected to announce their earnings and a short position 
in portfolios of stocks not expected to announce their earnings in the following month, 
generates returns that can not be fully explained by the Carhart (1997) four-factor model. 
The abnormal returns generated from this trading-strategy is statistically significant. If the 
Carhart (1997) four-factor model describes the risk related to following the tested trading 
strategy, a rejected zero hypothesis is inconsistent with weak form market efficiency at the 
Oslo Stock Exchange in the sense that historical information can be used to predict future 
stock prices.  
Contrasting with the results of Lamont and Frazzini (2007), the results presented in this 
thesis, which are not statistically significant, show that various versions of the trading 
strategy based on predicted earnings announcement dates seem to generate negative monthly 
average excess returns. There is hence no signs of an earnings announcement premium at the 
Oslo Stock Exchange in the sample period between 1999 and 2007. I find no results that can 
reject weak-form market efficiency at the Oslo Stock Exchange. 
This thesis is organised as follows. In section 2 an overview of market efficiency theory  is 
presented. Lamont and Frazzini (2007) claim that the main explanation for the earnings 
announcement premium is uninformed or irrational demand by individual investors, coupled 
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with imperfect arbitrage by sophisticated investors. In order to understand the implications 
of a found stock price anomaly, market efficiency theory, including behavioural finance 
theory, is given focus in this section. Section 3 reviews relevant literature covering the 
earnings announcement premium and its possible explanations. Additionally, section 3 
covers previously done empirical studies, with focus on stock price anomalies, which have 
been conducted on the Oslo Stock Exchange. Section 4 presents the data utilised in the 
empirical analysis as well as the methodology used for testing the zero hypothesis. In section 
5 the results and the analysis of the empirical research are presented, as well as robustness 
checks of the results. Section 6 presents a discussion of the results found in this thesis, and 
places the results in the literature presented in sections 2 and 3. Moreover, section 6 contains 
a discussion of potential reasons till why the presented results are in contrast to the results of 
Lamont and Frazzini (2007), criticism of the presented results as well as proposals for 
further studies on the earnings announcement premium at the Oslo Stock Exchange. Section 
7 presents conclusions. 
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2. Market Efficiency Theory 
Market efficiency theory is substantial knowledge when analysing stock return series, and its 
most important implication is that an investor can not obtain returns greater than the 
corresponding on taken risk. The earnings announcement premium of Lamont and Frazzini 
(2007) is not in accordance with weak-form efficiency in the U.S. stock market. In order to 
understand their results and being able to analyse the degree of efficiency in the Norwegian 
stock market, this first part of this section reviews market efficiency theory and its 
implications. Further, the relationship between risk and return as well as found stock price 
anomalies are discussed. This part is relevant for understanding the implications of trading 
on the basis of stock price anomalies that have been documented. Lamont and Frazzini 
(2007) offers an explanation in the field of behavioural finance for their found earnings 
announcement premium. Lamont and Frazzini (2007) claim that the main explanation for the 
earnings announcement premium is uninformed or irrational demand by individual investors, 
coupled with imperfect arbitrage by sophisticated investors. The last part of this section is 
therefore focusing on behavioural finance theory, a field of finance still in its early stage. 
This section ends with a short discussion of the predictability of stock prices. 
2.1 The Random Walk and the Efficient Market Hypothesis 
The market efficiency theory can be traced all the way back to the French mathematician 
Louis Bachelier’s dissertation, “The Theory of Speculation” from 1900. Bachelier’s “Theory 
of Speculation” from 1900 was not taken further into examination until the 1950s; Followed 
by the possibility of using computers for analysing economic time series in the early 1950s, 
Maurice Kendall examined the assumption that stock prices reflect the past and the future 
prospects of the firm (Kendall, 1953). He could not identify any predictable patterns in stock 
prices; stock prices seemed to follow random patterns.  
The suggestions of that stock prices are fluctuating randomly imply that changes in stock 
prices are independent of one another. In other words, it implies that there is no correlation 
between the change in the stock price at time t and at time t+1. This is known as the random 
walk hypothesis; stock price changes are random and unpredictable. The logic behind the 
random walk hypothesis is that if past stock price changes could be used to predict future 
stock price changes, investors would take advantage of it until the stock prices were adjusted 
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to a level where all the information in the past stock prices would be reflected in today’s 
stock price. Hence price patterns would not exist. 
That prices are fluctuating randomly was further demonstrated by Paul Samuelson in his 
article from 1965. Also Eugene Fama takes the theory of random walks in stock market 
prices as well as its implications further into examination is in his articles from the same 
year. It is in these articles that the expression “efficient market” first is used. In the article 
“Random Walks in Stock Market Prices” Fama (1965a, p. 2) defines the expression 
“efficient market” as  
“a market where there are large numbers of rational, profit-maximisers actively competing, 
with each trying to predict future market values of individual securities, and where 
important current information is almost freely available to all participants. In an efficient 
market, competition among the many intelligent participants leads to a situation where, at 
any point in time, actual prices of individual securities already reflect the effects of 
information based both on events that have already occurred and on events which, as of 
now, the market expects to take place in the future. In other words, in an efficient market at 
any point in time the actual price of a security will be a good estimate of its intrinsic value.” 
Fama argues that the implications of an efficient market are that past history of series of 
stock prices cannot be used to predict their future behaviour. He claims that “the future path 
of the price level of a security is no more predictable than the path of a series of cumulated 
random numbers.” (Fama 1965a, p. 2). Consequently, it is not possible to achieve above 
normal returns by using any trading rules or techniques based on the information that is 
already known in the market, compared to a buy-and-hold policy. This is known as the 
Efficient Market Hypothesis (EMH).  
The EMH states that stock prices fully reflect all available information. It is hence 
impossible to “beat the market” since stock prices already has all relevant information 
incorporated. This means that according to the EMH, stocks are always exchanged at their 
fair, or the fundamental, value. It is therefore not possible for investors to find over or 
underpriced stocks in the market. The only way to obtain higher returns is to invest in riskier 
stocks. 
The general assumptions made in the EMH are: 
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1) The market consists of a large number of rational investors who are actively 
competing with each other in order to maximise profits.  
2) The existence of irrational investors will affect stock prices both positively and 
negatively and the effect of this on stock prices is in total zero; the markets are hence 
assumed to be rational. 
3) All investors have access to the same information and they perceive this information 
in the same way.  
4) Information is obtainable for no or low costs. 
5) The market makes unbiased forecasts of the future. 
 
Due to that the statement claiming that stock prices in an efficient market fully reflect all 
available information was relatively general, and in order to make the efficient market model 
testable, Eugene Fama saw the necessity of specifying the efficient market definition. In his 
paper from 1970 “Efficient Capital Markets: A Review of Theory and Empirical Work”, 
Eugene Fama classified market efficiency into three forms; weak form efficiency, semi-
strong efficiency and strong efficiency: 
2.1.1 Weak Form Efficiency 
Weak form market efficiency claims that all past prices of a stock are reflected in today’s 
stock price.  Historical stock prices cannot be used to predict future stock prices, the stock 
prices follow a random walk. In other words, technical analysis cannot be used to predict and 
“beat” the market. 
On the other hand, the weak form market efficiency allows for that fundamental analysis can 
be used for finding under- or overpriced stocks. By using companies’ financial statements, 
not historical stock prices, investors can possibly find under- and overpriced stocks. 
2.1.2 Semi-strong Form Efficiency 
Semi-strong market efficiency claims that all public information, as well as future 
expectations, is reflected in a stock’s current price. The implication of the semi-strong 
market efficiency is that neither fundamental nor technical analysis can be used to achieve 
above normal returns. A passive, diversified buy-and hold strategy will generate the highest 
returns in a semi-strong form efficiency market since an active strategy; by definition, an 
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active strategy will not be more profitable due to the related transaction costs. Since all 
publicly known information is baked into the current stock price, an investor needs private 
information in order to achieve above normal returns. 
2.1.3 Strong Form Efficiency 
The strong form market efficiency implies that all information in a market, both public and 
private, is reflected in a stock’s price. Profits exceeding normal returns can not be obtained 
regardless of the amount of research or information an investor has access to. It also implies 
that above normal returns cannot be achieved by investors with insider information since the 
market predicts future stock behaviour and therefore has taken all private information into 
account. This degree of efficiency is by many seen as only theoretical, and there are hence 
strong regulations against insider information based trading. 
2.1.4 The Market Efficiency Paradox 
As stated by the EMH, it is impossible to” beat the market” since stock prices reflect all 
relevant information. It is therefore not possible for investors to find under –or overpriced 
stocks through analyses and the only way to obtain higher returns for investors is by taking 
on more risk through buying riskier stocks. In an efficient market no investors will hence 
have the incentives to perform analysis looking for under – or overpriced stocks since they in 
theory won’t be rewarded for it. On the other hand; available information has to be taken 
into account somehow, and it is through investors analysing this information and trading on 
the basis of their analysis that a stock market becomes efficient. In order to be willing to pay 
the costs related to analysing the available information in a market, investors require 
compensation. This leads us to the market efficiency paradox; In order to have an efficient 
stock market, there has to be investors believing that they can make above normal returns by 
performing additional analyses, hence, believing that the market is inefficient. The stock 
market is eventually efficient only because there are investors in the market believing that 
it’s not. 
2.2 The Relation Between Risk and Return 
According to the Efficient Market Hypothesis, an investor has to take on more risk in order 
to obtain higher returns. This is consistent with the assumption that investors are risk averse 
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in the sense that they are willing to sacrifice some return in order to reduce risk. Thus, an 
investor will demand higher returns for holding riskier assets.  
The standard deviation of returns, or volatility, is a widely accepted measure for risk 
(Womack and Zhang, 2003). The logic behind this is that the more an asset’s return is 
fluctuating, the less sure an investor holding the asset can be of its value at the time he or she 
wishes to sell the asset. The total risk of a stock is normally decomposed into two 
components, namely the market risk and the specific risk. Market risk, also called systematic 
risk, is the variance that arises from a stock’s covariance with the return of the market and 
can not be diversified away. The specific risk, also called un-systematic or idiosyncratic risk, 
is the variance that arises from other stock-specific determinants of returns and can be 
diversified away. Through holding several stocks with as little correlated returns as possible, 
an investor can hence reduce stock-specific risk, and hence overall portfolio volatility, 
without lowering return expectations. However, the rate of volatility reduction due to adding 
more assets into a portfolio is decreasing with the increasing number of assets. Therefore, a 
general rule of thumb is that a portfolio is well-diversified if it contains 30 or more assets 
(Womack and Zhang, 2003). Since stock-specific risk can be diversified away, its expected 
average is zero. In other words, there is no risk premium associated with stock specific risk 
and an investor can hence only expect compensation for the market risk. 
Beta is normally used to measure the degree to which the variation of the return of a stock is 
correlated with the variation in the return of the market. More specified, a stock’s beta is 
calculated as the covariance between the return of the market and the return of the asset, 
divided by the variance of the return of the market:  
)var(
),cov(
M
Mi
i
r
rr
=β  
The market beta is by definition unity. Stocks with a beta higher than unity are in general 
more sensitive to market movements than stocks with a beta lower than unity. The beta of a 
portfolio of stocks is normally calculated by taking the weighted average of each stock’s 
beta, on the basis of each stock’s market capitalisation. 
Various asset pricing models are used for predicting the expected return of a portfolio. The 
Capital Asset Pricing Model (CAPM), which was introduced by Jack Treynor, William 
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Sharpe, John Litner and Jan Mossin in the 1960’s, is one of them. The CAPM predicts the 
equilibrium relationship between a portfolio’s expected return and its risk: 
ptftMtftp rrErrECAPM β))(()(: ,,,, −+=  
The CAPM implies the equity risk premium of a portfolio, the market return, E(rM), minus 
risk free return, rf, is directly related to the beta of the portfolio. Thus, the CAPM predicts 
expected return of a portfolio, E(ri),  is equal to the equity risk premium times the portfolio’s 
beta plus risk free return. An investor’s compensation for bearing risk by investing in a risky 
asset is measured by the portfolio’s beta. The CAPM is therefore a single factor model. 
In order to be able to evaluate a portfolio’s performance, one compares its expected return 
with its actual return.  A portfolio’s difference between expected return and actual return is 
normally referred to as alpha, and is under the CAPM by definition expected to be zero in 
order to avoid arbitrage opportunities. If there is a difference between expected return and 
actual return on a portfolio, one can hence either draw the conclusion that CAPM is a poor 
asset pricing model, or that the portfolio has generated abnormal returns, returns that are 
lower or higher than expected with the level of risk taken on over the investment period. 
In order to calculate a portfolio’s alpha, it is common to run a regression based on the 
CAPM-model: 
tptftmpptftp rRrR ,,,,, )( εβα +−+=−  
Where Rp,t is the portfolio’s return, rf,t is the riskfree rate, αp is the portfolio’s alpha, βp is the 
portfolio’s beta, Rm,t is the return of the market while εp,t is the error-term.  
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A positive alpha is indicating that the portfolio has performed better than expected compared 
to the portfolio’s market related risk, namely its beta.  
The assumptions behind the CAPM are: 
1) Investors are rational, and they only care about expected return and risk. They will 
therefore always seek to maximise expected return for any given level of risk. 
2) All investors have the same perception of the trade-off between risk and expected 
return. 
3) Investors are well-diversified and therefore, they will only get compensated for the 
systematic market-risk they are bearing. 
 
According to Womack and Zhang (2003), the CAPM normally achieve an R2 measure 
around 0.85.  The R2 measure describes how well the model predicts actual returns, and if 
the CAPM was predicting returns perfectly, its R2  would have been 1. The predictable power 
of the CAPM is therefore relatively high. However, many researchers believe that there are 
other sub-factors of risk that, when added to a model, could predict expected returns more 
precisely than the CAPM. Fama and French’s three-factor model is the most known one: 
2.2.1 The Fama and French Three-Factor Model 
Fama and French (1993) observed that small capitalisation stocks tend to have higher 
average returns than large capitalisation stocks, and that stocks with a high book-to-market 
value tend to have higher average returns than stocks with low book-to-market value. They 
therefore represented an extended version of the CAPM in 1992, which is referred to as the 
Fama and French three-factor model. In addition to the overall market factor, they identified 
a factor related to firm size and a factor related to a firm’s book-to-market value, as risk 
factors in stock returns. In order to represent the risk factors related to firm size and book-to-
market value, they constructed a SMB and a HML factor.  
SMB stands for “Small Minus Big”. The factor is calculated as the average return for the 
smallest 30 % of stocks minus the average returns of the largest 30 % of stocks that month, 
and measures the additional return, or the “size premium” related to investing in small 
capitalisation stocks versus investing large capitalisation stocks. While a positive SMB 
indicates that small capitalisation stocks outperformed large capitalisation stocks in a given 
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month, a negative SMB indicates the opposite. The logic behind adding SMB as an 
additional risk factor is, according to Womack and Zhang (2003), that smaller firms’ stocks 
often are less liquid than larger firms’ stocks. Also, smaller firms are more sensitive to 
“many risk factors” and they’re ability to “absorb negative financial events” is lower than 
for larger firms. 
HML stands for “High Minus Low” and is calculated as the average return of the 50 % of 
stocks with the highest book-to-market ratio minus the average return of the 50 % of stocks 
with the lowest book-to-market ratio each month. The HML measures to which extent 
investors are compensated for investing in companies with high book-to-market values, also 
called the “value-premium”. Stocks with high book-to-market ratios are regarded as value-
stocks and stocks with small book-to-market values are seen as growth stocks. While a 
positive HML indicates that value stocks have outperformed growth stocks in a given month, 
a negative HML indicates the opposite. In order to get listed on a stock-exchange, a firm 
normally needs to be of a certain size. Thus, according to Womack and Zhang (2003), the 
logic behind adding HML as a risk factor is that firms with high book-to-market values have 
most likely been victims of the market’s disbelieve of the firms’ future earnings. “Since 
these companies have experienced some sort of difficulty, it seems plausible that they would 
be exposed to greater risk of bankruptcy or other financial troubles than their more highly 
valued counterparts”. 
In order to test if a portfolio is earning abnormal returns, one can therefore run a regression 
on the following equation: 
(4) tptptptpptftp eHMLhSMBsMKTrR ,,, ++++=− βα  
Where Rp,t is the portfolio’s return, rf,t is the riskfree rate, αp is the portfolio’s alpha, βp is the 
portfolio’s exposure towards market risk, MKT is the return of the market while ep,t is the 
error-term. The sp and hp are respectively the portfolio’s exposure towards SMB and HML. 
If alpha is significantly larger than zero, the portfolio is earning abnormal returns in the 
sense that its return is not fully explained by the three risk factors. According to Womack 
and Zhang (2003), the Fama and French three-factor model often achieve an R2 measure 
around 0.95, and is due to its strong explanatory power of returns commonly used. For 
example, Morningstar, a mutual fund rating company, classifies mutual funds based on the 
three Fama and French factors. Alpha-values found by performing a regression based on the 
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CAPM-equation often tend to diminish or turn into zero when regressed on the latter 
equation. In practise, if one finds abnormal returns by performing the CAPM-based 
regression, one should therefore execute a robustness check on the same data material by 
performing a regression based on more risk factors.  
2.2.2 The Carhart Four-Factor Model 
Mark Carhart (1997) introduced a forth risk-factor to the Fama and French three-factor 
model, namely the momentum-factor. This factor will, according to Carhart capture the one-
year momentum-anomaly discovered by Jegadeesh and Titman (1993)1.  
(5) tptptptptpptftp eYRPRpHMLhSMBsMKTrR ,,, 1 +++++=− βα  
Where Rp,t is the portfolio’s return, rf,t is the riskfree rate, αp is the portfolio’s alpha, βp is the 
portfolio exposure towards market risk, while ep,t is the error-term. Further, “SMB, HML and 
PR1YR are returns on value-weighted, zero-investment, factor-mimicking portfolios for size, 
book-to-market equity, and one-year momentum in stock returns” (p.61). The MKT is the 
market return. The momentum-factor, PR1YR, is constructed by taking “the equal-weight 
average of firms with the highest 30 percent eleven-month returns lagged one month minus 
the equal weight average of firms with the lowest 30 percent eleven-month returns lagged 
one month” (Carhart, 1997, p.61). An alpha-value different from zero indicates that the four 
factors can not fully explain a portfolio’s excess return. Thus, a portfolio earns abnormal 
returns if alpha is different from zero. 
Carhart (1997) claims that the four-factor model, on average, improves the pricing errors of 
the CAPM and the three-factor model. By examining the returns on portfolios of mutual 
funds, he finds that the mean absolute pricing errors from the CAPM is 0.35 percent, while it 
is 0.31 percent for the Fama and French three-factor model and 0.14 percent for the four-
factor model. Carhart (1997, p. 62) concludes that the four-factor model “well describes the 
cross-sectional variation in average stock returns”.  
                                                 
1
 This anomaly is further discussed in section 2.3.3. 
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2.3 Oppositians to market efficiency- Market Anomalies 
In an efficient market it is not possible for investors to obtain above risk-adjusted market 
returns; new information is immediately reflected in a stock’s price. It is hence necessary to 
look further into how quickly new information actually is reflected in a stock’s price. Fama 
et al. (1969) examined the process by which stock prices adjust to new information. More 
specifically, they examined how the stock market is reacting to stock splits and found no 
particular market-imperfections. Since this, it has been tested through several empirical 
studies whether different stock markets are efficient or not. In this section I will list a few of 
the studies that have found anomalies pointing towards market inefficiency. 
2.3.1 The Earnings Announcement Drift 
According to Brealey and Myers (2003), investors often under-react to earnings 
announcements and only revise their opinions about the full significance of the earnings 
announcements when further information arrives.  
Ball and Brown (1968) examined the movements of U.S. stock prices around earnings 
announcement dates between 1946 and 1966, and were amongst the first to provide evidence 
indicating that there is a drift in stock returns after earnings announcements.  
Bernard and Thomas (1990) found that companies with earnings surprises in a current 
quarter tend to experience positive earnings surprises of the same sign over the subsequent 
three quarters. This, they claim, is evidence that stock prices fail to reflect the implications of 
current earnings for future earnings: “stock prices partially reflect a naive earnings 
expectation: that future earnings will be equal to earnings for the comparable quarter of the 
prior year” (p. 338). In other words, Bernard and Thomas (1990) documented a tendency for 
stocks to generate positive (negative) abnormal returns during the three quarters following a 
positive (negative) earnings announcement. The alternative explanations considered, namely 
problems with risk adjustment and the impact of transaction costs, are by Bernard and 
Thomas not seen as viable for explaining the found return-pattern.   
2.3.2 Standardised Unexpected Earnings (SUE) 
Standardised Unexpected Earnings (SUE) is the difference between actual and expected 
earnings per share divided by the standard deviation of expectations. Latané et al. (1974) 
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were amongst the first to claim that unexpected earnings forecasts, based on publicly 
available information, can be used to forecast stock prices and to obtain abnormal returns. In 
contrary, Reinganum’s study from 1981 indicates that abnormal returns can not be earned by 
using SUE. However, by using a larger sample and claiming to represent a more complete 
and detailed analysis than Reinganum et al. (1982) again found results opposing to those of 
Reinganum; namely that there is a SUE effect. A trading strategy taking long positions in 
stocks with unexpected positive quarterly earnings announcements, while taking short 
positions in stocks with unexpected negative quarterly earnings announcements, would 
hence generate abnormal returns. They also found that about one half of the excess returns 
from stocks occur over the 90 day period after the unexpected earnings are announced. 
According to Keon et al. (2002), the SUE effect was highly present in the American stock 
market during the 1980s and the early 1990s. Over the later years, diverse regulations 
resulting in more companies supplying the market with more accurate information than 
before has resulted in the market rarely over-estimate earnings any more, meaning that the 
negative surprise is less frequent today.  Keonet al. (2002) claims the SUE effect to be nearly 
eliminated today, but with the lately developments in the financial markets related to the 
American sub prime crisis there might be a chance for SUE to revive. 
2.3.3 The Momentum Effect 
The momentum effect was documented by Jegadeesh and Titman (1993). By examining 
portfolios of stocks they found that stocks that had performed well (poorly) in the past would 
continue to perform well (poorly) over the next 3-12 months. A trading strategy taking long 
position in past winners and short positions in past losers generated significant positive 
returns over 3-12 months holding periods. They also documented a similar pattern of returns 
around the earnings announcements; average returns around quarterly earnings 
announcement dates are significantly positive following a favourable earnings surprise in the 
previous quarter. 
Jegadeesh and Titman (2001) tested their trading-strategy again in 2001 on another dataset 
and came to the conclusion that the momentum effect was present there too. This is 
inconsistent with the weak form market efficiency theory.  
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2.3.4 Mean-Reversion 
The mean-reversion effect implies that stocks that have performed well (poorly) over a 
certain period will reverse and perform worse (better) over the next period. De Bondt and 
Thaler (1985) examined portfolios consisting of winner stocks over past three years and 
portfolios consisting of looser stocks over three past years. They found that portfolios 
consisting of three years loser stocks performed better over the following five years than 
portfolios consisting of three years winner stocks over the same period. According to De 
Bondt and Thaler (1985) the mean reversion effect is due to an overreaction in the market to 
available information; winner stocks are hence overpriced while loser stocks are under 
priced. This is inconsistent with weak-form market efficiency.  
2.3.5 Calendar Effects 
A large range of theories are suggesting that certain days, months or seasons of the year are 
subject to above average stock market price changes. 
The Weekend effect, also known as the Monday effect, suggests that stock prices tend to be 
un-normally high on Fridays while they tend to fall on Mondays. What is puzzling about this 
effect is that since Monday stock returns are based on three days, one would expect that the 
higher risk involved with the longer period would be compensated with higher returns 
compared to the return of other days. A logical explanation may have its roots in behavioural 
finance theory; investors are in general more positive on Fridays since the weekend is around 
the corner than on Mondays while they have a whole working week in front of them, making 
investors more likely to trade on Fridays. This effect was first documented by French in 
1980 and has since been further examined by several researchers. The large transaction costs 
related with trading on this information makes a Weekend effect trading strategy 
unprofitable in most cases. 
Several seasonal effects have been documented, and especially the January effect has 
received a lot of attention. Keim (1983) found evidence that average abnormal returns are 
higher in January than in other months of the year. During the first week, and especially 
during the first day, of trading in January this effect is visible. He also finds that the relation 
between size and abnormal returns is always negative, and that this relation is more 
pronounced in January than in any other month. A possible explanation for the January 
effect is that investors sell past losers in December in order to realise capital losses that can 
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offset eventual capital gains, creating an abnormal selling pressure in December, which is 
relived in January when investors re-buy these past losers, creating a January premium for 
past loser stocks. Closely related to the January effect is the December effect; through 
holding past winner stocks until January investors can postpone capital gain tax payments by 
a year. This would result in a small selling pressure on past winner stocks in December, 
which translates into rising prices of past winners in December; the December effect. Chen 
and Singal (2003) present evidence of the existence of tax-advantage-motivated behaviour 
causing the December and January effect. They also stress that the December effect is 
persistent due to limited knowledge amongst investors of its existence. In addition, the 
January effect they find is mainly for small-cap stocks, and it is persistent due to the 
difficulties exploiting profits, due to the large transaction costs involved with trading small-
cap stocks.  
Other examples of calendar effects are the Halloween effect suggesting that the stock market 
on average has stronger growth in the period from November to April resulting in a trading 
strategy “Sell in May and go away”, and the Holiday effect suggesting that stocks perform 
unusually well on days prior to public holidays. There are several other calendar effects 
which have been discovered and discussed amongst investors, some are documented and 
some are not. However, many calendar effects have disappeared or even reversed since they 
were discovered (behaviouralfinance.net, 2008). 
2.3.6 The Size Effect 
Banz (1981) examined the relationship between market value and return of stocks listed at 
the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE), and found that smaller firms in average had larger 
risk adjusted returns than larger firms. This is known as the size-effect; despite the higher 
(beta-) risk involved with investing in smaller firms versus larger firms, he found that the 
increased risk itself was not enough for explaining the differences in returns. Even though 
Banz concluded that it was difficult to say “whether the size per se is responsible for the 
effect or whether size is just a proxy for one or more true unknown factors correlated with 
size”, his study indicated that the CAPM is misspecified. 
2.3.7 The Value Effect 
The price-earnings (P/E) ratio is calculated as the market value of a company’s stocks 
compared to its earnings per share, and is used by analysts and investors in the belief that it 
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may be an indicator of a stock’s future performance. Basu (1977) examined the relationship 
between investment performance of NYSE-listed stocks and their P/E-ratios and found that 
low P/E portfolios earned higher risk-adjusted returns than high P/E portfolios. His results 
were inconsistent with the semi-strong form of the efficient market hypothesis as P/E ratio 
information proved to not be fully reflected in stock prices. However, Basu (1977) 
concluded that transaction and search costs, as well as tax effects, taken into account, 
eliminated the possibilities for investors to earn abnormal returns greater than zero by 
trading on the P/E-effect over the sample period. Basu (1977) confirmed the existence of the 
value-effect in his study from 1983, but concluded that the value-effect is not independent of 
firm size; he found the P/E-effect and the size-effect’s effect on expected returns to be more 
complicated than previously thought and stressed that both variables most likely were 
“proxies for more fundamental determinants of expected returns for common stocks”. 
Another value-effect is the Book-to-Market (B/M) ratio, a ratio comparing the accounting 
value of a firm to its market value. A firm with a B/M ratio greater than 1 is said to be 
undervalued in the market while a firm with a B/M ratio lower than 1 is said to be 
overvalued in the market. Stattman (1980) examined the B/M ratio and found that average 
returns on US stocks were positively related to their B/M-ratios. In their study from 1992, 
Fama and French confirmed that firms with high B/M ratios in average had higher returns 
than firms with low B/M ratios. Their results also showed that when adjusting beta, a firm’s 
systematic risk, for size and the B/M ratio, the beta can not fully explain average returns. 
Fama and French (1992) conclude that their results not necessarily indicate market 
imperfection, but that stock risks may be multidimensional. They suggest that one dimension 
of risk is proxied by size, while another dimension of risk is proxied by B/M. This was the 
start of the Fama-French three-factor model that is further explained in section 2.2.1. 
2.4 Are These Anomalies Real?  
The Efficient Market Hypothesis, which is explained in section 2.1., assumes zero 
transaction costs and zero information gathering costs. The already mentioned market 
efficiency paradox states that investors would not participate in the information gathering, 
unless they would at least earn their research costs back.  
In their article from 1993, Fama and French offers evidence that several of the patterns 
previously found in stock price data are explained with their three-factor model. Fama 
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(1998) examines the reliability of individual studies having found long-term return 
anomalies. His findings suggest that long-term market anomalies tend to disappear when the 
way they are measured changes. However, he cannot find explanations for Jegadeesh and 
Titman’s short term momentum-effect neither the post-earnings-announcement drift 
mentioned in section 2.3.1.  
Today, there are still opposing views regarding whether market anomalies do exist or not. 
However, it is a common perception that no markets are perfectly efficient. Market events 
such as the October 1987 stock market crash as well as the 1999-2000 technology, media 
and telecom bubble, provides evidence that stock prices can defer tremendously from their 
fundamental value (Ritter, 2003). 
Possible explanations for stock price anomalies are further discussed in section 3.3. Section 
2.5 focuses on behavioural finance theory, which is a field of finance that tries to explain 
stock market anomalies by psychology based theories. 
2.5 Behavioural Finance 
From micro economic theory it is known that prices are set on the basis of supply and 
demand. Likewise, in the stock market, stock prices at any time are set by matching the 
highest offered price (demand) with the lowest demanded price (supply).  In an efficient 
market with perfect investor rationality, these prices will reflect the true value, the 
fundamental value, of a stock. As described in section 2.4, there have been several studies 
that have documented long-term historical phenomenon in the stock market implicating that 
the efficient market hypothesis is not perfectly described by models based on rational 
investor behaviour. Behavioural finance is a field of finance that tries to explain these stock 
market anomalies by psychology based theories. Martin Sewell (2007) defines behavioural 
finance as “the study of the influence of psychology on the behaviour of financial 
practitioners and the subsequent effect in markets”(p. 1).   
2.5.1 From Expected Utility Theory to Prospect Theory 
The expected utility hypothesis assumes that the utilities of different outcomes are weighted 
by their probabilities. An individual’s expected utility is calculated by taking into account 
the individual’s utility in each possible outcome. In their book from 1944, “Theory of Games 
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and Economic Behaviour” Neumann and Morgenstern proved that any "normal" preference 
relation over a finite set of states can be written as an expected utility (Leonid Hurwicz, 
1945). Neumann and Morgenstern had by this defined rational economic behaviour of an 
individual when the rationality of the individual’s actions depends on the likely behaviour of 
other individuals. 
Until the 1970’s, the Neumann Morgenstein utility model was extensively applied as a 
descriptive model of economic behaviour and for studies of decision making under risk. In 
1979 the two psychologists Tversky and Kahneman represented an alternative model for 
choice under risk, the prospect theory. In their model, they showed that when individuals are 
faced with assigning probabilities to uncertain outcomes, they tend to use cognitive 
heuristics, “rules of thumb-reasoning”. They showed that individuals tend to overweight 
outcomes that are considered certain compared to outcomes that are just probable, a so-
called “certainty effect”. In other words, they showed that an individual’s utility of outcomes 
is not weighted only by the probability of the different outcomes. The certainty effect proved 
to lead to risk aversion in choices involving certain gains, and to risk seeking in choices 
involving certain losses. Tversky and Kahneman also found that choices represented in 
different forms tend to lead to inconsistent preferences, a so-called “isolation effect”. This 
tendency showed that individuals tend to discard components shared by all options of 
choices, or prospects, under consideration. Tversky and Kahneman therefore replaced some 
the terms in the expected utility model; Instead of probabilities of outcomes, their model 
contains decision weights and instead of the money-value of the outcome of the decision, 
they refer to value in terms of gains and losses relative to a certain reference point. For 
example, the difference in value between a gain of 100 and a gain of 200, is perceived to be 
greater than the difference between a gain of 1100 and 1200. Likewise, the difference of a 
loss of 100 and a loss of 200, is perceived to be greater than the difference of a loss of 1100 
and a loss of 1200. Thus, the value function is in general concave for gains, implying risk 
aversion, and convex for losses, implying risk seeking. Also, the value function tends to be 
steeper for losses than for gains, implying loss aversion. Regarding the decision weights, 
they were found to be lower than the corresponding probabilities, with exception of low-
probabilities outcomes that tended to be overweighed. Tversky and Kahneman had proved 
that decision-making under uncertainty could not be fully explained by the expected utility 
model due to its non-recognition of psychological principles involved in decision making. 
Tversky and Kahneman (1986) also suggest a “framing”-theory. They argue that when the 
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same problem is framed in different ways, an individual’s perception of the problem and its 
evaluation of probabilities and outcomes produce foreseeable shifts of preference. 
Cognitive psychology refers to the mental process of perception, and is a field of psychology 
that has been widely used for analysing investors’ behaviour in the stock market after the 
publications of Kahneman and Tversky’s first articles. In 1984, Robert Shiller proposed in a 
model of stock prices that recognises the influence of psychological principles. By studying 
the history of the U.S. stock market in the post-war period, he finds results indicating that 
social movements and fashion are likely to have major effects on the aggregate demand for 
stocks, and hence result in excessive stock market volatility. In other words, his results are 
indicating that the opinions of individual investors may reflect the opinion of a larger group, 
resulting in stock price movements that have little rational explanation. 
As mentioned in section 2.3.4,  De Bondt and Thaler (1985) propose evidence that investors 
tend to systematically overreact to unexpected and dramatic news events, resulting in weak-
form inefficiencies in the stock market. This is the article that is seen as forming the start of 
what is today known as behavioural finance.  
In his book “Market Volatility” from 1991, Shiller examines different stock market data and 
finds evidence of price volatility that is too large relative to economic fundamentals 
(Sandmann, 1992). The unexplained stock price volatility that could indicate stock market 
inefficiency, he claims, may in reality be due to an incomplete description of the market by 
the efficient market theory. Further, he investigates investor behaviour during the 1987 stock 
market crash. Through questionnaires answered by market participants during the market 
crash period, he finds results indicating that investors were trading on the basis of price 
changes, not on the basis of news and information about fundamentals (Russel, Philip and 
Torbey, Violet, 2008). He therefore concludes that social psychology is an important factor 
for understanding price changes in the stock markets. 
Several cognitive biases, errors in investors’ information processing have been documented. 
In the following section the most important ones will be presented. 
2.5.2 Mental Accounting 
Based on the value function of Tversky and Kahneman’s prospect theory, Thaler (1985) 
developed a new model of consumer behaviour called “mental accounting”. He stresses that 
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individuals tend to separate their assets into different asset groups, especially current assets 
tend to be separated from future assets. Further, he claims that individuals tend to allocate 
different levels of utility to each asset group, affecting their consumption decisions and their 
attitude towards risk. Thus, instead of rationally viewing each dollar in their “capital-basket” 
as equal, individuals may split their dollars into portions that they have different risk-
attitudes towards. Mental accounting may therefore help explain why many investors divide 
their capital into “risk capital” and “low-risk capital”. While rational behaviour would be to 
treat the whole “capital-basket” as unity, they have different risk attitudes to mentally 
portioned parts of their capital. 
2.5.3 Informational Cascades and Herd Behaviour 
In 1992, Abhijit Banerjee published the paper “A Simple Model of Herd Behaviour”. By 
analysing a sequential decision model, he finds that rather than using their own information, 
individuals rely on decisions made by previous decision makers, causing herd behaviour. 
Each individual finds it rational to rely on the previous decision-makers decision, rather than 
using their own information, because previous decision makers may have had some 
information being important for them too. On an individual basis, most individuals would 
not necessarily make the same decision. Banerjee showed that herd behaviour may cause a 
social disequilibrium. An example of herd-behaviour was exhibited in the end of the 1990’s 
through the dotcom bubble, when large amounts of money were invested in internet-related 
companies without properly established financial business models. The attention this kind of 
companies got through the media and in the markets is likely to having provoked investor 
herd behaviour.  
Bikhchandani et al. (1998) stress that the informational cascades theory, or, herd behaviour, 
may help explain market events such as stock market crashes. The logic behind this is as 
follows: An informational cascade arises when individuals instead of analysing available 
options, rely on the decision action of others. Relying on the decision action of others may 
seem rational for an individual due to the time and money that would be spent if he was to 
analyse the available options on an individual basis. Bikhchandani et al. stresses that the 
higher the investigation cost is for an individual, the less incentives he will have to collect 
information himself, making him likely to rely “more” on the previous decision maker. The 
higher the investigation costs and the “more” wrong the previous decision maker was, the 
noisier the next decision maker’s decision is likely to be etc. Bikhchandani et al. also 
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underlines the importance of “fashion leaders”. People tend to imitate the actions of others 
who seem to be better informed. Profiled investors’ decisions may therefore lead to 
information cascades.  
2.5.4 Representativeness 
Kahneman and Tversky (1973) observed that intuitive predictions follow a representative 
heuristic. The representativeness heuristic refers to people’s tendency to evaluate the 
probability of an event with reference to how closely it resembles a “comparable” event, 
assuming that the probabilities are similar. According to Kahneman and Tversky, this 
heuristic may cause that people think they see patterns in random sequences. People 
predicting by representativeness do often not take into account that a small sample of a 
population is not as representative as a large sample. As an example, the high stock returns 
in the U.S and Western Europe between 1982-2000 have caused many people to assume that 
such high returns are normal (Ritter, 2003). According to Bodie et al. (2005), the 
representativeness heuristic may cause anomalies such as overreactions as well as 
corrections. Bodie et al. (2005) mention a study by Chopra et al. (1992) that provide 
evidence that prior winner stocks are subject to reversals the days around quarterly earnings 
announcements. This may be interpreted as a correction to too extreme initial investor-
beliefs.  
2.5.5 The Conservatism Principle 
Another cognitive bias that has been discovered by psychologists is the conservatism 
principle; people are slow to change their opinions and tend to anchor on the way things 
“always” have been. In 1997, Sudipta Basu finds evidence for the conservatism principle in 
financial statements. Basu (p.33) characterise conservatism in accounting as “the more 
timely recognition in earnings of bad news regarding future cash flows than good news”. 
Using firms’ stock returns to measure news, he finds earnings to be more sensitive to 
negative unexpected returns than positive unexpected returns. Thus, he finds that earnings 
reflect bad news more quickly than they reflect good news.  He also argues that positive 
earnings changes tend to persist whereas negative earnings changes tend to reverse. As a 
concluding remark, he stresses that conservatism has increased over time, something he links 
to auditors’ increased legal liability exposure over the same time period. According to Bodie 
et al. (2005), investors being too slow in responding to recent information may lead to under-
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reactions to events in the stock market; stock prices will reflect new information only 
gradually, which may again lead to momentum in stock market returns.  
The conservatism bias and the representativeness bias are contradicting in the sense that the 
conservatism bias may lead to under-reactions while the latter may lead to over-reactions 
and corrections. However, Ritter (2003, p. 5) argues that if the pattern is long enough people 
“will adjust to it and possibly overreact, underweighting the long-term average”. According 
to Bodie et al. (2005), combining these two biases patterns of short-to-middle-term 
momentum followed by long-term reversals can be obtained. 
2.5.6 The Disposition Effect 
In their article from 1985, Shefrin and Statman predicted a “disposition effect”. The 
disposition effect relates to that people dislike realising losses much more than they enjoy 
making gains. On the basis of this, Shefrin and Statman (1985) predicted a tendency for 
investors being more willing to realising gains, and reluctant to realising losses. Terrance 
Odean (1999) provides evidence for the disposition effect; he finds a tendency for investors 
to sell stocks whose price is increasing while keeping stocks whose price has fallen relative 
to their purchase value. According to Odean (1999), this tendency leads to profitable stocks 
being disposed of too soon and losing stocks being held for too long. Thus, investors tend to 
be more influenced by the past movements of stock prices than their likely future 
movements. 
2.5.7 Overconfidence 
Overconfidence is a cognitive bias that consists of that people tends to overestimate their 
abilities and the precision of their forecasts (Bodie et al. 2005). Oskamp (1965) found 
evidence of overconfidence in people’s behaviour by conducting an experiment on judges.  
His findings showed that the judges’ confidence shown in answering a question increased 
steadily with the number of new information that was given. However, the accuracy of their 
conclusions did not increase significantly with increasing information. He therefore 
concluded that increased feelings of confidence are not necessarily related to increased 
predictive accuracy.   
Daniel et al. (1998) proposed a theory of securities market over- and under-reactions based 
on investor overconfidence and biased self-attribution. They define an overconfident 
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investor as “one who overestimates the precision of his private information signal, but not of 
information signals publicly received by all” (p.1841). Daniel et al. argue that an 
overconfident investor will underestimate his forecast errors. Biased self-attribution is 
referred to as when “individuals too strongly attribute events that confirm the validity of 
their actions to high ability and events that disconfirm the action to external noise and 
sabotage” (p. 1842).  Based on this, Daniel et al. develop a theory that implies that investors 
overreact to private information signals while they underreact to public information signals. 
They also show that momentum returns may be results of continuing overreactions in the 
stock market, and that these are followed by long-run corrections; short-term momentum 
returns may therefore be consistent with long-term reversals. 
Odean (1998) provides another example of overconfidence in the financial markets. He finds 
that overconfident investors are expected to trade more than rational investors. Further, he 
finds that an overconfident investor’s increased trading activity lowers his expected utility. 
He claims that a markets consisting of many overconfident traders tend to underreact to the 
information of rational traders. Also, he argues, markets tend to overreact to “salient, but less 
relevant, information” while underreacting to “abstract, statistical, and highly relevant 
information” (p.1916). According to Barber and Odean (2001), psychology literature reveals 
that men are more overconfident than women in male-dominated areas such as finance. By 
testing this hypothesis through analysing the trading activities of people with discount 
brokerage accounts, they document that men trade more actively than women. In accordance 
with the findings of Odean (1998), the more frequent trading-activity amongst men results in 
male investors having a poorer predicted investment performance, compared to female 
investors. 
2.5.8 Forecasting errors 
This cognitive bias refers to that people, when making forecasts, tend to give recent 
experience compared to prior beliefs too much attention (Bodie et al. 2005). This may cause 
forecasts that are too extreme. By examining security analysts’ earnings forecasts, De Bondt 
and Thaler (1990) found that their earnings expectations were too extreme and too positive 
to be considered rational, causing patterns of overreactions in the stock market. They claim 
that excessive optimism (pessimism) may be related to high (low) market-to-book value ratio 
firms and high (low) growth rate of earnings over the last years firms. However, they found 
that neither of these variables could explain the variation in the forecast errors to a large 
 36 
extent. Given that their paper investigates the behaviour of security analysts which are seen 
as “one possible source of rationality in financial markets” (p.56), De Bondt and Thaler 
(1990) conclude that a “generalized overreaction can pervade even the most professional of 
predictions” (p. 57). 
2.5.9 Limits to Arbitrage 
According to Bodie et al. (2005), profiting from “behavioural mispricings” in the stock 
market is difficult in practise. They list three factors that are limiting rational investors to 
profit from the mistakes of “behavioural investors”, namely fundamental risk, 
implementation costs and model risk. 
As an example of fundamental risk, Bodie et al. (2005) point out buying an underpriced 
stock. The risk related to this is that the market underpricing may get worse. If the investor 
exploiting an arbitrage opportunity has a short investment horizon, there is hence a chance 
that the market value of the stock not yet has converged into its fundamental value when he 
wishes to sell it. Thus, buying an underpriced stock is not a risk-free profit opportunity. 
According to Bodie et al. (2005), fundamental risk related to exploiting obvious arbitrage 
opportunities may therefore limit “both the activity and the effectiveness” of potential 
“arbitrage traders”. 
When it comes to implementation cost related to exploit profit opportunities, it is according 
to Bodie et al. (2005) related to transaction costs, short selling constraints and management 
fees. As an example, they mention costs related to short selling. An indirect cost related to 
that is that an investor borrowing a stock to short sell it may have to return the borrowed 
stock on short notice, making the short sale horizon uncertain. 
Model risk is related to the risk of finding arbitrage opportunities due to poor valuation 
models. An investor using an unreliable valuation model may find, according to his model, 
under- or overpriced stocks in the market, while they in reality are correctly priced. Risk 
related to trading on model-found arbitrage opportunities may therefore, according to Bodie 
et al., limit apparent arbitrage opportunities trading activity. 
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2.5.10 Criticism Towards Behavioural Finance Theory and its 
Future 
In the Efficient Market Hypothesis it is assumed that investors behave rationally and that 
they percept the same information in the same way. However, it has come true in this section 
that individuals have limited capabilities of processing information and that investors do not 
always behave rationally. Behavioural finance theory may help explain what is not captured 
by models based on perfect investor rationality. David Hirshleifer claimed in 2001 that 
psychology-based asset-pricing theory, although in an early stage, had promise of capturing 
the reality. Today, the main criticism towards behavioural finance is that many of the 
theories do not give advice on how to exploit investor irrationality caused market anomalies 
(Bodie et al., 2005). According to Ritter (2003), many of the behavioural finance theories are 
accused for only providing possible explanations of market phenomenon ex post. Thus, 
many of the theories are not seen as useful for making ex ante predictions of how investor 
irrationality may affect stock market prices. Finally, Bodie et al. (2005) points out that 
behavioural finance is still in an early stage, and that it “is probably still too early to pass 
judgement on the behavioural approach, specifically, which behaviour models will “stick” 
and become part of the standard toolkit of financial analysts” (p. 401). 
2.5.11 So Are Stock Returns Predictable? 
According to Cochrane (1999), the predominant view amongst financial economists was 
until the mid 1980’s that returns are unpredictable. The view was that stock returns are close 
to unpredictable and that they follow a random walk. Also, it was believed that apparent 
predictability was a “statistical artifact” caused by too short sample periods or too specific 
samples. According to Cochrane, short horizon stock returns, such as daily, weekly and 
monthly, are still seen as nearly unpredictable by financial economists. However, Cochrane 
argues, a large amount of stock return variation over business cycle horizons, and longer 
horizons, appears to be predictable by variables such as the dividend/price ratio.  Further he 
suggests that strategies “such as value and growth, market-timing possibilities generated by 
return predictability, dynamic bond and foreign strategies, and even a bit of momentum” (p. 
56) may provide investors with substantial premiums for “holding dimensions of risk 
unrelated to market movement . However, he stresses that “the exact size of the premiums 
and the economic nature of the underlying risks is still a bit open to question” (p. 56). 
 38 
Stamland (2007) claims that the view of Cochrane (1999) is consistent with the current view 
of many financial economists. 
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3. Literature Review and Relevant Facts 
Section 3 presents and reviews literature that is relevant for understanding the earnings 
announcement premium documented by Lamont and Frazzini (2007). Further, this section 
builds a basis for analysing whether or not there is an earnings announcement premium at 
the Oslo Stock Exchange. The main focus of section 3. is naturally given to the paper of 
Lamont and Frazzini from 2007, “The Earnings Announcement Premium and Trading 
Volume”. Moreover, this section presents relevant information about the Oslo Stock 
Exchange as well as studies of stock prices at the Oslo Stock Exchange. This is relevant for 
the discussion in Section 6. Finally, possible explanations for stock price anomalies are 
presented and discussed. 
3.1 The Earnings Announcement Premium and Trading 
Volume 
3.1.1 The Earnings Announcement Premium 
As already mentioned in section 2.3.1, Ball and Brown (1968) were amongst the first to 
provide evidence that there is a drift in stock returns after earnings announcements. 
Beaver (1968) examined whether investors do react to earnings announcements and how, 
and observed both a price and a volume reaction. His results indicated an “above normal 
price activity when earnings reports are released” (p. 82). Also, he observed above normal 
trading activity for about two weeks after an earnings announcement, hence a substantial 
increase in volume. Beaver concluded that the above normal trading activity in the two 
weeks following an earnings announcement was consistent with investors evaluating the 
content of the released reports. 
Chari et al. (1998) documented a seasonal pattern in stock returns around quarterly earnings 
announcement dates. They find that small companies in average have large positive 
abnormal returns around quarterly earnings announcement dates. Also, they find that the 
variability of returns increases around quarterly earnings announcements for smaller 
companies. However, Chari et al. (1998) find that large firms do not seem to generate 
abnormal returns around quarterly earnings announcements. In addition, they claim that the 
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increase in the variability of returns around quarterly earnings announcements is much 
smaller for larger companies that for smaller companies. 
Ball and Kothari (1991) documented generally positive abnormal risk adjusted returns 
around earnings announcement dates that were decreasing in firm size. They suggest that an 
explanation for the abnormal returns may be that they are a compensation for “disclosure 
risk”. In other words, a compensation for the risk of holding a stock in a period when 
information that is relevant to the stock’s value is expected to be released.  
Cohen et al. (2007) re-examined the earnings announcement premium that was documented 
by Ball and Kothari (1991). Cohen et al. (2007) stress that the “disclosure environment” has 
become richer after the time period studied by Ball and Kothari (1991). Thus, the motivation 
behind the re-examination was that the richer disclosure environment should according to 
Cohen et al. cause a decreased earnings announcement premium. On the other hand, they 
underline that there has been an increased earnings announcement period variance after the 
period studied by Ball and Kothari (1991); which in that case, they claim, should have 
increased the earnings announcement premium. While Ball and Kothari (1991) used actual 
announcement dates in order to measure the earnings announcement premium, Cohen et al. 
(2007) use predicted earnings announcement dates. The predicted earnings announcement 
dates are estimated by using “the median announcement date for each firm quarter as the 
proxy for the expected announcement date” (p. 157). In addition, expected earnings 
announcement dates are collected from the “Earnings Calendar” published in the Wall Street 
Journal. Based on their predicted earnings announcements method, Cohen et al. (2007) 
documents a statistically significant earnings announcement premium beyond the period 
studied by Ball and Kothari (1991). However, they find that the “magnitude” of the earnings 
announcement premium is smaller than the premium documented in the period studied by 
Ball and Kothari (1991). Cohen et al.’s evidence is hence consistent with the claim that the 
earnings announcement premium has decreased with the increased disclosure activity of 
companies over the later years. They also claim that arbitrage has not completely eliminated 
the earnings announcement premium over the studied period. Especially, they claim, stocks 
with “greater limits to arbitrage” tend to have a higher earnings announcement premium, 
indicating that the premium is likely to continue existing. 
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3.1.2 The Volume Hypothesis 
According to the volume-hypothesis, stocks with the largest predicted volume increases in 
earnings announcement months tend to have a higher subsequent premium. 
Odean (1999) documented that the overall trading volume in the U.S. stock market is 
excessive amongst investors with brokerage accounts. By trading excessively is meant that 
the investors reduce their average returns through trading additionally. He offers a possible 
explanation for the excess trading, namely investor overconfidence. Odean(1999) suggests 
that attention awoken by news-sources such as the financial media, the disposition effect and 
investors’ unwillingness to sell short may explain the return patterns before and after 
purchases and sales are made by overconfident investors. 
Lee and Swaminathan (2000) provided evidence that past trading volume provides an 
important link between momentum and value strategies. They find that trading volume is 
unlikely to be an approximation for a stock’s liquidity. Contrarily, their results provide 
evidence that “the information content of trading volume is related to market misperceptions 
of firms’ future earnings prospects” (p. 2065). This is backed up by their findings that low 
volume stocks tend to be under-valued in the market, while high volume stocks tend to be 
overvalued by the market. Further, Lee and Swaminathan (2000) provide evidence that past 
trading volume may help predict the timing of the long-term momentum effect reversal. In 
other words, they find that past trading volume may help predict “the magnitude and 
persistence of future price momentum” (p. 2065). The ability of past trading volume to 
predict future returns is inconsistent weak form market efficiency. However, Lee and 
Swaminathan (2000) conclude that:  
“The market is better characterised as being in a constant state of convergence toward 
intrinsic value. Viewed in this light, intermediate-horizon “underraction” and long-horizon 
“overreaction” are simply two elements of the same continuous process by which prices 
impound new information” (p. 2066). 
Barber and Odean (2008) claim that when an individual has many different alternatives, 
“options that attract attention are more likely to be considered, hence more likely to be 
chosen” (p. 1). This, they argue, is especially true for investors; when buying a stock, there 
are “thousands of common stocks from which to choose” (p. 1). Contrarily, when selling a 
stock, investors mainly consider stocks they already know. This is particularly expressed for 
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individual investors, who, according to Barber and Odean (2008), rarely sell short, and thus 
mostly sell stocks they already own. Due to the fact that humans can process only a certain 
amount of information, humans have “bounded rationality” (p. 1). Barber and Odean (2008) 
test the hypothesis that that attention is a key factor determining which stocks individual 
investors buy, not the stocks individual investors sell. Also, they test the hypothesis that 
individual investor buying behaviour is more heavily influenced by attention that the buying 
behaviour of sophisticated investors. Predicting that individual investors’ buying activity 
will increase on high attention days, they examine a stock’s abnormal daily trading volume, 
the stock’s return on the previous day as well as whether or not the company were in the 
news the day the abnormal trading volume is observed. Barber and Odean (2008) find that 
individual investor buying behaviour clearly is driven by attention. Also, they find that 
attention-driven individual investor buying is similar for large capitalisation stocks and small 
stocks. However, they conclude that the documented “attention-driven buying patterns…do 
not generate superior returns” (p. 25). 
3.1.3 The Earnings Announcement Premium and Trading Volume 
Lamont and Frazzini (2007) examined U.S. stock returns in the period between 1972 and 
2004. They examined the monthly returns of the value weighted portfolio of companies 
expected to announce as well as the monthly returns for companies not expected to 
announce. In other words, they test if companies expected to announce tend to have higher 
returns than companies not expected to announce in a given calendar month. Based on 
predicted earnings announcement dates, they test a trading strategy consisting of holding a 
zero-cost portfolio of expected announcers while selling short a portfolio of expected non-
announcers. Lamont and Frazzini (2007) document that this trading strategy earns excess 
returns of between 7 and 18 percent per year. The documented excess returns, they claim, 
can not be explained by the factors included in the Carhart (1997) four-factor model. The 
earnings announcement premium they document is large and statistically significant. They 
also find that the trading strategy gives higher Sharpe-ratios than “other popular anomalies”, 
such as the one-year momentum strategy documented by Jegadeesh and Titman (1993). In 
other words, their trading-strategy generates higher risk-adjusted returns over the sample 
period than for example the momentum-strategy.  
In addition, Lamont and Frazzini (2007) find that the earnings announcement premium is 
strong in large capitalisation stocks. This is contradicting the findings of Chari et al. (1988) 
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and Ball and Kothari (1991), who documented a larger earnings announcement premium for 
smaller companies2. According to Lamont and Frazzini (2007), this is surprising due to the 
fact that there is higher transaction costs involved with trading smaller companies’ stocks. 
The earnings announcement premium should therefore be higher for smaller companies in 
order to cover these transaction costs. Also, they stress, there is in general less information 
available in the markets about smaller companies. Consequently, one would think that 
earnings announcements should generate larger volatility for smaller companies than for 
larger companies. 
Besides, Lamont and Frazzini (2007) document that stocks with high past earnings 
announcement premiums tend to have a high subsequent earnings announcement premiums. 
They also claim that the stock-specific seasonal effect documented by Heston and Sadka 
(2005) is not driving their results. 
The Volume Hypothesis 
Moreover, Lamont and Frazzini (2007) tests whether the predictable increase in stock prices 
around earnings announcements is driven by the predictable rise in volume around earnings 
announcements. Their results are indicating that the earnings announcement premium is 
“strongly related to the concentration of past trading activity around earnings 
announcement dates” (p. 1). They find that stocks with predictably high announcement 
volume have an earnings announcement premium of 1.5 percent per month. Contrastingly, 
stocks without predictably high announcement volume have, they claim, “a small earnings 
announcement premium that is insignificantly different from zero” (p. 21). Consequently, 
they construct a long/short portfolio that generates a yearly earnings announcement premium 
of 18 percent. 
Possible Explanations for the Earnings Announcement Premium 
Further, Lamont and Frazzini (2007) test whether or not the earnings announcement 
premium is a compensation for idiosyncratic risk related to the long/short trading strategy. 
They find that idiosyncratic risk is substantially higher in announcement months. Also, they 
document that compared to stocks with low volume concentration, stocks with high volume 
                                                 
2
 However, it should be emphasised that both Chari et al. (1998) and Ball and Kothari (1991) used actual earnings 
announcement dates, not predicted, and daily returns, not monthly. 
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concentration have higher idiosyncratic volatility increases in announcement months. This 
proves that “higher premium stocks have higher earnings-related idiosyncratic risk” (p. 21).  
However, they claim that not all of the return earned by high volume stocks can be explained 
by excess idiosyncratic risk. As an example, they show that stocks with high volume earn 
average excess returns of 1.9 percent in expected announcement months, and 0.4 percent in 
other months. For comparison, volatility is 14.5 percent on expected announcement months 
and 12.6 percent in other months. Lamont and Frazzini (2007) therefore propose that a 
possible explanation for earnings announcement period returns is that they “reflect 
fundamental/permanent innovations in prices” (p. 22) while they suggest that non-
announcement period returns “reflect sentiment/noise/temporary innovation in prices” (p. 
22). Further, they compare their findings to the framework of Campbell and Shiller (1988) 
and Campbell and Vuolteenaho (2004), and suggest that earnings announcement returns may 
“reflect cash flow news” (p. 22) while non-announcement returns may “reflect future return 
news” (p.22). On the other hand, Lamont and Frazzini (2007) stress, if fundamental 
idiosyncratic risk earns a higher premium, while non-fundamental idiosyncratic risk does 
not, this would be an explanation for high average returns around earnings announcement 
dates. Lamont and Frazzini (2007) underlines that while the latter explanation may contain 
some truth, it “fails to generate predictions about volume” (p. 22) which they have shown is 
a “key element of the story”  (p. 22). Moreover, idiosyncratic risk can be seen as a limit to 
arbitrage in the way that it prevents rational arbitragers from eliminating the earnings 
announcement premium. A high idiosyncratic risk around earnings announcements would 
“deter attempts to eliminate the anomaly” (p. 22) for investors that “for some reason are 
unable to sufficiently diversify” (p. 22). However, Lamont and Frazzini (2007) argue that 
limits to arbitrage do not provide an explanation for the sign of the earnings announcement 
premium.  
Besides the volume hypothesis, Lamont and Frazzini (2007) consider other explanations for 
the earnings announcement premium: 
One possible explanation, they argue, is that the earnings announcement premium is a 
liquidity risk premium: If there are high levels of asymmetric information or low liquidity 
around earnings announcement dates, investors will require a reward, the earnings 
announcement premium, for holding stocks during these periods. However, Lamont and 
Frazzini (2007) stress, this could only be a possible explanation for the few days before an 
earnings announcement, not for a the premium generated by in average buying stocks two 
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weeks before its expected announcement and selling it two weeks after. They refer to Lee, 
Mucklow and Ready (1993) who show that bid/ask spreads are “widening in the hours 
surrounding the announcement but quickly reverting to normal within a day or two” (p. 24). 
One explanation, Lamont and Frazzini (2007) claim, may be downward analyst forecast 
biases that “naive” investors fail to realise. Naive investors will consequently be 
systematically positively surprised by actual earnings announcements. If these naive 
investors affect market prices they will hence consistently push up stock prices on their 
earnings announcements. 
Another similar explanation, they argue, is related to the conservatism principle explained in 
section 2.5.5. If investors use historical earnings as their benchmark, they will in average end 
up being consistently surprised due to growing nominal profits caused by either inflation or 
real growth. 
However, Lamont and Frazzini (2007) state that these two closely related latter explanations 
“fail to predict the cross-sectional relation between volume and the premium” (p. 23). 
Further, these explanations are contradicted by “two other pieces of evidence” (p. 23). 
Firstly, they argue, Barber and Odean (2004) and Hirshleifer et al. (2004) showed that 
“individual investors are net buyers in response to either positive surprises (such as 
extremely high earnings growth) or negative surprises (such as extremely low earnings 
growth)” (p. 23). Individual investor buying in response to negative surprises is inconsistent 
with the conservatism principle. Secondly, Lamont and Frazzini (2007) find that the earnings 
announcement premium appears in different sub-periods. The premium appears in periods 
before analyst forecasts were common (prior to the 1970’s), in periods with low inflation 
(1927-1949) and in periods with high inflation (1973-1983). Thus, Lamont and Frazzini 
(2007) argue that the earnings announcement premium is stable enough over the sub-periods 
to suggest a “more general explanation” (p. 24). 
Further, Lamont and Frazzini (2007) test whether individual investor buying is triggered by 
earnings announcements by calculating imputed order flow from small and large investors. 
They find that large investors tend to buy stocks in the days and the weeks before earnings 
announcements. Further, they find that small investor buying tend to soar on announcement 
days, while large investor buying tend to drop on announcement dates and on the two days 
subsequent to the earnings announcement. Also they find that large imputed buy orders to 
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peak the day before small imputed buy orders. Thus, like the “fashion leaders” described in 
section 2.5.3, large investors seem to be “front-running” small investors by ”initiating 
purchases of announcement stocks in the weeks prior to an earnings announcement” (p. 26-
27). An explanation for this may be that large informed investors expect small investor 
buying, and hence are “arbitraging away” the earnings announcement anomaly. This is 
consistent with efficient market theory: Sophisticated investors are trading to eliminate 
predictable returns, and hence smoothing stock prices, that are driven by the predictable 
demand-shock caused by small investors around earnings announcement dates. However, 
Lamont and Frazzini (2007) claim, since small, uninformed investors are still affecting 
prices with their increased buying around announcement dates, large informed investors are 
not “arbitraging enough”. A possible explanation for this is according to Lamont and 
Frazzini (2007) idiosyncratic risk or holding costs: “If sophisticated traders are unable to 
fully diversify or face a high daily cost of holding shares, then they will not trade off price 
appreciation against length of holding period” (p. 27).  
Finally, they show that companies with high past trading volume around earnings 
announcements have high small investor buying around earnings announcements, while 
firms with low past announcement volume have “no discernable announcement effect” (p. 
27). According to Lamont and Frazzini (2007), individual investors are more likely to buy 
stocks that grab their attention via earnings announcement than large, sophisticated 
investors. In addition, they claim that individual investors rarely sell short. Lamont and 
Frazzini (2007) therefore suggest that for “some stocks”, buying pressure from individuals is 
causing the price increase around earnings announcements. By “some stocks”, they refer to 
stocks that get more media coverage related to their earnings, companies that have more 
variable earnings or companies that appeal differently to “inattentive” investors.  Lamont 
and Frazzini (2007) hence conclude that companies that are getting more attention in general 
earn higher predictable returns around earnings announcements due to small investor buying. 
Yet, they emphasise that their found relation between buying pressure from individuals and 
price increases around earnings announcements is “primarily suggestive since it relies on a 
number of assumptions” (p. 24).  
Conclusively, Lamont and Frazzini (2007) documented that predictable increases in volume 
lead to predictable increases in stock prices around quarterly earnings announcement dates 
and that “concepts such as liquidity, information flow, heterogeneous beliefs, and short sale 
constraints are potentially important in understanding this connection” (p. 29). Uninformed 
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investor trading activity combined with imperfect arbitrage trading by informed 
sophisticated investors is suggested as the main explanation for the earnings announcement 
premium. However, Lamont and Frazzini (2007) call for further future theories connecting 
volume and stock prices. 
3.2 Relevant Information and Studies of Stock Prices at 
the Oslo Stock Exchange 
3.2.1 About Oslo Stock Exchange 
The Oslo Stock Exchange was opened for stock trading in 1981. In December 2000, the Oslo 
Stock Exchange signed a co-operation agreement together with the Stockholm Stock 
Exchange, the Copenhagen Stock Exchange and the Iceland Stock Exchange, creating 
NOREX, a “joint Nordic marketplace for trading in securities” (Oslo Børs, 2008). The four 
stock exchanges are using the same surveillance system, the same regulatory framework and 
the same trading system. The intentions behind this were to make Nordic securities more 
accessible to international markets, make the marketplace more cost-effective through 
economies of scale and serving the needs for simplicity and quality to its investors, issuers 
and members. Oslo Børs claims that the surveillance system used by NOREX  is “one of the 
most effective surveillance systems in the world”. NOREX’ goal for the future is “to be one 
of the world’s most efficient securities markets”. The companies listed on the Oslo Stock 
Exchange were required to report their earnings quarterly from 2000 (Dyvik, 2008).  
The strongest sectors at the Oslo Stock Exchange are related to Norway’s natural resources 
are energy, shipping and fishery. As a result, many international oil- and shipping-industry 
related companies are listed on the Oslo Stock Exchange. The daily turnover at the Oslo 
Stock Exchange has quadrupled over the later years, as an example, the daily turnover went 
from around 1.3 billion NOK in 1998 to around 14 billion NOK in 2007 (Oslo Stock 
Exchange, 2008). International investors’ ownership at the Oslo Stock Exchange is 
increasing and currently around one third (Sønnervig, 2007). The Norwegian government’s 
ownership is also around a third, but its ownership is decreasing (Sønnervig, 2007). 
Sønnervik (2007) points out that the Norwegian government is a typical buy-and-hold 
investor and that it is international investors that stand for around two thirds of the trading 
activity at the Oslo Stock Exchange. 
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The volatility of Norwegian stock prices is seen as relatively high compared to other markets 
(Eilifsen et al., 1999). Eilifsen et al. (1999) claim that the standard deviation on annual stock 
returns of 24 percent in Norway in the period between 1983 to1994. As a comparison, the 
standard deviation of annual stock returns for the same period was 12 percent in the US and 
13 percent in the UK. They claim that the volatile stock prices in Norway may have 
economic and market-structure related explanations. One of those reasons is related to the 
Norwegian economy which is characterized as small and open. The market prices of 
Norway’s natural resources, such as oil and gas, are hence sensitive to world market prices. 
They also claim that the commodity price risk sensitivity is increased by the Norwegian 
industry structure, “characterized by processing intermediate products rather than final 
goods” (p.4).  However, they claim that the commodity price risk sensitivity is what makes 
Norwegian securities attractive investments for international investors. Another point worth 
mentioning is that the Norwegian stock market is a small one compared to many other stock 
markets in the world, such as the US and the UK. Also, it is a less mature one seen with the 
eyes of the world. This, according to Eilifsen et al. results in “both market structure-related 
noise and information-related noise, as well as lagged price adjustment to value changes” 
(p.4). 
OSEAX Performance March 2001- December 2007 (Yahoo Finance, 2008)
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Figure 1: OSEAX Index Performance March 2001 - December 2007 
Figure 1 shows the price development of the Oslo Stock Exchange All Share Index 
(OSEAX) from March 2001 to December 2007. The OSEAX consists of all stocks listed at 
the Oslo Stock Exchange. The index is adjusted for dividends, corporate actions and the 
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current outstanding numbers of shares on a daily basis. The OSEAX index was introduced 
on 2nd of February 2001 and Yahoo Finance has data available starting from 7th of February 
2001. Figure 1 shows that there has been considerable upwards trend starting from March 
2003. 
3.2.2 The Value Relevance of Financial Reporting on the Oslo 
Stock Exchange Over the Period 1964-2003 
Gjerde et al. (2005) examined the value relevance, or usefulness, of financial reporting for 
investors trading on the Oslo Stock Exchange in the period between 1964 and 2003. Their 
findings indicate that the value relevance has increased significantly over the sample period. 
This is according to Gjerde et al. (2005) consistent with the general view that “Norwegian 
accounting regulators and standard setters have been successful in achieving more relevant 
financial statements over time”. Over the examined period, Norway has according to Gjerde 
et al. (2005) moved from a “tax-based creditor-oriented accounting legislation” to a 
“market-based investor-oriented accounting legislation”. Gjerde et al. (2005) points out that 
Norwegian accounting rules have been based on an earnings-oriented conceptual 
framework, meaning that the rules have been on revenues and expenses. For comparison, 
International Accounting Standards Board (IASB) and the Financial Accounting Standards 
Board (FASB) have based their accounting principles on a balance-oriented conceptual 
framework, meaning that the rules have been on assets and liabilities.  
It is important to emphasise that Norwegian companies listed at the Oslo Stock Exchange 
have since 2006/2007 been required to report their earnings under the International Financial 
Reporting Standards (IFRS) adopted by the IASB. Non-Norwegian companies listed at the 
Oslo Stock Exchange, but also listed at other stock exchanges with other financial reporting 
standards have been given the option to report according to their “home”-standards under the 
convergence period to IFRS. To my knowledge, no literature has empirically studied the 
usefulness of accounting information on investors trading at the Oslo Stock Exchange after 
the introduction of the IFRS. It is therefore important to point out that even though IFRS is 
not based on an earnings-oriented conceptual framework, it is likely that investors’ 
usefulness of financial reporting at the Oslo Stock Exchange have continued increasing with 
the introduction of the IFRS in 2006/2007. The IASB’s intention is to adopt standards that 
make sure financial reporting meets the informational needs of all stakeholders in a 
company. Investors being the group of stakeholders with the greatest informational needs, 
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the requirements of financial reporting are often fit to meet their needs. Also, the IFRS, and 
modified forms of the IFRS, are used as financial reporting standards by stock exchanges 
located over the whole world, such as in the European Union and European Economic Area 
membership-countries, Hong Kong, Singapore and India. International investors can in 
general therefore more easily compare and understand the financial statements of companies 
listed on stock exchanges with IFRS requirements. Given the previously mentioned 
increasing ownership of international investors at the Oslo Stock Exchange, the introduction 
of the IFRS requirements at the Oslo Stock Exchange is unlikely to have decreased 
investors’ usefulness of financial reporting. 
3.2.3 Stock Price Volatility at the Oslo Stock Exchange 
According to Eilifsen et al. (1999), there is an increased flow of information in the 
Norwegian stock market before earnings announcement dates. As a consequence, investors 
are revising their earnings expectations consequently when an earnings announcement date 
is approaching. Eilifsen et al. (1999) examined stock returns of companies listed at the Oslo 
Stock Exchange in the period 1990-1995 and found “a significant reduction in stock price 
volatility in the post-announcement period relative to the pre-announcement period” (p.1). 
By decomposing the found return volatility into three components, namely “the volatility of 
the underlying business”, “the volatility caused by the speed at which information is 
incorporated into stock prices” and thirdly, “the volatility caused by noise in the price 
process”, they find a significant decline in the latter component after earnings 
announcements for the largest companies in their sample. Consequently, they claim to have 
found support for the hypothesis stating that an earnings announcement reduces 
informational asymmetry amongst investors, which again reduces noise. Further, they find 
that earnings announcements per se don’t have any effect on the first volatility-component. 
Regarding the second volatility component, they find coefficients “generally higher than 
unity”, suggesting that there is a general overreaction to new information in the Norwegian 
stock market. Eilifsen et al. (1999) suggest that this may provide an explanation for the 
higher observed stock return volatility at the Oslo Stock Exchange, compared with other 
markets such as the UK or the US. Nonetheless, they find that earnings announcements per 
se do not affect the speed of which prices are adjusting to newly released information. 
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3.2.4 Calendar Effects at the Oslo Stock Exchange 
According to Holm (2007), Ingrid Johansen found in her siviløkonomutredning from 1995 
significant positive returns on Fridays and significant negative returns on Mondays, 
providing evidence for a week-end effect at the Oslo Stock Exchange in the period from 
1984 to 1995, (Holm, 2007). 
In his master-thesis from 2007, Holm examined the OSEBX (Oslo Stock Exchange 
Benchmark Index), the OSEAX (Oslo Stock Exchange All Share Index) and the OSESX 
(Oslo Stock Exchange Small Cap Index) at Oslo Stock Exchange, between 1996 and 2005, 
and claims to have found significant positive returns on Fridays and before Holidays. 
However, when testing for the existence of week-day effects on individual stocks, Holm 
(2007) finds that the Friday-effect is non-existent for most of the stocks. Further, Holm 
(2007) finds that the Friday-effect has diminished at the OSEBX and enlarged at the OSESX 
over the last half of the examined period compared to the first half of the examined period. 
His results are indicating that the Friday-effect is stronger for small capitalisation companies. 
Although he doesn’t find significantly positive returns at the OSEBX on Fridays between 
2000 and 2005, he finds that there are in average higher returns on Fridays compared to 
average treading day returns over this period. Holm (2007) concludes that since the 
diminished Friday-effect at the OSEBX over the last half of his sample period it may 
indicate that the Oslo Stock Exchange has become more efficient over the sample period. 
Åsland (2006) examined in his siviløkonomutredning a sample of 50 stocks in the period 
between 1999 and 2004. He did not find evidence of the existence of a December effect in 
the Norwegian stock market. 
3.2.5 Momentum at the Oslo Stock Exchange 
Kloster-Jensen (2006) analysed a dataset consisting of 73 stocks listed on the Oslo Stock 
Exchange between 1996 and 2005 in his master thesis. He finds that a momentum strategy 
combining long positions in winner portfolios with short positions in loser portfolios 
generates excess returns. However, he finds that these excess returns are mainly 
compensation for systematic risk related to trading on a momentum strategy, rather than a 
momentum premium. Kloster-Jensen (2006) also underlines that transaction costs related to 
implementing the momentum strategy would eliminate any eventual excess returns. 
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Also Myklebust (2007) tested whether the momentum effect exists in the Norwegian stock 
market or not in his master thesis. Analysing a dataset consisting of stock listed at the Oslo 
Stock Exchange between 1984 and 2006, he finds significant positive returns for the 
momentum-strategies he is testing, but not for all sub-periods. He claims that the obtained 
positive returns are not explained by beta, but underlines that other variables explaining risk 
have not been considered. However, like Kloster-Jensen (2006), Myklebust (2007) has not 
taken into account transaction costs related to trading on the momentum strategies. In 
addition, he underlines that it may be difficult to trade on the momentum-strategy in reality. 
As an example, it may be difficult in reality to take short positions in small and relatively 
illiquid stocks at the Oslo Stock Exchange. 
3.2.6 Overreaction at the Oslo Stock Exchange 
In his siviløkonomutredning from 2006, Mamelund tests the Oslo Stock Exchange for weak-
form market efficiency in the period between 1989 and 2005. Mamelund (2006) claims to 
find a tendency for past winner-stocks consisting of that prices in average continue to 
increase the following day after a price increase greater than 5 percent, indicating that the 
market is reacting slowly to new information having caused the original greater than 5 
percent decrease. For past loser stocks, he claims to find that days with price decreases 
greater than 5 percent in average tend to be followed with a price-increase the following day. 
His results indicate that there is an overreaction for past loser stocks at the Oslo Stock 
Exchange. Mamelunds findings are hence inconsistent with weak-form market efficiency. 
3.2.7 The Speed of which Information is Incorporated in Stock 
Prices after the Release of Yearly Earnings Announcements 
In their Siviløkonomutredning from 2000, Åkre and Røsdal tested how quickly and 
efficiently new information was incorporated in stock prices at the Oslo Stock Exchange 
after companies had released their yearly results in the time period between 1993 and 1997. 
They find a tendency for the market to overreact on surprisingly good earnings results. The 
overreaction, they claim, is being followed by a correction. However, Åkre and Røsdal 
(2000) concludes that the Oslo Stock Exchange can not be regarded as inefficient. 
 53 
3.3 Possible Explanations for Stock Price Anomalies 
According to Stamland (2007), patterns that at first gaze look like market anomalies may 
have other explanations. Firstly, the “abnormal” returns may in reality be compensation for 
increased risk related to trading on the above mentioned effects. An example of this is the 
so-called peso-effect: If the market expects an event that may happen and which may affect 
the firm, and hence its stock price, in the future with a very small probability, “abnormal” 
returns may in reality therefore be compensation related to the risk for holding the stock. 
Also, several empirical models are assuming constant parameters, and does hence not allow 
for time-varying systematic risk. This may also be an explanation for “abnormal” returns that 
in reality are compensation for higher risk than the model-measured risk 
Secondly, it is important to remember the limits to arbitrage mentioned in section 2.5.9, such 
as large transaction costs involved with the trading strategies utilised for taking advantage of 
these effects. Further, investors may have tax incentives behind their trading decisions; 
something that should be taken into consideration in the various models utilised for testing 
for market anomalies.  
Data-mining and data-snooping may also cause patterns that are not real to appear in a 
dataset. Often, researchers independently test various trading strategies in the same dataset, 
causing data-mining problems: When several tests are made in one dataset, it is quite likely 
that some of these tests will give significant results. Most often, only the studies giving 
significant results are published. The statistical power of a result, its p-value, tells us how 
likely it is that we’re wrongly rejecting the zero-hypothesis being tested. However, it is 
important to take into consideration the p-values of other tests run in the same dataset. With 
N tests run in one dataset, the true p-value of the test is equal to 1- (1-p)^N. When N grows 
big enough, the p-value of the test goes towards 1, or in other words, the more tests that are 
run in one dataset, the more likely it becomes that significant results are noise. While 
published studies often only take into consideration their own p-value, not the p-values of 
unpublished studies of strategies tested in the same datasets without significant results, it is a 
large possibility that the published results are found due to randomness; noise. Data-
snooping on the other hand, is when a zero-hypothesis is formed knowing the dataset. If a 
researcher has looked at the dataset aimed for testing before forming his zero-hypothesis, it 
is likely that his data-knowledge will affect him when forming the zero-hypothesis, which 
again makes it more likely for him to get significant results.  
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Like explained in section 2.5, behavioural finance theory may help predict irrational investor 
behaviour creating arbitrage opportunities. In that sense, and as shown by Lamont and 
Frazzini (2007) behavioural finance theory may also provide explanations for market 
anomalies. 
 55 
4. Presentation of Sources of Data and 
Methodology 
This section presents the data utilised as input in the empirical analysis as well as the utilised 
methodology for testing the zero hypothesis. Due to differences in Norwegian stock market 
data compared to U.S. stock market data, this thesis test additional L/S portfolio trading 
strategies to those tested by Lamont and Frazzini (2007). This is mostly related to the fact 
that the large majority of the companies listed on the Oslo Stock Exchange have their fiscal 
year end in December. The chosen methodology is, except from some additional tests which 
are properly described further down in this section, otherwise similar to the methodology 
applied by Lamont and Frazzini (2007). 
4.1 Sources of Data 
Government bonds issued by stable governments are normally seen as a good approximation 
for the risk free rate. According to Harris (2007), the three month US Treasury Bill is 
commonly used by portfolio managers as an approximation for the risk-free rate. Having a 
sample including only Norwegian stocks, I have therefore chosen to use the three months 
Norwegian Treasury Bill as an approximation for the risk free rate. The three months 
Norwegian Treasury Bill for the period between 01.01.1999 to 31.12.2007 is provided from 
Reuters.  
The monthly and daily stock prices, trading volume, shares issued, book-values and fiscal 
year for the period from 01.01.1999 to 31.12.2007 are provided from Børsprosjektet at NHH. 
The stock prices are generic and adjusted for dividends and splits. Børsprosjektet claims to 
have adjusted the stock prices according to formulas presented in an article3 written by the 
NHH professor Thore Johnsen in 1983. Splits and dividends do not change the real value for 
an investor. Thus, the adjustment for splits and dividends is done in order to express current 
and past returns are on a comparable basis. 
                                                 
3
 The original title of the article is ”Aksjekurser og regnskapsdata ved kapitalutvidelser”. 
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Quarterly earnings announcement dates between 1998 and 2007 have partly been collected 
from the Daily Bulletin, called NewsWeb, of the Oslo Stock Exchange and partly provided 
from Bloomberg.  
All the data sources I have downloaded data from contain full historical records. A stock is 
only eliminated from my sample the year it gets de-listed from the Oslo Stock Exchange. 
Survivorship bias will therefore not affect the sample selection.  
4.2 Methodology 
Børsprosjektet at NHH is in position a dataset containing all announcements made at the 
Oslo Stock Exchange from 1981. However, sorting earnings announcement dates out from 
all announcements ever made at the Oslo Stock Exchange for the whole period would be 
time-consuming. In addition, companies listed at the Oslo Stock Exchange were not required 
to report their earnings quarterly until in 2000 (Dyvik, 2008). Whether a company 
announced its earnings on a quarterly basis or not before 2000 was hence a decision to make 
for the company itself. The coverage of companies announcing their earnings quarterly is 
therefore likely to be relatively poor before 2000. Also, companies choosing to announce 
their earnings quarterly before they were legally required to may have other company-
characteristics than companies that didn’t. Testing for an earnings announcement premium 
on companies choosing to announce quarterly before they were required to could therefore 
lead to results being relevant only for those companies, not a general result of if there is an 
earnings announcement premium at the Oslo Stock Exchange. I have chosen to focus on the 
period between 01.01.1998 and 31.12.2007. This period includes eight years of which there 
were quarterly earnings announcement requirements and two years without. That will help 
determine whether or not the coverage of earnings announcements mentioned below changes 
after the quarterly reporting requirement or not.  
Bloomberg provides quarterly earnings announcement dates from July 1999 until 2008. 
However, their coverage proved to be somewhat inconsistent, especially for year 2000 and 
2001. I have therefore checked the Oslo Stock Exchange NewsWeb for companies where 
Bloomberg reports three earnings announcements in a year, in order to verify whether there 
was a fourth earnings announcement that year for each of those companies. For companies 
with large market capitalisation where Bloomberg does not report full earnings 
announcement coverage for a given year I have performed the same procedure. Earnings 
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announcements between 01.01.1998 and July 1999 is sorted manually from the Oslo Stock 
Exchange NewsWeb as well as from the dataset containing all announcements ever made at 
the Oslo Stock Exchange provided from Børsprosjektet. 
A stock is included in the selection if it has 12 months of previous return-history. I will from 
now on refer to this as the stock universe for my sample-period. It was considered to exclude 
illiquid stocks from the sample due to the positive autocorrelation low trading volume stocks 
may cause in a portfolio. However, Lamont and Frazzini (2007) claims trading-volume 
provides part of the explanation for the earnings announcement premium, thus all stocks 
with 12 previous months of return-history is included in the stock universe no matter their 
trading volume. I will come back to this a potential source of error when discussing the 
results in section 6. The coverage of the companies in the sample with four earnings 
announcements in a year is then calculated. 
In order to test if there is a predictable earnings announcement premium on the Oslo Stock 
Exchange, I use predictions of expected earnings announcement dates rather than actual 
announcement dates. The reason for this is mainly that the trading strategy would be 
impossible to implement in reality if actual announcement dates were used, since these are 
not publicly known in advance by all market participants. Also, if the actual scheduled 
announcement dates were publicly known in advance, they could be delayed, cancelled or 
even released too early. According to Lamont and Frazzini (2007), a discrepancy between 
the scheduled and the actual announcement could contain information itself. For example, a 
delayed earnings announcement may indicate unfavourable news. In order to predict 
earnings announcement dates I will use the same two algorithms as the ones used by Lamont 
and Frazzini (2007). 
4.2.1 Algorithm 1: Previous Year’s Announcement Month 
The first algorithm used for predicting earnings announcement dates is based on the previous 
year’s announcement month. If a company had an announcement in January 1998, it is 
expected to have an announcement in January 1999. In order to predict earnings 
announcements for a year I will hence require the company to have had four earnings 
announcements the previous year. 
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4.2.2 Algorithm 2: Fiscal Year End 
The second algorithm used for predicting earnings announcement dates is based on the 
companies’ fiscal year ends. A company’s fiscal year ending is collected the first time the 
company appears in the universe, which is the first year after it has had 12 months of 
previous return history at the Oslo Stock Exchange. The advantage of this method is that it 
doesn’t require a company to have had four announcements the previous year in order to 
predict this year’s announcement dates. However, a substantial source of error here is that 
companies may change their fiscal years during the sample period. Børsprosjektet at NHH 
has fiscal year end information available for the companies listed at the Oslo Stock 
Exchange as far back as 1980. I have nevertheless chosen to focus on the period between 
1998 and 2007 also here for three reasons: Firstly, this method for predicting earnings 
announcement date proved to be less accurate than the method based on previous year’s 
announcement months in Lamont and Frazzini’s study (2007). Secondly, and as already 
mentioned, quarterly earnings announcements were not required by law at the Oslo Stock 
Exchange before 2000. Thirdly, using both methods for predicting is mostly done for 
comparison reasons. Using a longer sample period for one of the forecasting methods would 
therefore be somewhat irrelevant. 
The distribution of earnings announcement dates is found by matching actual 
announcements with fiscal year end month. Like this, it is possible to determine which 
months companies with a fiscal year ending I month X tend to announce in. For companies 
with fiscal year ending in month X, they are predicted to announce their earnings in the 
months with the most frequent announcement-activity in the table.  
Further, the predicted announcement dates are compared with the actual announcement dates 
for both algorithms. For example, if one of the algorithms has predicted a company’s 
earnings announcement in June 1999, but there is no earnings announcement in June 1999, 
this counts as an error. 
According to Lamont and Frazzini (2007), news sources are more likely to report earnings 
announcements for large stocks. It is therefore interesting to investigate whether the 
accuracy of predicted announcement months increases with company size. Lamont and 
Frazzini (2007) assign companies to 10 different size deciles by using New York Stock 
Exchange breakpoints. A general rule of thumb is that a portfolio is well-diversified if it 
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contains 30 or more stocks (Womack and Zhang, 2003). Given that my sample size is 
varying from 115 to 188 stocks I have chosen to assign companies into five different size 
groups. According to communications with Randi Hovde (2008) at the Oslo Stock 
Exchange, the Oslo Stock Exchange does not operate with breakpoints for sorting companies 
into size-groups like the New York Stock Exchange. The Oslo Stock Exchange classifies 
companies after their degree of liquidity. In order to assign companies into five different size 
group at the beginning of each month I simply sort the fifth of the companies with lowest 
market capitalisation at the beginning of the month into one size group etc.  
There are several reasons for using monthly data and not daily: 
1) The focus is on expected announcement returns. In order to increase the chance that a 
stock is bought before the earnings announcement and sold after the earnings 
announcement, it is convenient to have a longer period around the specific day 
(Lamont and Frazzini, 2007). 
2) Different news sources may report earnings announcements on different days. In 
addition, earnings can be announced before, during and after the relevant stock 
exchange’s trading hours. In practise, it may therefore be difficult to determine the 
exact date of the earnings announcement (Lamont and Frazzini 2007). 
3) Monthly returns will not reflect “short-term asymmetric information and changes in 
liquidity” around earnings announcement dates. In average, the utilised strategy will 
make sure that stocks are bought two weeks before the expected announcement date 
and sold two weeks after (Lamont and Frazzini 2007, p. 9). 
4) Monthly returns are often used by other financial economists and will hence allow 
for comparisons with existing stock price patterns (Lamont and Frazzini, 2007). 
5) According to Lamont and Frazzini (2007), a three day window around the earnings 
announcement date misses much of the earnings announcement premium. A longer 
window is therefore more informative. 
6) It is very likely that some of the stocks on the Oslo Stock Exchange are not being 
exchanged during one day. By using monthly data instead of daily data it is possible 
to avoid problems related to non-synchronous trading (Harris, 2007). 
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4.2.3 Excess returns of the L/S Portfolio Based on Predicted 
Announcement by the Previous Year Method 
Based on the monthly announcement dates predicted by the first forecasting algorithms, I 
form value weighted portfolios based on whether or not a company is expecting to have an 
announcement this month. The sample is restricted to companies that have exactly four 
earnings announcements in the previous 12 calendar months. Firstly, a value weighted 
portfolio of all stocks in the sample is formed, and its monthly average return in excess of 
the risk free rate is calculated. This portfolio’s return may be regarded as the market’s return. 
Secondly, the monthly average excess return of a value-weighted portfolio of excepted non-
announcers and the monthly average excess return of a value-weighted portfolio of expected 
announcers is calculated. At the beginning of each calendar month each stock is assigned to 
one of the two portfolios, based on whether the stock is predicted to have an announcement 
or not. That means that each stock jumps into the long portfolio four months per year and 
into the short portfolio eight months of the year. All stocks are value-weighted within their 
respective portfolios and the portfolios are rebalanced each month in order to maintain the 
value-weights. 
And finally, the monthly average excess return of an L/S portfolio is calculated. The L/S 
portfolio is a value-weighted zero-cost portfolio that each month takes long positions in 
stocks that are expected to have an announcement that month and sells short the month’s 
expected non-announcers, in other words, a combination of the two latter portfolios. 
In the main part of the empirical analysis, arithmetic averages of simple returns is used. 
Simple returns for each stock in the portfolio are calculated as follows:  
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Arithmetic averages of the portfolios monthly returns are calculated as follows:  
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However, continuously compounded returns, or logarithmic returns, are more likely to have 
statistically desirable properties, such as normality, than simple returns. Also, bad returns 
will have a greater impact on the geometric average than the arithmetic average. With return 
data that is relatively volatile, a geometric average will therefore be “more pessimistic” than 
a arithmetic average. Continuously geometric averages on compounded returns as a basis for 
computing average returns may thus provide different results than arithmetic averages of 
simple returns. Therefore, when robustness-checking my results, I have chosen to compare 
the arithmetic averages of simple returns with geometric averages of continuously 
compounded returns. 
Continuously compounded returns for each stock are calculated as follows:  
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The portfolios’s monthly value-weighted return is calculated as follows: 
 
 
Geometric averages of the monthly continuously compounded portfolio returns are 
calculated as follows:   
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The geometric average of continuously compounded returns are normalised the following 
way: 
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Whether the L/S portfolio strategy is profitable or not is tested by the following zero-
hypothesis: 
A) H0: Average monthly excess returns L/S portfolio = 0 
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H1: Average monthly excess returns L/S portfolio > 0 
 
The zero-hypothesis are tested by conducting a t-test, with n-1 degrees of freedom, of the 
average excess return with an unknown population variance: 
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Where N is the number of observations, which in this case will be number of monthly 
average excess returns included in the sample the t-statistics is calculated for. If criticaltt > , 
the zero-hypothesis is rejected. At a 5 percent significance level, the zero-hypothesis is 
rejected if the absolute t-value is over 1.96. With a 5 percent significance level, there is a 5 
percent chance for a type I error, namely that a correct zero-hypothesis is wrongly rejected. 
A type II error consists of not rejecting a false zero-hypothesis, and is equal to 1 minus the 
chosen significance level. In this case, with a 5 percent significance level, there would 
therefore be a 95 percent chance of wrongly not rejecting the zero-hypothesis. There is hence 
a trade-off between when choosing the significance level of a test. In general, a executing a 
type I error is seen as worse than executing a type II error. Therefore significance levels of 5 
or 1 percent are most often used in practise (Brooks, 2002). 
σp is the standard deviation of each portfolio as is calculated the following way: 
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For all the portfolios, skewness and kurtosis are calculated. Skewness measures the risk that 
normal distribution (zero skew) is assumed while the data in reality is skewed to the right 
(positive skew) or to the left (negative skew) of the mean. Kurtosis describes the distribution 
of the data around the mean. A high kurtosis means that the data has fat tails and a low, even 
distribution. A low kurtosis means that the data has skinny tails and a distribution that is 
concentrated towards the mean. A normal distribution is not skewed and has a coefficient of 
kurtosis of 3. In other words, skewness and kurtosis are additional measures of the 
portfolio’s riskiness. 
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The Sharpe-ratio is calculated for each of the value-weighted portfolios in order to compare 
their risk-adjusted performance: 
p
fp
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=  
Where: 
pR = Average portfolio return 
fr = Risk free rate 
pσ = Portfolio standard deviation 
The greater the portfolio’s Sharpe ratio, the better its risk-adjusted performance has been 
over the sample period. According to the CAPM, the market portfolio will by definition 
always have the highest possible Sharpe-ratio. 
4.2.4 Excess returns of the L/S Portfolio Based on Predicted 
Announcement by the Fiscal Year Method:  
Lamont and Frazzini (2007) also form a L/S portfolio based on announcements forecasted by 
the previous year method. However, the large majority of companies listed at the Oslo Stock 
Exchange are having their fiscal year end in December. This information was not known 
before looking at the dataset. As explained in section 3.3., is equal to data-snooping. 
Forming a trading-strategy after having looked at the dataset will obviously affect the way 
the trading-strategy is formed. When testing the trading strategy in the same dataset, it is 
hence likely that one will find the results one wishes to find. Thus, if the tested zero-
hypothesis are rejected when testing this trading-strategy is tested, this has to be taken into 
account. 
The four calendar months with the highest fraction of quarterly earnings announcements for 
companies with their fiscal year ending in December is found, and used as expected 
announcement moths for the companies with their fiscal year ending in December. 
Excluding the companies not having their fiscal year end in December, I test a trading 
strategy consisting of a value-weighted L/S portfolio that takes a long position in all stocks 
in the four predicted announcement months, and a short position in all stocks in the resting 
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months is formed. The excess returns of this portfolio are tested the similar way as for the 
L/S portfolio based on the previous year method. 
4.2.5 Excess Returns of the L/S Portfolio Based on Actual 
Announcement Dates 
Lamont and Frazzini (2007) formed an L/S portfolio on the basis of actual announcement 
dates is also formed. This is not an implementable strategy in practise. However, it’s useful 
for determining whether or not it is theoretically possible to earn average excess returns 
larger than zero with the tested trading strategy. If any of these L/S portfolios based on 
actual announcement dates are generating average excess returns that are statistically 
significantly larger than zero, and the L/S portfolios based on predicted announcement dates 
are not, this indicates that one with a more accurate announcement date forecasting method 
can earn average excess returns larger than zero. 
With actual announcement dates, I form the same portfolios as formed with the previous 
year method. The excess returns of the L/S portfolios based on actual announcement dates 
are tested the similar way as the portfolios based on forecasted dates by the previous year 
method.  
4.2.6 Regression Analysis to Determine the Source of the Excess 
Returns 
If any of the tested L/S portfolios are generating average monthly excess returns that are 
statistically significantly larger than zero, the following methodology is further applied: 
In order to test whether or not the monthly returns generated by the rolling L/S strategy are 
abnormal or not, I run a regression based on the Carhart (1997) four-factor model explained 
in section 2.2.2: 
tptptptptpptftp eYRPRpHMLhSMBsMKTrR ,,, 1 +++++=− βα  
Where Rp,t is the portfolio’s return, rf,t is the riskfree rate, while ep,t is the error-term Alpha is 
the excess returns generated by the rolling L/S strategy that cannot be explained by the L/S 
portfolio’s sensitiveness to the market return (MKT), the Fama and French size factor 
(SMB), the Fama and French value factor (HML) or the Jeegadesh and Titman one-year 
momentum factor (PR1YR). The MKT, SMB, HML or PR1YR are time series calculated on 
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the basis of monthly returns, and are all described more in detail in section 2.2.1. and 2.2.2.  
The coeffisients in front of each factor describes the portfolio’s exposure towards these 
factors. If the L/S portfolio strategy is generating abnormal returns, the alpha will be 
statistically significantly larger than zero. It should however be mentioned that due to the 
way the L/S portfolio is created, it is not very probable that the factors in the Carhart four-
factor model can explain eventual abnormal returns generated by the portfolio.  
In other words, the following zero hypothesis is tested in the case of a L/S portfolio strategy 
generating statistically significant positive average excess monthly returns: 
B)  H0: Average monthly abnormal returns L/S portfolio = 0 
H1: Average monthly abnormal returns L/S portfolio > 0 
If the zero hypothesis is rejected, and the alternative hypothesis is accepted, this indicates 
that there is an earnings announcement premium at the Oslo Stock Exchange. This means 
that a monthly trading strategy buying stocks expected to announce their earnings and selling 
short stocks not expected to announce their earnings in the following month, generates 
excess returns over the Norwegian Government three month Treasury bill that can not be 
fully explained by the Carhart (1997) four-factor model. The abnormal return generated from 
this trading-strategy is statistically significant, which in that case is inconsistent with weak 
form efficiency at the Oslo Stock Exchange. 
The zero-hypothesis is rejected if criticaltt > , which is 1.96 on a 5 percent significance level. 
This may help to identify whether companies of specific company characteristics, such as 
small capitalisation companies or value companies, are announcing their earnings. This is 
especially important for the period before year 2000 when companies listed at the Oslo Stock 
Exchange were not legally required to announce their earnings on a quarterly basis.  
4.2.7 Robustness Checks of the Results 
In order to check the robustness of the results, I have chosen to report results for the whole 
period from 1999-2007, as well as for the two sub-periods 1999-2000 and 2001-2007. The 
period before and after 2000 is the period before and after quarterly earnings announcements 
were required for companies listed at the Oslo Stock Exchange. Since 1999 dates are used to 
predict 2000 dates, I have chosen to include 2000 in the first sub-period. 
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For the L/S portfolio based on previous year predicted announcement dates, and for the L/S 
portfolio based on actual announcement dates, I do the following robustness-checks: 
1) If some of the months have zero expected announcers, I test how excluding these 
months affects the result. 
2) It is likely that some of the months have several more expected announcers than 
others. In order to give these months “more importance” when the average excess 
returns are calculated, I make a managed L/S portfolio. That means that each month, 
the size of the value-weighted L/S portfolio is determined by the amount of expected 
announcers that month. For example, for year t, X announcements are expected to be 
made for the whole year, while Y announcements are expected to be made this 
current month. The size of the L/S portfolio depends on the number of expected 
announcers and is equalised to Y/X this current month.  
In addition to looking at monthly average excess returns of the tested L/S portfolios for the 
whole  sample period, the two sub-periods 1999-2000 and 2001-2007 are examined. 
Moreover, geometric averages are taken of logarithmic returns, in order to verify whether or 
not the method used for calculating the returns are affecting the results. 
If any of the L/S portfolios are generating average excess returns that are statistically 
significantly larger than zero, the source of the excess returns will be tested with a regression 
with the four factors from Carhart (1997) as explanatory variables. Regressions will then be 
run for the sub-periods 1999-2000 and 2001-2007 as well as for the whole sample period. 
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5. Results and Analysis 
This section presents the results and the analysis of the conducted empirical research. Firstly, 
the coverage and the distribution of the earnings announcement dates is presented and 
analysed. Further, the main results of the tested L/S portfolio trading strategies are presented 
and analysed. The complete overview of the results of the tested trading strategies may be 
found in the appendix. In contrary to the results of Lamont and Frazzini (2007), none of the 
L/S portfolio trading strategies that are tested in this thesis generates average monthly excess 
returns over the Norwegian Government three month Treasury bill that are statistically 
significantly larger than zero. Moreover, the results are robustness checked. None of the 
found results are rejecting zero-hypothesis A. The regression analysis is consequently not 
conducted. 
5.1 Coverage and Distribution of Earnings Announcement 
Dates 
    Exactly 4 Announcements 
Year   
All 
Comp 
Smaller 
Comp 
Larger 
Comp 
Market 
Value 
            
1998   0,71 0,70 0,71 0,90 
2007   0,87 0,87 0,86 0,92 
1998-1999   0,66 0,65 0,66 0,83 
2000-2007   0,78 0,78 0,78 0,86 
1998-2007   0,75 0,75 0,75 0,86 
Table 1: Coverage of Earnings Announcement Dates 1998-2007 
Table 1 shows the fraction of companies in the universe with exactly four announcements 
that calendar year. For each year, the median of the market value of all stocks with 12 
previous months of returns history is computed. Companies with market capitalisation above 
the median are assigned into “Larger Comp”, while companies with market capitalisation 
below the median are assigned into “Smaller Comp” each year. The “Market Value” is the 
total market capitalisation of companies with exactly four announcements in that calendar 
year divided by the total market value of the stocks with 12 previous months of return 
history. 
The table shows that the coverage, or the number of companies in the universe announcing 
their quarterly results each year, has increased over the sample period. More particularly, the 
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coverage for all companies is rising from 71 percent in 1998 to 87 percent in 2007, while the 
coverage for the full sample is 75 percent. The coverage for both smaller and larger 
companies has increased over the sample period. For comparison, Lamont and Frazzini 
(2007) found that the coverage of earnings announcements increased from 50 percent in 
1974 to 95 percent in 2004. 
When comparing the two sub-periods, 1998-1999 and 2000-2007, we can also see a 
substantial coverage increase. This is most likely related to the fact that companies at the 
Oslo Stock Exchange were not required by law to announce their earnings on a quarterly 
basis before year 2000. 
Lamont and Frazzini (2007) find a substantial difference in the coverage for smaller versus 
larger firms. Especially in the earlier years of their sample, they find that the coverage for 
smaller stocks often is incomplete, which they claim is closely correlated with the fact that 
“news sources are more likely to report earnings announcements for big stocks” (p. 5). 
However, table 1 indicates that there is no substantial difference in the coverage of earnings 
announcements for smaller stock versus larger stocks at the Oslo Stock Exchange. In 
contrary, the coverage for smaller versus larger companies seems to be quite similar over the 
whole sample period.  
Over the total sample, 86 percent of the companies measured in market value had exactly 
four announcements. The coverage of companies announcing their quarterly earnings 
calculated in market value has also increased over the sample period, from 90 percent in 
1998 to 92 percent in 2007. For comparison, Lamont and Frazzini (2007) found that the 
coverage measured in market capitalisation increases from 84 percent in 1974 to 96 percent 
in 2004. 
What might seem strange is that the coverage for all companies has increased from 71 
percent in 1998 to 87 percent in 2007, while the coverage measured in market value has 
increased only from 90 percent in 1998 to 92 percent in 2007. This may indicate that the 
companies assigned to the “Large Comp” in 2007, and not having exactly four 
announcements in 2007, are larger measured in market capitalisation than the companies 
assigned to “Large Comp” in 1998 that did not have exactly four announcements.   
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      all firms 
  
Fiscal yr 
end Ann Q4 Q1-Q3 
Jan 0,00 3,73 11,14 0,03 
Feb 0,00 26,02 77,96 0,10 
Mar 0,23 3,24 9,60 0,07 
Apr 0,23 9,80 0,86 14,37 
May 0,00 11,72 0,14 17,60 
Jun 0,90 0,35 0,07 0,50 
Jul 0,00 4,53 0,00 6,72 
Aug 0,23 17,46 0,07 25,72 
Sep 0,00 0,38 0,00 0,57 
Oct 0,00 12,46 0,07 18,79 
Nov 0,68 10,12 0,03 15,27 
Dec 97,74 0,19 0,07 0,26 
Table 2: Distribution of Earnings Announcement Dates 1998-2007 
 
Table 2 shows the distribution of earnings announcement dates. Column one reports the 
fraction of companies with fiscal year ending in each calendar month. 97.74 percent of the 
companies listed at the Oslo Stock Exchange have their fiscal year end in December.  
Column two reports the fraction of earnings announcements occurring in each calendar 
month. Column three reports the fraction of fourth fiscal quarter earnings announcements 
occurring in each calendar month. Column four reports the fraction first, second or third 
fiscal quarter earnings announcements occurring in each calendar month. 
For comparison, Lamont and Frazzini (2007) also reports that most of the announcing 
activity is taking place in December. However, their sample contains companies with fiscal 
year endings also in other months of the calendar year. 62 percent of the announcing activity 
in their sample takes place in December compared to 97.74 percent in this sample. Lamont 
and Frazzini claim that each month in their sample “has a sufficiently large number of 
earnings announcements” (p. 6) so that the portfolios they form based on scheduled 
announcements will be “sufficiently diversified each month” (p. 6). This is clearly not the 
case for the sample utilised in this thesis. Yet, I have decided to form a version of the L/S 
portfolio based on announcement dates predicted by the fiscal year end method for 
comparison reasons. 
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  Fiscal Year End Month 
% of ann Mar Apr Jun Nov Dec 
Jan 0,00 0,00 0,00 2,33 3,77 
Feb 25,00 33,33 29,41 25,58 26,17 
Mar 11,11 0,00 0,00 11,63 3,19 
Apr 0,00 0,00 29,41 6,98 9,86 
May 25,00 0,00 5,88 4,65 11,76 
Jun 0,00 0,00 0,00 4,65 0,34 
Jul 0,00 0,00 17,65 9,30 4,44 
Aug 16,67 33,33 0,00 6,98 17,22 
Sep 2,78 0,00 0,00 9,30 0,32 
Oct 0,00 0,00 17,65 11,63 12,56 
Nov 16,67 33,33 0,00 4,65 10,19 
Dec 2,78 0,00 0,00 2,33 0,17 
Table 3: Distribution of Earnings Announcement Dates by fiscal Year 1998-
2007 
Table 3 shows the distribution of earnings announcement dates by fiscal year end month. 
The earnings announcement represents the date in which quarterly earnings were first 
reported. For every company with a fiscal year ending in calendar month t, the fraction of 
actual announcements occurring in every calendar month in the period 1998-2007 is 
reported. For fiscal year end month, the four calendar months with the highest fraction of 
announcements is reported in bold. January, February, May, July, August and October are 
not included in table 3 for the simple reason that none of the companies in the sample has a 
fiscal year end month in any of those months. Companies with a December fiscal year end 
month tend to announce their quarterly earnings in February, May, August and October. 
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Therefore, when predicting earnings announcement dates based on the fiscal year algorithm, 
companies with their fiscal year ending in December are expected to report their earnings in 
February, May, August and October. 
  All firms Four announcements in the previous year 
 
1998 – 
2007 1998 2007 
1998-
1999 
2000-
2007 
1998-
2007 
Ann predicted based on fiscal year end       
% Announcement 0,69 0,62 0,71 0,64 0,69 0,69 
% No Announcement 0,31 0,38 0,29 0,36 0,31 0,31 
       
 1999-2007 1999 2007  
2000-
2007 
1999-
2007 
Ann predicted based on previous year       
% Announcement 0,67 0,25 0,82  0,73 0,67 
% No announcement 0,33 0,75 0,18  0,27 0,33 
       
Size group 1 (small) 2 3 4 5 (large)  
Ann predicted based on fiscal year end       
% Announcement 0,67 0,70 0,71 0,72 0,68  
% No announcement 0,33 0,30 0,29 0,28 0,32  
       
Ann predicted based on previous year       
% Announcement 0,64 0,70 0,63 0,64 0,74  
% No announcement 0,36 0,30 0,37 0,36 0,26  
Table 4: Accuracy of Announcement Dates Predictions 1998-2007 
Table 4 shows the accuracy of announcement predictions based on the fiscal year end and 
previous year methods for the period from 1998 to 2007. The top panel of table 4 shows the 
accuracy of both methods for all firms, and then for firms with 4 earnings announcements in 
the previous year, including selected sub-periods. Regarding the announcements predicted 
based on the fiscal year end method, there has been little change in the accuracy of 
announcement predictions over the observation period. For announcements predicted based 
on previous year announcements the accuracy has significantly increased from 0.25 in 1999 
to 0.82 in 2007. This can largely be attributed to the fact that companies listed at the Oslo 
Stock Exchange were not required by law to announce their earnings on a quarterly basis 
until year 2000. In addition, Bloomberg’s coverage of earnings announcement dates for 
companies listed at the Oslo Stock Exchange has been limited until year 2000. This is largely 
solved by searching for earnings announcements manually from the daily bulletin at the Oslo 
Stock Exchange. 
The lower panel of Table 4 shows the accuracy of both methods for companies divided into 
5 size groups based on market capitalisation. For the fiscal year end method the is no 
significant difference between the size groups. For the previous year method the accuracy 
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increases for the larger companies. Frazzini and Lamont (2007) argue this is because the 
coverage for small companies is incomplete and they are more likely to report earnings 
announcements of large companies. However, in the sample used here, the difference is not 
as large as with the sample used by Frazzini and Lamont (2007). 
5.2 Excess returns of the L/S Portfolio Based on the 
Previous Year Method 
Monthly Aritmethic Averages of Simple Returns 
All Stocks With 4 Announcements the Previous Year 
 All Stocks Expected Non-Announcers Expected Annonuncers L/S 
1999-2007 
    
Mean -0,416 % -0,046 % -0,772 % -0,640 % 
t-stat 0,58 0,06 0,91 0,91 
1999-2000 
    
Mean -1,221 % -0,168 % -2,062 % -1,722 % 
t-stat 0,67 0,10 0,95 1,02 
2001-2007 
    
Mean -0,186 % -0,011 % -0,388 % -0,331 % 
t-stat 0,22 0,01 0,43 0,43 
Table 5: All Stocks With 4 Announcements the Previous Year- Previous 
Year Method 
Table 5 shows that the monthly average returns of the value-weighted L/S portfolio 
including all stocks with exactly four earnings announcements in the previous year. “All 
stocks” refers to all stocks with four announcements in the previous year. The tested L/S 
portfolio seem to be generating negative monthly average excess returns for the sample 
period, as well as for the sub-periods. However, the t-values are indicating that the found 
results are not statistically significant. Zero-hypothesis A stating that the L/S portfolio does 
not generate excess returns over the three month Norwegian Treasury bill returns greater 
than zero, is not rejected. For comparison, Lamont and Frazzini (2007) found that a L/S 
portfolio formed on the basis of the previous year method generated positive statistically 
significant average monthly excess returns of 0.613 percent  in their sample period between 
1973 and 2004. 
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Months with zero expected Announcements Deleted 
 All Stocks Expected Non-Announcers Expected Annonuncers L/S 
1999-2007 
    
Mean 0,208 % 0,624 % -0,772 % -1,395 % 
t-stat 0,31 0,95 0,85 1,78 
1999-2000 
    
Mean -0,691 % 0,457 % -2,062 % -2,519 % 
t-stat 0,15 0,45 0,41 0,85 
2001-2007 
    
Mean 0,475 % 0,673 % -0,388 % -1,061 % 
t-stat 0,27 0,83 0,75 1,56 
Table 6: Months with Zero Expected Announcers Deleted - Previous Year 
Method 
Lamont and Frazzini (2007) reports that each month in their sample “has a sufficiently large 
number of earnings announcements” (p. 6) so that the portfolios they form based on 
scheduled announcements will be “sufficiently diversified each month” (p. 6). This is clearly 
not the case for this sample; Some of the months in this sample, no companies are expected 
to announce their earnings. Table 6 reports the monthly average excess returns over the 
Norwegian Government three month Treasury bill of a L/S portfolio traded only in the 
months with predicted quarterly earnings announcements. The table shows that the L/S 
portfolio traded only in the months with expected announcers, does not generate positive 
monthly average excess returns that are statistically significant for the sample period, nor for 
the sub-periods. However not statistically significant, also this L/S portfolio seem to 
generate negative monthly average excess returns. Zero-hypothesis A can not rejected on the 
basis of the results in table 6. 
Managed L/S Portfolio 
 All Stocks Expected Non-Announcers Expected Annonuncers L/S 
1999-2007 
    
Mean -0,416 % -0,018 % -0,117 % -0,099 % 
t-stat 0,545 0,247 1,144 1,017 
1999-2000 
    
Mean -1,221 % -0,059 % -0,266 % -0,208 % 
t-stat 0,272 0,123 0,572 0,508 
2001-2007 
    
Mean -0,186 % -0,006 % -0,075 % -0,069 % 
t-stat 0,510 0,231 1,070 0,951 
Table 7: Managed L/S Portfolio - Previous Year Method 
Some of the months in the sample period tend to have more expected announcers than 
others. Consequently, some of the months in the sample have few expected announcers. In 
order to adjust for this, a managed L/S portfolio is constructed. For each month, the size of 
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the value-weighted L/S portfolio is determined by the amount of expected announcers that 
month. For example, for year t, X quarterly earnings announcements are expected to be 
made for the whole year, while Y quarterly earnings announcements are expected to be made 
this current month. The size of the L/S portfolio depends on the number of expected 
announcers and is equalised to Y/X this current month. Table 7 shows that zero-hypothesis 
A can not be rejected. Like the results presented in table 5 and 6, the managed L/S portfolio 
seem to generate statistically insignificant negative monthly average excess returns over the 
sample period and in the sub-periods. 
L/S Portfolio Traded in February, May, August and October 
 All Stocks Expected Non-Announcers Expected Annonuncers L/S 
1999-2007 
    
Mean -1,416 % -0,795 % -1,740 % -0,945 % 
t-stat 1,31 0,79 1,20 0,69 
1999-2000 
    
Mean -3,663 % -0,368 % -5,385 % -5,017 % 
t-stat 1,75 0,16 2,11 1,66 
2001-2007 
    
Mean -0,774 % -0,918 % -0,698 % 0,219 % 
t-stat 0,51 0,80 0,53 0,15 
Table 8: L/S Portfolio Traded in February, May, August and October - 
Previous Year Method 
Table 2 and 3 showed that most companies (97.74) listed at the Oslo Stock Exchange have 
their fiscal year end in December. Out of the companies having their fiscal year end in 
December, most of these companies (67.71 percent) tend to announce their earnings in 
February, May, August and October. Table 8 shows the average monthly excess returns of a 
L/S portfolio traded only in February, May, August and October. In other words, I form the 
same value-weighted zero cost L/S portfolio as previously, but it is only traded in February, 
May, August and October. This portfolio is different from the L/S portfolio based on the 
fiscal year method since the latter is traded in all months. The L/S portfolio traded in 
February, May, August and October, holds the portfolio of expected announcers in February, 
May, August and October and sells short the portfolio of expected non-announcers in 
February, May, August and October.  
Table 8 shows that the L/S portfolio traded only in February, May, August and October does 
not generate positive statistically significant excess returns over the three month Norwegian 
Government Treasury bill returns over the sample period. In the sub-period from 2001-2007, 
the L/S portfolio seem to generate positive average excess returns. However, the t-statistics 
are too low for rejecting zero-hypothesis A in the sub-period between 2001 and 2007.  
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5.3 Excess Returns of the L/S Portfolio Based on the 
Fiscal Year Method  
All Stocks With 4 Announcements the Previous Year 
 All Stocks Expected Non-Announcers Expected Annonuncers L/S 
1999-2007 
    
Mean -0,416 % 0,050 % -0,484 % -0,533 % 
t-stat 0,58 0,06 0,77 0,74 
1999-2000 
    
Mean -1,221 % -0,011 % -1,228 % -1,217 % 
t-stat 0,67 0,01 0,93 0,67 
2001-2007 
    
Mean -0,186 % 0,067 % -0,271 % -0,338 % 
t-stat 0,30 0,08 0,07 0,44 
Table 9: All Stocks with 4 Announcements the Previous Year - Fiscal Year 
Method 
According to table 3, companies with their fiscal year ending in December are expected to 
report their earnings in February, May, August and October. Considering that only 2.26 
percent of the companies in the universe of stocks with four announcements in the previous 
year have a fiscal year ending in other months than December, it does not make sense to 
form the same L/S portfolio based on announcements forecasted by the fiscal year method as 
Lamont and Frazzini (2007). Therefore, excluding the 2.26 percent of companies not having 
their fiscal year end in December, I test a trading strategy that takes a long position in all 
stocks (having their fiscal year end in December) in February, May, August and October, 
and a short position in all stocks (having their fiscal year end in December) in the rest of the 
months. Table 9 shows that nor does this trading strategy generate positive excess returns 
over the three month Norwegian Government Treasury bill returns over the sample period, 
nor in any sub-periods. Zero-hypothesis A can not be rejected. For comparison, Lamont and 
Frazzini (2007) found that a L/S portfolio based on company fiscal year end generated 
monthly average statistically significant excess returns of 0.723 percent.  
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5.4 Excess Returns of the L/S Portfolio Based on Actual 
Announcement Dates 
Monthly Aritmethic Averages of Simple Returns 
All Stocks With 4 Announcements Each Calendar Year 
 All Stocks Non-Announcers Annonuncers L/S 
1999-2007 
    
Mean -0,416 % -0,468 % 0,153 % 0,600 % 
t-stat 0,58 0,57 0,17 0,73 
1999-2000 
    
Mean -1,221 % -1,412 % 0,935 % 2,191 % 
t-stat 0,67 0,67 0,43 1,04 
2001-2007 
    
Mean -0,186 % -0,196 % -0,053 % 0,145 % 
t-stat 0,21 0,22 0,05 0,17 
Table 10: All Stocks with 4 Announcements the Previous Year - Actual 
Announcement Dates 
Table 10 reports the average monthly excess returns of a value-weighted zero cost L/S 
portfolio based on actual announcement dates. Based actual announcement dates, a value-
weighted zero cost L/S portfolio holding the stocks that are announcing and selling short the 
stocks not announcing in a month. This trading strategy is not implementable in practise, but 
is useful for determining whether or not it is theoretically possible to earn average excess 
returns larger than zero with the tested trading strategy. None of the results in table 10 are 
statistically significant and the zero-hypothesis A can consequently not be rejected. If the 
zero-hypothesis had been rejected, this would have indicated that it is theoretically possible 
to obtain positive monthly average excess returns with the quarterly earnings announcement 
trading strategy at the Oslo Stock Exchange, only with a better method for predicting  
quarterly earnings announcement dates. However, this is not the case. For comparison, 
Lamont and Frazzini (2007) reports statistically significant average monthly excess returns 
of a L/S portfolio based on actual announcement dates of 0.603 percent. 
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Months with Zero Actual Announcements Deleted 
 All Stocks Non-Announcers Annonuncers L/S 
1999-2007 
    
Mean -0,059 % -0,216 % 0,154 % 0,368 % 
t-stat 0,08 0,26 0,16 0,36 
1999-2000 
    
Mean -1,324 % -2,414 % 0,823 % 3,237 % 
t-stat 0,04 0,12 0,08 0,17 
2001-2007 
    
Mean 0,317 % 0,446 % -0,045 % -0,485 % 
t-stat 0,07 0,22 0,14 0,32 
Table 11: Months with Zero Expected Announcers Deleted - Actual 
Announcement Dates 
Table 11 reports the monthly average excess returns over the Norwegian Government three 
month Treasury bill of a value-weighted zero cost L/S portfolio traded only in the months 
with actual earnings announcements. The table shows that zero-hypothesis A can not be 
rejected. Neither this non implementable trading strategy does generate positive monthly 
average excess returns that are statistically significant for the sample period, nor for the sub-
periods. 
Managed L/S Portfolio 
 All Stocks Non-Announcers Annonuncers L/S 
1999-2007 
    
Mean -0,416 % -0,080 % -0,063 % 0,018 % 
t-stat 0,54 0,78 0,75 0,15 
1999-2000 
    
Mean -1,220 % -0,183 % -0,112 % 0,071 % 
t-stat 0,27 0,39 0,37 0,08 
2001-2007 
    
Mean -0,186 % -0,051 % -0,049 % 0,002 % 
t-stat 0,51 0,73 0,70 0,14 
Table 12: Managed L/S Portfolio - Actual Announcement Dates 
Table 12 reports the monthly average excess returns of the same managed value-weighted 
zero cost L/S portfolio as in table 7, only with actual announcement dates. In other words, it 
is the same L/S portfolio; lagged one year. Table 12 shows that the L/S portfolio seem to 
generate positive monthly average excess returns over the sample period as well as in the 
sub-periods. However, none of these results are statistically significant. Zero-hypothesis A 
can hence not be rejected. 
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L/S Portfolio Traded in February, May, August and October 
 All Stocks Non-Announcers Annonuncers L/S 
1999-2007 
    
Mean -1,416 % -2,910 % -0,565 % 2,264 % 
t-stat 1,31 2,04 0,48 1,47 
1999-2000 
    
Mean -3,663 % -5,122 % -2,147 % 2,975 % 
t-stat 1,75 1,25 1,01 0,60 
2001-2007 
    
Mean -0,774 % -2,254 % -0,112 % 2,061 % 
t-stat 0,59 1,58 0,08 1,42 
Table 13: L/S Portfolio Traded in February, May, August and October - 
Actual Announcement Dates 
Like table 8, table 13 shows the average monthly excess returns of a value-weighted zero 
cost L/S portfolio traded only in February, May, August and October. Unlike table 8, the L/S 
portfolio is formed on the basis of actual announcement dates.  
The L/S portfolio based on actual announcement dates traded in February, May, August and 
October earns positive average monthly excess returns over the sample period. However, this 
result is not statistically significant. Zero-hypothesis A is consequently not rejected for the 
sample period. It could nevertheless be interesting to see if one with a longer sample period, 
would be able to get statistically significant results. Given statistically significant results, a 
better method for predicting earnings announcement dates would consequently provide us 
with a L/S portfolio, traded only in February, May, August and October, generating monthly 
average excess returns larger than the Norwegian Government three month Treasury bill. 
However, this is not the case. 
5.5 Robustness Checks of the Results with Geometric 
Averages of Logarithmic Returns 
Logarithmic returns are more likely to have desirable statistical properties such as normal 
distribution than simple returns. In order to determine whether or not the way the returns are 
calculated has something to say for the results, geometric averages of logarithmic returns are 
calculated. This should not change the results dramatically, and if statistically significantly 
positive average excess returns were found previously, this part would have been more 
important since results rejecting a zero-hypothesis should be properly robustness checked. 
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5.5.1 Geometric Averages of Logarithmic Returns Previous Year 
Method 
Monthly Normalised Geometric Averages of Logarithmic Returns 
All Stocks With 4 Announcements the Previous Year 
 All Stocks Expected Non-Announcers Expected Annonuncers L/S 
1999-2007 
    
Mean -1,970 % -1,370 % -2,268 % -1,286 % 
t-stat 2,44 1,77 2,38 1,68 
Months with zero expected Announcements Deleted 
 All Stocks Expected Non-Announcers Expected Annonuncers L/S 
1999-2007 
    
Mean -1,032 % -0,344 % -2,544 % -2,305 % 
t-stat 1,41 0,51 2,52 2,58 
Managed L/S Portfolio 
 All Stocks Expected Non-Announcers Expected Annonuncers L/S 
1999-2007 
    
Mean -1,970 % -0,080 % -0,256 % -0,177 % 
t-stat 2,30 1,06 1,92 1,41 
L/S Portfolio Traded in February, May, August and October 
 All Stocks Expected Non-Announcers Expected Annonuncers L/S 
1999-2007 
    
Mean -2,857 % -1,637 % -3,984 % -2,479 % 
t-stat 2,28 1,57 2,21 1,43 
Table 14: Geometric Averages of Logarithmic Returns - Previous Year 
Method 
In order to determine whether or not the way the returns are calculated has something to say 
for the results, table 14 reports geometric averages of logarithmic returns for the four 
different L/S portfolios formed on the basis of the previous year method. The table shows 
that none of the L/S portfolio trading strategies based on announcement dates predicted by 
the previous year method generate positive excess returns over the Norwegian Government 
three month Treasury bill over the sample period. However, when the geometric averages is 
taken of the logarithmic returns of the L/S portfolio that is not traded in months with zero 
expected announcers, it seems to generate excess returns that are statistically significantly 
different from zero. The sign of the excess returns is nevertheless negative. Zero hypothesis 
A can consequently not be rejected.  
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5.5.2 Geometric Averages of Logarithmic Returns Fiscal Year 
Method 
All Stocks With 4 Announcements the Previous Year 
 All Stocks Expected Non-Announcers Expected Annonuncers L/S 
1999-2007 
    
Mean -1,970 % -1,046 % -0,983 % -0,469 % 
t-stat 2,44 1,24 1,31 0,57 
Table 15: Geometric Averages of Logarithmic Returns - Fiscal Year Method 
Table 15 shows that the geometric monthly average of logarithmic returns of the L/S 
portfolio based on earnings announcement dates predicted by the fiscal year method does not 
give us any reason to reject the zero hypothesis. Like table 9, table 15 shows that the L/S 
trading strategy based on fiscal year ends does not generate statistically significant positive 
excess returns over the Norwegian Government three month Treasury bill over the sample 
period. Zero-hypothesis A is not rejected. 
 
5.5.3 Geometric Averages of Logarithmic Returns Actual 
Announcement Dates 
Monthly Normalised Geometric Averages of Logarithmic Returns 
All Stocks With 4 Announcements Each Calendar Year 
 All Stocks Non-Announcers Annonuncers L/S 
1999-2007 
    
Mean -1,970 % -1,976 % -1,313 % 0,050 % 
t-stat 2,44 2,20 1,42 0,06 
Months with Zero Actual Announcers Deleted 
 All Stocks Non-Announcers Annonuncers L/S 
1999-2007 
    
Mean -1,457 % -1,464 % -1,475 % -0,460 % 
t-stat 1,90 1,66 1,51 0,43 
Managed L/S Portfolio 
 All Stocks Non-Announcers Annonuncers L/S 
1999-2007 
    
Mean -1,970 % -0,162 % -0,171 % -0,018 % 
t-stat 2,30 1,44 1,67 0,14 
L/S Portfolio Traded in February, May, August and October 
 All Stocks Non-Announcers Annonuncers L/S 
1999-2007 
    
Mean -2,857 % -4,176 % -2,121 % 1,515 % 
t-stat 2,28 2,70 1,52 0,83 
Table 16: Geometric Averages of Logarithmic Returns - Actual 
Announcement Dates 
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Table 16 shows that the L/S portfolio based on actual announcement dates containing all 
stocks with four announcements in the previous year and the L/S portfolio based on actual 
announcement dates traded in February, May, August and October seem to generate positive 
excess returns, but that the t-statistics are not high enough for rejecting zero-hypothesis A. 
Improved methods for predicting earnings announcement dates would not assist in forming 
L/S portfolios generating average monthly returns statistically significantly larger than zero 
over the sample period. 
5.6 Summary Statistics 
To summarize, none of the tested trading strategies combining a value-weighted portfolio 
that buys expected announcers with a value-weighted portfolio that sells short expected non-
announcers are generating excess returns over the Norwegian Government three month 
Treasury-bill that are statistically significantly larger than zero over the sample period. Zero-
hypothesis A is not rejected for any of the tested trading strategies. Zero-hypothesis B is 
consequently not tested.  
Some of the portfolios formed on the basis of actual announcement dates seem to generate 
positive monthly excess returns. However, none of these results are statistically significant. 
A longer sample period could therefore be interesting to examine in order to test whether or 
not  some of the portfolios formed on the basis of actual announcement dates could generate 
statistically significantly positive monthly excess returns. In that case, better methods for 
predicting earnings announcement dates could assist in forming a L/S portfolio trading 
strategy generating positive monthly excess returns over the Norwegian Government three 
month Treasury bill. 
The only statistically significant result is the geometric average of the logarithmic returns of 
the L/S portfolio that is not traded in months with zero expected announcers. The sign of the 
this L/S portfolio’s excess returns is nevertheless negative. The tested trading strategies 
based on earnings announcement dates predicted by the previous year method or the fiscal 
year end method did not generate positive monthly average excess returns at the Oslo Stock 
Exchange over the sample period from 1999 to 2007, nor in the sub-periods from 1999 to 
2000 and from 2001 to 2007. These results, which are contrasting to those of Lamont and 
Frazzini (2007), will be discussed in the next chapter. 
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6. Discussion of the Results 
I test various versions of a monthly L/S portfolio trading strategy consisting of buying a 
value-weighted portfolio of stocks expected to announce their quarterly earnings, while 
selling short a value-weighted portfolio of stocks not expected to announce their earnings the 
following month. The found results are indicating that none of the tested trading strategies 
are generating monthly average statistically significant positive excess returns over the 
Norwegian Government three month Treasury bill over the sample period. In contrary, most 
of the tested L/S portfolio trading strategies are generating negative excess returns, however 
not statistically significant. That the results are not statistically significant is clearly related 
to that the sample period utilised in this analysis is relatively short. The presented results are 
contrasting with those of Lamont and Frazzini (2007) who found that the L/S portfolio 
trading strategy based on predicted earnings announcement dates generates statistically 
significant excess returns of between 7 and 18 percent per year. This section contains a 
discussion of my results as well as their validity. Moreover, the presented results are together 
with the results of Lamont and Frazzini (2007) placed in the market efficiency litterature. 
Further, and most importantly, I discuss different reasons for why my findings are in contrast 
to the findings of Lamont and Frazzini (2007). Finally, potential sources of errors and 
eventual proposals for further studies of the topic are presented. 
6.1 Discussion of the Results 
Lamont and Frazzini (2007) documented an earnings announcement premium in the U.S. 
stock market that is “large, robust and strongly related to the fact that volume surges around 
announcement dates” (p. 2). By examining the monthly returns of the value weighted 
portfolio of companies expected to announce as well as the monthly returns for companies 
not expected to announce, they found that U.S. stock-prices rise in average around earnings 
announcements. Based on predicted earnings announcement dates, they test a trading 
strategy consisting of holding a value-weighted portfolio of expected announcers while 
selling short a value-weighted portfolio of expected non-announcers. Lamont and Frazzini 
(2007) document that this trading strategy earns excess returns of between 7 and 18 percent 
per year. The positive excess returns, they claim, can not be explained by the factors 
included in the Carhart (1997) four-factor model. Measured by the Sharpe-ratio, their 
trading-strategy generates higher risk-adjusted returns over the sample period than other 
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popular stock market anomalies such as the momentum-strategy. Lamont and Frazzini 
(2007) suggest that the documented earnings announcement premium is driven by small 
investor buying when an earnings announcement catches their attention. They documented 
that predictable increases in volume lead to predictable increases in stock prices around 
quarterly earnings announcement dates and that “concepts such as liquidity, information 
flow, heterogeneous beliefs, and short sale constraints are potentially important in 
understanding this connection” (p. 29). Uninformed investor trading activity combined with 
imperfect arbitrage trading by informed sophisticated investors is suggested as explanation 
for the earnings announcement premium. 
I test if a similar trading strategy generates excess returns at the Oslo Stock Exchange in the 
time period between 1999 and 2007. At the last day of month t-1, the monthly trading 
strategy buys a value-weighted portfolio of stocks that are expected to announce their 
quarterly earnings the coming month and sells short a value-weighted portfolio of stocks that 
are not expected to announce their earnings the coming month. The expected announcement 
dates are predicted by two different algorithms, namely the previous year method and the 
fiscal year method. I test four versions of the L/S trading strategy based on quarterly 
earnings announcement dates predicted by the previous year method, and one version of the 
L/S trading strategy based on the fiscal year end method. Although not an implementable 
trading strategy in practise, I also test if four versions of a value-weighted zero cost L/S 
portfolio based on actual announcement dates generated average statistically significant 
excess returns relative to the three month Norwegian Treasury Bill. 
I find that various versions of a L/S portfolio based on announcement dates forecasted by the 
previous year method and by the fiscal year end method generate negative monthly average 
excess returns over the sample period between 1999 and 2007. It should be emphasised that 
these results are not statistically significant, which may be due to the somewhat short sample 
period utilised in the empirical analysis. Some of the portfolios formed on the basis of actual 
announcement dates seem to generate positive monthly excess returns. However, none of 
these results are statistically significant. A longer sample period could therefore be 
interesting in order to test whether or not some of the portfolios formed on the basis of actual 
announcement dates could generate statistically significantly positive monthly excess 
returns. In that case, better methods for predicting earnings announcement dates could assist 
in forming a L/S portfolio trading strategy generating positive monthly excess returns over 
the Norwegian Government three month Treasury bill. 
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The results are robustness checked by comparing arithmetic averages of simple returns to 
geometric averages of logarithmic returns. I perform robustness checks of my results for all 
the tested trading strategies as well as for the sub-periods, and find that the way the excess 
returns are calculated do not affect the decision to not reject the zero-hypothesis; None of the 
results are indicating that the zero hypotheses, stating that the L/S portfolio trading strategy 
can not earn excess returns greater than zero, can be rejected. There is no sign of an earnings 
announcement premium at the Oslo Stock Exchange in the sample period between 1999 and 
2007. In other words, I find no results that can reject that the Oslo Stock Exchange is weak 
form efficient. My results are in contrast to those of Lamont and Frazzini (2007) whose 
results are not according with weak-form efficiency in the U.S. stock market. 
6.2 The Presented Results and the Results of Lamont and 
Frazzini (2007) versus the Market Efficiency Theory 
Literature 
In addition to the earnings announcement premium, several stock market anomalies have 
been documented by various empirical studies. Momentum, mean-reversal, calendar effects, 
the value-effect and the size-effect are some of the anomalies that have been discussed in 
this thesis. However, when risk-adjusted, many of the anomalies seem to disappear. Fama 
and French presented an extended version of the CAPM in 1992 that, in addition to the 
overall market risk-factor contained a risk factor related to firm size and a risk-factor related 
to a firm’s book-to-market value. Fama and French (1993) claim that several of the patterns 
previously found in stock price data are explained with their three-factor model. “Abnormal” 
returns may hence in reality be a compensation for increased risk related to trading on the 
strategies based on patterns found in stock market data. Further, Fama (1998) suggest that 
long-term market anomalies tend to disappear when the way they are measured changes. 
Carhart (1997) introduced a forth risk-factor to the Fama and French three-factor model, 
namely the momentum-factor. This factor is according to Carhart (1997) capturing the one-
year momentum-anomaly discovered by Jegadeesh and Titman (1993) and explaining the 
cross-sectional variation in average stock returns. The results of Lamont and Frazzini (2007) 
are not explained by the Carhart four-factor model, and are considered abnormal in that 
sense. 
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Transaction costs, management fees, liquidity and constraints such as short selling 
constraints are often not considered in these studies. When included, such costs and 
constraints may eliminate the, considered abnormal, returns generated by following a certain 
trading strategy. In other words, returns, that by first sight might seem abnormal, generated 
by following a certain trading strategy, may in reality be a compensation for the excess risk 
or costs related to executing the trading strategy. Lamont and Frazzini (2007) have not 
considered these mentioned limits to arbitrage in their analysis. This is further discussed in 
section 6.3. 
Financial models and theories, such as the efficient market theory, are often assuming 
rational investors. Various studies have been summarised in this text, and it is clear that 
human behaviour is not always rational. By predicting irrational investor behaviour, 
behavioural finance theory aims to fill the gap between traditional finance theory and the 
reality where investors with irrational behaviour exist. Cognitive biases such as mental 
accounting, herd behaviour, the representativeness-bias, the conservatism-bias, the 
disposition-bias, overconfidence and forecasting errors may lead to irrational behaviour 
amongst investors. Irrational investor driven returns may hence provide an explanation for 
abnormal returns. Lamont and Frazzini (2007) claim that the main explanation for the 
earnings announcement premium is uninformed or irrational demand by individual investors, 
coupled with imperfect arbitrage by sophisticated investors. Their results are not in 
accordance with weak-form market efficiency in the U.S. stock market, in the sense that 
historical information can be used to predict future stock prices. 
The efficient market hypothesis claims that it is impossible to ” beat the market” since stock 
prices reflect all relevant information. In order for prices to reflect all available information, 
someone has to analyse the information available in the market. Above market returns may 
therefore be seen as a reward for the costs related to analysing stock price information. The 
market efficiency paradox is hence built on the fact that an efficient stock market has to have 
market participants believing that the market is inefficient. Although exceptions exist, most 
investors are not able to outperform the market in the long term. The results presented in this 
thesis can not reject market efficiency at the Oslo Stock Exchange: No earnings 
announcement premium is documented in the sample period between 1999 and 2007. 
However, the sample size and the sample period utilised is too small for concluding whether 
or not the Oslo Stock Exchange is an efficient market in general. 
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Regarding market efficiency at the Oslo Stock Exchange, previous studies have, with few 
exceptions, not been able to reject that the Oslo Stock Exchange is efficient. Johansen (1995) 
found a Friday effect and a Monday effect at the Oslo Stock Exchange in the time period 
between 1984 and 1995. Also Holm (2007) documents a Friday effect at the Oslo Stock 
Exchange in the period between 1996 and 2005. However, Holm (2007) finds that the effect 
has diminished over the last half of the studied period. Åsland (2006) did not find evidence 
for a December effect in the Norwegian stock market in the period between 1999 and 2004. 
Jensen (2006) found that a momentum strategy tested at the Oslo Stock Exchange between 
1996 and 2005 generated positive excess returns, but that the generated excess returns were 
mainly compensation for systematic risk. Myklebust (2007) found significant that a 
momentum strategy tested at the Oslo Stock Exchange generated positive returns for the 
period between 1984 and 2006, but not for all sub-periods. He claims that the obtained 
positive returns are not explained by beta, but underlines that other variables explaining risk 
have not been considered. Mamelund (2006) claims to have found evidence for an 
overreaction at the Oslo Stock Exchange between 1989 and 2005, indicating weak-form 
market inefficiency. Åkre and Røsdal (2000) examines how quickly new information is 
incorporated in stock prices at the Oslo Stock Exchange and their results are not indicating 
market inefficiency at the Oslo Stock Exchange.  
Some of previous studies conducted on Norwegian stock prices are hence showing that when 
risk adjusted, stock returns at the Oslo Stock have not historically been abnormal. With the 
exception of Mamelund (2006), Johansen (1995) and Holm (2007), the results of the above-
mentioned studies are indicating that the Oslo Stock Exchange is efficient. Regarding the 
documented abnormal patterns, it should be emphasised that transaction costs have not been 
considered in their studies. In December 2000, the Oslo Stock Exchange joined the NOREX, 
which claim that they have “one of the most effective surveillance systems in the world”. 
NOREX’ goal for the future is “to be one of the world’s most efficient securities markets”. 
One possibility is that the Oslo Stock Exchange has become more efficient since it joined the 
NOREX. This is confirmed by Holm (2007) who found that the Friday effect first 
documented by Johansen (1995) has diminished after 2000, indicating that the Oslo Stock 
Exchange has become more efficient since that. A more efficient market at the Oslo Stock 
Exchange would be in accordance with the findings of Gjerde et al. (2005) who claim that 
the usefulness of financial reporting for investors trading on the Oslo Stock Exchange has 
increased over the later years. Further, increased market efficiency at the Oslo Stock 
 87 
Exchange after year 2000 would be in accordance with the results presented in this thesis in 
the sense that no earnings announcement premium is documented in the sample period 
between 1999 and 2007, which can not reject weak form market efficiency at the Oslo Stock 
Exchange. 
6.3 Suggestions to why the Presented Results are 
Contrasting to the Results of Lamont and Frazzini 
(2007) 
The found results are indicating that none of the tested trading strategies are generating 
monthly average statistically significant positive excess returns over the Norwegian 
Government three month Treasury bill over the sample period. In contrary, most of the tested 
L/S portfolio trading strategies are generating negative excess returns. However, the results 
presented in this thesis are not statistically significant. This is clearly related to the fact that 
the sample period utilised in this analysis is relatively short. My findings are contrasting with 
those of Lamont and Frazzini (2007) who found that the L/S portfolio trading strategy 
generates statistically significant excess returns of between 7 and 18 percent per year over 
the sample period from 1972 to 2004, contrasting with weak-form market efficiency in the 
U.S. stock market. Theoretically, one would expect the much smaller and younger 
Norwegian stock market, the Oslo Stock Exchange, to be less efficient than the much larger 
and older U.S. stock market. This opens for a discussion of whether or not the Norwegian 
stock market really is more efficient than the U.S. stock market, or if Lamont and Frazzini 
(2007) have found random results. 
Considering the efficiency of the two different stock markets, it has to be emphasised that 
the Norwegian stock market is much smaller and more concentrated than the U.S. stock 
market. Given that there are fewer companies listed at the Oslo Stock Exchange, and that the 
amount of analyst firms analysing these stocks have grown over the later years, it is 
reasonable to think that the amount of companies listed at the Oslo Stock Exchange being 
analysed by at least one analyst company also has increased over the later years. Especially 
the large companies listed at the Oslo Stock Exchange are analysed by at least one, and often 
more than one, equity research analysts. A mainly speculative possible explanation for the 
differing results is therefore that equity analyst companies, e.g. sophisticated investors, 
expect small investor buying and consequently arbitrages away any eventual earnings 
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announcement premium which is eventually caused by individual investor attention-driven 
demand around quarterly earnings announcements at the Oslo Stock Exchange. In that case, 
like the “fashion leaders” described in section 2.5.3, sophisticated investors are “front-
running” small investors by ”initiating purchases of announcement stocks in the weeks prior 
to an earnings announcement” (Lamont and Frazzini, 2007, p. 26-27). This is consistent 
with efficient market theory: Sophisticated investors are trading to eliminate predictable 
returns, and hence smoothing stock prices, that are driven by the predictable demand-shock 
caused by small investors around earnings announcement dates. 
The sample period used by Lamont and Frazzini (2007), which is from 1972 to 2004, is 
much longer than the sample period used in this study, which is from 1999 to 2007. One 
could consequently think that the chosen sample period in this study could have something 
to do with the different results. However, Lamont and Frazzini (2007) reports that the 
earnings announcement premium is “large and highly statistically significant across the 
entire sample period, delivering between 40 and 92 basis points a month” (p. 13). 
Consequently, my results should not be dependent of the chosen sample period. Given the 
fact that companies listed at the Oslo Stock Exchange not were required by law to announce 
their earnings on a quarterly basis until year 2000 (Dyvik, 2008), it would not make sense to 
compare the period before year 2000 with the results of Lamont and Frazzini (2007). 
Some of the portfolios formed on the basis of actual announcement dates seem to generate 
positive monthly excess returns. However, none of these results are statistically significant. 
A longer sample period could therefore be interesting in order to test whether or not some of 
the portfolios formed on the basis of actual announcement dates could generate statistically 
significantly positive monthly excess returns. If that was the case, a possible explanation for 
the differing results presented in this thesis is that the methods for predicting earnings 
announcement dates utilised by Lamont and Frazzini (2007) in the U.S. stock market are not 
accurate enough for predicting earnings announcement dates in the Norwegian stock market. 
Another possible explanation for the different results is that the results of Lamont and 
Frazzini are random. As mentioned in section 3.3., data-mining and data-snooping may 
cause patterns that are not real to appear in a dataset (Stamland, 2007). Considering that the 
dataset utilised by Lamont and Frazzini (2007) consists of U.S. stock prices between 1972 
and 2004 that have been analysed by many financial economists, there is at least a possibility 
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for data-mining; When a dataset is analysed a many times, it is likely that some patterns will 
be found at some point. 
Further, Lamont and Frazzini (2007) do not mention whether or not they have removed 
illiquid stocks from their sample. Due to the fact that they test whether or not trading volume 
is connected with the earnings announcement premium, it is assumed that they have not 
removed stocks with low trading volume from their sample. A possible explanation for the 
earnings announcement premium is consequently that positive autocorrelation, as a result of 
non-synchronous trading of illiquid stocks, has resulted in the found patterns. 
An additional problem related to including stocks with low trading volume in the sample is 
that it makes the trading strategy less feasible in real life. Especially, it is not realistic to 
expect to be able to take short positions in small stocks with low trading volume. 
Finally, Lamont and Frazzini (2007) have not considered the transaction costs related to the 
tested trading strategy. Given that each stock jumps  in and out of the long and the short 
portfolio four times per year, relatively large transaction costs are related to the tested 
trading strategy. However, a good reason for not including transaction costs when 
considering whether or not a trading strategy theoretically generates positive excess returns, 
is that trading costs are varying from investor to investor. For example, a large institutional 
investor will have very different transaction costs than a small, private investor. When 
transaction costs are not included in a study, it is therefore up to each investor to determine 
whether or not his transaction costs will be lower than the potential profits by exploiting a 
trading strategy claiming to generate positive abnormal excess returns. 
6.4 Critisism of the Presented Results and Potential 
Sources of Error 
There are several potential sources of error that may have affected the results presented in 
this thesis. However, most of these sources of error would have been more important to 
examine in the case of a rejected zero hypothesis. This section goes roughly through the 
most important potential sources of error. 
The main potential source of error is that the data is provided from different sources. While 
return-data is provided from Børsprosjektet at NHH, earnings announcement dates are 
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provided from Bloomberg and the Oslo Stock Exchange NewsWeb. The risk free rate is 
provided from Reuters. The potential source of error consists of that the different sources 
may have had different ways of collecting, processing and presenting the data.  Most of these 
problems are avoided due to the fact that monthly data is used in the analysis.  
Regarding the earnings announcement dates between 1998 and 2007, they have partly been 
collected from the NewsWeb of the Oslo Stock Exchange and partly provided from 
Bloomberg. Earnings announcements between 01.01.1998 and July 1999 is sorted manually 
from the Oslo Stock Exchange NewsWeb as well as from the dataset containing all 
announcements ever made at the Oslo Stock Exchange provided from Børsprosjektet. As 
mentioned in section 4.2., Bloomberg coverage of quarterly earnings announcement dates 
between 1999 and 2007 proved to be somewhat inconsistent, particularly for the years 2000 
and 2001. I have therefore checked the Oslo Stock Exchange NewsWeb for companies 
where Bloomberg reports three earnings announcements in a year, in order to verify whether 
there was a fourth earnings announcement that year for each of those companies. For 
companies with large market capitalisation where Bloomberg does not report full earnings 
announcement coverage for a given year I have performed the same procedure. In other 
words, a relatively large part of the dataset conserning the quarterly earnings announcement 
dates is  manually sorted. This presents a relatively large potential source of error in the 
sense that some companies that in reality did announced their earnings four times in one 
year, might have been excluded from the sample. However, given that the sample size varies 
from 115 to 188, it is unlikely that a possible inclusion of more stocks in the sample would 
lead to results very different from the presented results. Also, the potential source of error 
related to registering the wrong earnings announcement date is minimised due to the fact that 
monthly data is used in the analysis. 
Another potential source of error regarding the earnings announcement dates is that some 
companies listed at the Oslo Stock Exchange are announcing their preliminary quarterly 
earnings before they’re announcing their final quarterly earnings. In many occasions, the 
preliminary report contains the same numbers as in the final report. It is therefore reasonable 
to assume that the market is reacting to preliminary earnings announcements. The dates used 
in my analysis are mostly final earnings announcements, unless the only quarterly 
announcement made for a company was preliminary. However, preliminary quarterly 
earnings and final quarterly earnings are often announced within the same month, 
minimising this potential source of error. 
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Some of the companies listed at the Oslo Stock Exchange have A and B series of stocks with 
different voting rights. This presents a potential source of error due to that this has been 
manually adjusted. 
Another potential source of error is autocorrelation caused by non-synchronous trading. 
Some of the stocks listed at the Oslo Stock Exchange have low trading volume, and were 
considered to be removed from the sample due to the positive autocorrelation stocks with 
non-synchronous trading may cause in a portfolio. In other words, non-synchronous trading 
may lead to patterns in the data that are not really there. However, Lamont and Frazzini 
(2007) claim that trading-volume provides part of the explanation for the earnings 
announcement premium, thus all stocks with 12 previous months of return-history is 
included in the stock universe no matter their trading volume. Due to the fact that most of the 
stocks with low trading volume at the Oslo Stock Exchange are small stocks, and that the 
L/S portfolios are value-weighted, the importance of these stocks is relatively small. In 
addition, this potential source of error would have been more important to consider if the 
zero-hypothesis were rejected, which is not the case. 
If the L/S portfolio trading strategy had generated statistically significant positive excess 
returns, it would have been important to consider limits to arbitrage of the tested trading 
strategy. The most relevant potential limits to arbitrage related to the L/S portfolio trading 
strategy is related to transaction costs and if whether or not the trading strategy is feasible in 
real life. Regarding whether or not the trading strategy is feasible in real life, it is important 
to mention that taking short positions in small and less liquid stocks at the Oslo Stock 
Exchange probably would introduce problems. 
6.5 Proposal of Further Studies of This Topic 
Some of the portfolios formed on the basis of actual announcement dates seem to generate 
positive monthly excess returns. However, none of these results are statistically significant. 
It could therefore be interesting to examine a longer sample period, in order to test whether 
or not some of the portfolios formed on the basis of actual announcement dates could 
generate statistically significantly positive monthly excess returns. In that case, better 
methods for predicting earnings announcement dates could assist in forming a L/S portfolio 
trading strategy generating positive excess returns. A suggested further study of this topic is 
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therefore to test if the portfolios formed on the basis of actual announcement dates generates 
statistically significant positive excess returns over a longer sample period.  
A suggested method for predicting earnings announcement dates in the case of a rejected 
zero-hypothesis A for portfolios based on actual announcement dates over a longer sample 
period is the following: If a substantial amount of the companies listed at the Oslo Stock 
Exchange are announcing an earnings announcement calendar, it could be interesting to test 
a L/S trading strategy based on those dates. In other words, it could be interesting to test if a 
trading strategy holding stocks scheduled to announce their earnings while selling short 
stocks not scheduled to announce their earnings could generate positive excess returns. 
However, companies listed at the Oslo Stock Exchange were not required to announce their 
earnings on a quarterly basis until year 2000 (Dyvik, 2008) , so looking at the period before 
year 2000 would mean that rather than testing if there is an earnings announcement premium 
at the Oslo Stock Exchange, one would test if there was an earnings announcement premium 
associated with companies choosing to announce their earnings on a quarterly basis. The 
companies choosing to announce their earnings on a quarterly basis could have company 
specific characteristics, meaning that one would not test if there in general is an earnings 
announcement premium at the Oslo Stock Exchange. 
A second possibility is to sort the dataset containing all announcements ever made at the 
Oslo Stock Exchange with more accuracy, and redo the whole data analysis. As mentioned 
in section 6.4., a potential source of error is that some of the data is manually sorted, which 
may have conducted to exclusions of stocks that in reality had four earnings announcements 
one year. However, given that the sample size varies from 115 to 188, it is unlikely that a 
possible inclusion of more stocks in the sample would lead to results very different from the 
results presented in this thesis. 
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7. Conclusion 
Lamont and Frazzini (2007) document that a trading strategy consisting of buying every 
stock expected to announce within the coming month and selling short every stock not 
expected to announce the coming month earns excess returns of between 7 and 18 percent 
per year in the U.S. stock market between 1972 and 2004. The positive excess returns, they 
claim, can not be explained by the factors included in the Carhart (1997) four-factor model. 
Lamont and Frazzini (2007) claim that the main explanation for the earnings announcement 
premium is uninformed or irrational demand by individual investors, coupled with imperfect 
arbitrage by sophisticated investors. Their results are not in accordance with weak-form 
market efficiency in the U.S. stock market in the sense that historical information can be 
used to predict future stock prices. In this thesis related trading strategies based on predicted 
quarterly earnings announcement dates are tested at Oslo Stock Exchange in the period 
between 1999 and 2007 with the following zero-hypothesis:  
A) H0: Average monthly excess returns L/S portfolio = 0 
H1: Average monthly excess returns L/S portfolio > 0 
B)  H0: Average monthly abnormal returns L/S portfolio = 0 
H1: Average monthly abnormal returns L/S portfolio > 0 
Zero-hypothesis A is not rejected for any of the tested L/S portfolio trading strategies. 
Subsequently, zero-hypothesis B has not been tested in this thesis. The presented results 
show that the large majority of the tested L/S portfolio strategies based on predicted earnings 
announcement dates are generating negative monthly average excess returns. However, these 
results are not statistically significant.  
The results of the conducted analysis show no signs of an earnings announcement premium 
at the Oslo Stock Exchange in the sample period between 1999 and 2007. The sample size 
and the sample period is too short for making a general conclusion about whether or not the 
Oslo Stock Exchange is an efficient market. Nevertheless, in accordance with the results of 
Åkre and Røsdal (2000), Åsland (2006), Jensen (2006), and the aim of NOREX, my results 
can not reject market efficiency at the Oslo Stock Exchange in the sample period between 
1999 and 2007. 
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The main reasons for that the presented results are differing from the results of Lamont and 
Frazzini (2007) may be related to the possibility that the dataset of earnings announcement 
dates utilised in the analysis is not representative for the sample period regarding the real 
coverage of earnings announcement dates. Another, and relatively speculative, explanation is 
that if there is an eventual earnings announcement premium at the Oslo Stock Exchange, 
sophisticated investors trading in the Norwegian stock market may have managed to fully 
exploit the arbitrage opportunity by “front-running” the individual irrational or uninformed 
investors. Finally, there is a possibility that the patterns found by Lamont and Frazzini 
(2007) are random, and caused by for example data-mining, and that the earnings 
announcement premium consequently does not exist in reality.  
Conclusively, I would not recommend following the earnings announcement premium 
trading strategy of Lamont and Frazzini (2007) at the Oslo Stock Exchange. 
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Appendix 
7.1 Full list of Companies with 4 announcements 
Companies with 4 announcements in 1998 
            
ACL Atlantic Container 
Line 
HEX Hexagon Composites PRS Prosafe 
AGR Agresso Group HIT Hitec PRV Provida 
AIK Aktiv Kapital HJE Hjellegjerde PRX Proxima 
AKE Aker RGI A HYD Hydralift RANG Sparebanken Rana 
ALV Alvern IBY IBY Eiendom RAU Raufoss 
ALX Altinex IGNIS Ignis RCL Royal Caribbean 
Cruises 
AMA Aker Maritime IMSK I.M. Skaugen RING Ringerikes 
Sparebank 
ARK ARK IPL Iplast RNA Reitan Narvesen 
AVA Avantor JIN Jinhui Shipping and 
Transport 
ROGG Sparebanken 
Rogaland 
AVE Avenir KBK KredittBanken SADG Sandnes Sparebank 
AWS Awilco ser. A KEN Kenor SANG Sandsvr Sparebank 
AXI Axis Biochemicals KIT Kitron gammel SASB SAS Norge B 
BBA Bergensbanken KLI Klippen Invest SCH Schibsted 
BEA Bergesen d.y ser. A KOA Kongsberg 
Automotive 
SCI Scana Industrier 
BMA Byggma KVI Kvrner SEL Selmer 
BNR Bergen Nordhordland 
Rutelag 
LEG Legra SEN SensoNor 
BON Bonheur LHO Leif Hegh & Co SFJ DSND Subsea 
BRA Braathens LIN Linde-Group SLA SE Labels gammel 
BSH Bona Shipholding MBN MediaBin SME Smedvig ser. A 
CAG Computer Advances MDX Mindex SNOG Gjensidige NOR 
Sparebank 
CHS Choice Hotels 
Scandinavia 
MHO Media Holding SOFF Solstad Offshore 
CKR Chr. Bank og 
Kreditkasse 
MING Sparebanken Midt-
Norge 
SPC SPCS-Gruppen 
COL Color Group MORG Sparebanken Mre SST Steen & Strm 
COV ContextVision MSL Mosvold Shipping 
Ltd. 
STB Storebrand 
DNBNOR DnB NOR NAV Navia STN Stento 
DNO DNO NBK Nordlandsbanken SUO SuperOffice 
DOF District Offshore NCL NCL Holding SVEG Sparebanken Vest 
DYN Dyno NCO Norcool Holding TAA Tandberg 
EDB EDB - Elekt.  
Databeh. 
NER Nera TAD Tandberg Data 
EKJ Elkjp NHY Norsk Hydro TAT Tandberg Television 
EKO Ekornes NLD Norsk Lotteridrift TCA Telecast 
ELK Elkem NOD Nordic 
Semiconductor 
TEC Technor 
EME Ementor NONG Sparebanken Nord-
Norge 
TGS TGS-NOPEC 
Geophysical 
Company 
 103 
EVE Evercom Network NOR Norman THR Thrane-Gruppen 
FAR Farstad Shipping NOV Norsk Vekst TOM Tomra Systems 
FIN Finansbanken NSG Norske 
Skogindustrier 
TOTG Totens Sparebank 
FOE Fred. Olsen Energy NTC NetCom TTS TTS Marine 
FOK Fokus Bank NWS Norway Seafoods ULS Ulstein Holding 
FOT First Olsen Tankers OCR Ocean Rig UNS Ugland Nordic 
Shipping 
FRO Frontline ODF Odfjell ser. A UTO Unitor 
GOD Goodtech ORC Oslo Reinsurance Co WAT Waterfront Shipping 
GRE Gresvig PDR Petrolia Drilling VEI Veidekke 
GRO Ganger Rolf PFI P4 Radio Hele Norge VIS Visma 
HAG HG PGS Petroleum Geo-
Services 
VSBG SpareBanken 
Vestfold 
            
Total 132 Companies 
        
Table 17: Companies with 4 announcements in 1998 
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Companies with 4 announcements in 1999 
            
ACL Atlantic Container 
Line 
KBK KredittBanken ROGG Sparebanken 
Rogaland 
AGR Agresso Group KEN Kenor ROX Roxar 
AIK Aktiv Kapital KIT Kitron SADG Sandnes Sparebank 
ALV Alvern KOG Kongsberg Gruppen SASB SAS Norge B 
AMA Aker Maritime KVI Kvrner SCH Schibsted 
ASC ABG Sundal Collier LHO Leif Hegh & Co SCI Scana Industrier 
AURG Aurskog Sparebank LUX Luxo SEL Selmer 
AVA Avantor MDX Mindex SEN SensoNor 
AVE Avenir MELG Melhus Sparebank SFJ DSND Subsea 
BBA Bergensbanken MHG Pan Fish SFM Synnve Finden 
BEA Bergesen d.y ser. A MING Sparebanken Midt-
Norge 
SMA Stavdal 
BET Benor Tankers MOE Moelven Industrier SME Smedvig ser. A 
BLO Blom MORG Sparebanken Mre SNIB Stolt-Nielsen B 
BNR Bergen Nordhordland 
Rutelag 
MSL Mosvold Shipping 
Ltd. 
SNOG Gjensidige NOR 
Sparebank 
BRA Braathens NAV Navia SOI Software Innovation 
CAG Computer Advances NBK Nordlandsbanken SST Steen & Strm 
CKR Chr. Bank og 
Kreditkasse 
NCL NCL Holding STB Storebrand 
DNO DNO NER Nera STN Stento 
DOF District Offshore NESG Nes Prestegjelds 
Sparebank 
SUO SuperOffice 
DYN Dyno NHY Norsk Hydro SVEG Sparebanken Vest 
EKJ Elkjp NIS NAVIS TAA Tandberg 
EKO Ekornes NLD Norsk Lotteridrift TAD Tandberg Data 
ELK Elkem NOD Nordic 
Semiconductor 
TEC Technor 
ELT Eltek NONG Sparebanken Nord-
Norge 
TGS TGS-NOPEC 
Geophysical 
Company 
EME Ementor NOR Norman TOM Tomra Systems 
EVE Evercom Network NOV Norsk Vekst TOTG Totens Sparebank 
FAR Farstad Shipping OCR Ocean Rig TSH Team Shipping 
FOE Fred. Olsen Energy ODF Odfjell ser. A TTS TTS Marine 
FOT First Olsen Tankers OTR Otrum UNS Ugland Nordic 
Shipping 
GOD Goodtech PDR Petrolia Drilling UTO Unitor 
GRE Gresvig PFI P4 Radio Hele Norge WAT Waterfront Shipping 
HAG HG PGS Petroleum Geo-
Services 
WBS Western Bulk 
Shipping 
HEX Hexagon Composites PLUG Sparebanken Pluss VEI Veidekke 
HJE Hjellegjerde PRO Profdoc VIS Visma 
IFB Industrifinans 
Boligeiendom 
PRV Provida VME VMetro 
IFN Industrifinans 
Nringseiendom 
RANG Sparebanken Rana VSBG SpareBanken 
Vestfold 
IGNIS Ignis RAU Raufoss VVL Voss Veksel- og 
Landmandsbank 
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ITE Itera Consulting 
Group 
RCL Royal Caribbean 
Cruises 
    
JIN Jinhui Shipping and 
Transport 
RING Ringerikes 
Sparebank 
    
            
Total 115 Companies 
        
Table 18: Companies with 4 announcements in 1999 
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Companies with 4 announcements in 2000 
            
AAV Adresseavisen IFN Industrifinans 
Nringseiendom 
RANG Sparebanken Rana 
ACL Atlantic Container 
Line 
IGE Int. Gold Exploration RAU Raufoss 
AFG AF Gruppen IGNIS Ignis RCG RC Gruppen 
AFK Arendals 
Fossekompani 
IMSK I.M. Skaugen RCL Royal Caribbean 
Cruises 
AIK Aktiv Kapital INM Inmeta RIC Rica Hotels 
ALX Altinex ISSG Indre Sogn 
Sparebank 
RIE Rieber & Sn 
AMA Aker Maritime ITE Itera Consulting 
Group 
RING Ringerikes 
Sparebank 
ATG Andvord Tybring-
Gjedde 
KBK KredittBanken RNA Reitan Narvesen 
AURG Aurskog Sparebank KEN Kenor ROGG Sparebanken 
Rogaland 
AVA Avantor KIT Kitron ROX Roxar 
AWS Awilco ser. A KLI Klippen Invest SADG Sandnes Sparebank 
BEA Bergesen d.y ser. A KOG Kongsberg Gruppen SANG Sandsvr Sparebank 
BEL Belships KVE Kverneland SASB SAS Norge B 
BLO Blom LHO Leif Hegh & Co SCH Schibsted 
BNB Bolig- og 
Nringsbanken 
LUX Luxo SCI Scana Industrier 
BON Bonheur MHG Pan Fish SFJ DSND Subsea 
BRA Braathens MING Sparebanken Midt-
Norge 
SFM Synnve Finden 
CKR Chr. Bank og 
Kreditkasse 
MORG Sparebanken Mre SME Smedvig ser. A 
COV ContextVision MSL Mosvold Shipping 
Ltd. 
SNOG Gjensidige NOR 
Sparebank 
DNBNOR DnB NOR NBK Nordlandsbanken SOFF Solstad Offshore 
DNO DNO NER Nera SOI Software Innovation 
DOF DOF NESG Nes Prestegjelds 
Sparebank 
SPC SPCS-Gruppen 
EKO Ekornes NHY Norsk Hydro STA Stavanger Aftenblad 
ELK Elkem NIS NAVIS STB Storebrand 
ELT Eltek NKI Norsk Kjkkeninvest SUO SuperOffice 
EME Ementor NOD Nordic 
Semiconductor 
SVEG Sparebanken Vest 
ENI Enitel NOL Nortrans Offshore SWR Swan Reefer 
EVE Evercom Network NONG Sparebanken Nord-
Norge 
TAA Tandberg 
FAR Farstad Shipping NOV Norsk Vekst TAD Tandberg Data 
FOE Fred. Olsen Energy NSG Norske 
Skogindustrier 
TEC Technor 
FSL Fesil OCR Ocean Rig TGS TGS-NOPEC 
Geophysical 
Company 
GOD Goodtech ODF Odfjell ser. A TOM Tomra Systems 
GRE Gresvig OLT Olav Thon 
Eiendomsselskap 
TOTG Totens Sparebank 
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GRR Green Reefers OTR Otrum TSH Team Shipping 
HAG HG PCL PC LAN TTS TTS Marine 
HJE Hjellegjerde PDR Petrolia Drilling UNS Ugland Nordic 
Shipping 
HNA Hafslund ser. A PFI P4 Radio Hele Norge UTO Unitor 
HSPG Hland Sparebank PGS Petroleum Geo-
Services 
VEI Veidekke 
HSU Havila Supply PLUG Sparebanken Pluss VME VMetro 
HYD Hydralift PRO Profdoc VSBG SpareBanken 
Vestfold 
IFB Industrifinans 
Boligeiendom 
PRS Prosafe VVL Voss Veksel- og 
Landmandsbank 
            
Total 123 Companies 
        
Table 19: Companies with 4 announcements in 2000 
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Companies with 4 announcements in 2001 
            
AAV Adresseavisen IMSK I.M. Skaugen PRS Prosafe 
ACL 
Atlantic Container 
Line INM Inmeta RCL 
Royal Caribbean 
Cruises 
AFG AF Gruppen INN Intellinet RIC Rica Hotels 
AFK 
Arendals 
Fossekompani INVEST Investra RIE Rieber & Sn 
AIK Aktiv Kapital ITE 
Itera Consulting 
Group RING 
Ringerikes 
Sparebank 
AMA Aker Maritime JIN 
Jinhui Shipping and 
Transport ROGG 
Sparebanken 
Rogaland 
ASC ABG Sundal Collier KBK KredittBanken ROX Roxar 
AURG Aurskog Sparebank KEN Kenor SADG Sandnes Sparebank 
AWS Awilco ser. A KLI Klippen Invest SANG Sandsvr Sparebank 
BEA Bergesen d.y ser. A KOG Kongsberg Gruppen SCH Schibsted 
BEL Belships KOM Komplett SCI Scana Industrier 
BLO Blom KVE Kverneland SLA SE Labels 
BMA Byggma KVI Kvrner SME Smedvig ser. A 
BNR Bergen Nordhordland 
Rutelag 
LHO Leif Hegh & Co SNOG Gjensidige NOR 
Sparebank 
BON Bonheur LOI Loki SNS Sense 
Communications 
International 
DAT Data Respons LUX Luxo SOFF Solstad Offshore 
DNO DNO MELG Melhus Sparebank SOI Software Innovation 
EKO Ekornes MHG Pan Fish SOLV Solvang 
ELK Elkem MING Sparebanken Midt-
Norge 
SPOG Sparebanken st 
ELT Eltek MOE Moelven Industrier SST Steen & Strm 
EME Ementor MORG Sparebanken Mre STB Storebrand 
EVE Evercom Network NBK Nordlandsbanken STP Stepstone 
EXPERT Expert NEC Norse Energy Corp. SVEG Sparebanken Vest 
FJO Fjord Seafood NESG Nes Prestegjelds 
Sparebank 
TAA Tandberg 
FLOG Sparebanken Flora-
Bremanger 
NHY Norsk Hydro TAT Tandberg Television 
FOE Fred. Olsen Energy NOD Nordic 
Semiconductor 
TCO TeleComputing 
FOS Fosen Trafikklag NOF Northern Offshore TEC Technor 
FSL Fesil NONG Sparebanken Nord-
Norge 
TEL Telenor 
GRE Gresvig NOW Nordic Water Supply TGS TGS-NOPEC 
Geophysical 
Company 
GRO Ganger Rolf NSG Norske 
Skogindustrier 
TOM Tomra Systems 
HAG HG NUT Nutri Pharma TOR Tordenskjold 
HELG Helgeland Sparebank OCR Ocean Rig TOTG Totens Sparebank 
HEX Hexagon Composites ODF Odfjell ser. A TTS TTS Marine 
HJE Hjellegjerde OFL Office Line UTO Unitor 
HNA Hafslund ser. A ORK Orkla VEI Veidekke 
HSPG Hland Sparebank OSH OfficeShop Holding VIS Visma 
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HSU Havila Supply OTR Otrum VME VMetro 
HYD Hydralift PFI P4 Radio Hele Norge VOI Voice 
IFN Industrifinans 
Nringseiendom 
PGS Petroleum Geo-
Services 
VSBG SpareBanken 
Vestfold 
IGNIS Ignis PHO PhotoCure WWI Wilh. Wilhelmsen ser. 
A 
IGR iGroup PLUG Sparebanken Pluss VVL Voss Veksel- og 
Landmandsbank 
            
Total 123 Companies 
        
Table 20: Companies with 4 announcements in 2001 
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Companies with 4 announcements in 2002 
            
AAV Adresseavisen HYD Hydralift PGS 
Petroleum Geo-
Services 
ACTA Acta Holding IFB 
Industrifinans 
Boligeiendom PHO PhotoCure 
AFG AF Gruppen IFN 
Industrifinans 
Nringseiendom PLUG Sparebanken Pluss 
AFK 
Arendals 
Fossekompani IGE Int. Gold Exploration PRO Profdoc 
AIK Aktiv Kapital IGNIS Ignis PRS Prosafe 
ALX Altinex IGR iGroup RANG Sparebanken Rana 
APR A-pressen IMSK I.M. Skaugen RAU Raufoss 
ASC ABG Sundal Collier INM Inmeta RCL 
Royal Caribbean 
Cruises 
ATG 
Andvord Tybring-
Gjedde INVEST Investra RGT Rocksource 
AURG Aurskog Sparebank ISSG 
Indre Sogn 
Sparebank RIC Rica Hotels 
AVA Avantor ITE Itera Consulting 
Group 
RIE Rieber & Sn 
AWS Awilco ser. A JIN Jinhui Shipping and 
Transport 
RING Ringerikes 
Sparebank 
BEA Bergesen d.y ser. A KBK KredittBanken ROGG Sparebanken 
Rogaland 
BEL Belships KDP Kristiansand 
Dyrepark 
ROX Roxar 
BLO Blom KEN Kenor SADG Sandnes Sparebank 
BMA Byggma KIT Kitron SANG Sandsvr Sparebank 
BNB Bolig- og 
Nringsbanken 
KLI Klippen Invest SCH Schibsted 
BNR Bergen Nordhordland 
Rutelag 
KOG Kongsberg Gruppen SCI Scana Industrier 
BON Bonheur KOM Komplett SFM Synnve Finden 
BOR Borgestad KVE Kverneland SKI Skiens Aktiemlle 
COV ContextVision KVI Kvrner SME Smedvig ser. A 
CRP Crystal Production LHO Leif Hegh & Co SNS Sense 
Communications 
International 
DAT Data Respons LIN Linde-Group SOFF Solstad Offshore 
DNBNOR DnB NOR LOI Loki SOLV Solvang 
DNO DNO LUX Luxo SPOG Sparebanken st 
DOF DOF MBN MediaBin SRI Star Reefers Inc. 
DOM Domstein MEF Mefjorden SST Steen & Strm 
EKO Ekornes MELG Melhus Sparebank STA Stavanger Aftenblad 
ELK Elkem MHG Pan Fish STB Storebrand 
ELT Eltek MING Sparebanken Midt-
Norge 
STL Statoil 
EME Ementor NBK Nordlandsbanken STP Stepstone 
EXE Exense NEC Norse Energy Corp. SUO SuperOffice 
EXPERT Expert NER Nera SVEG Sparebanken Vest 
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FAR Farstad Shipping NESG Nes Prestegjelds 
Sparebank 
TAA Tandberg 
FAST Fast Search & 
Transfer 
NHY Norsk Hydro TAT Tandberg Television 
FDR Frontier Drilling NOD Nordic 
Semiconductor 
TCO TeleComputing 
FJO Fjord Seafood NOF Northern Offshore TEC Technor 
FOE Fred. Olsen Energy NONG Sparebanken Nord-
Norge 
TEL Telenor 
FOS Fosen Trafikklag NOR Norman TGS TGS-NOPEC 
Geophysical 
Company 
GGS Global Geo Services NOV Norsk Vekst TOM Tomra Systems 
GOD Goodtech NOW Nordic Water Supply TOR Tordenskjold 
GRE Gresvig NSG Norske 
Skogindustrier 
TOTG Totens Sparebank 
GRO Ganger Rolf NUT Nutri Pharma TTS TTS Marine 
GRR Green Reefers OCR Ocean Rig UTO Unitor 
GYL Gyldendal ODF Odfjell ser. A VEI Veidekke 
HAG HG OFL Office Line VIS Visma 
HELG Helgeland Sparebank OLT Olav Thon 
Eiendomsselskap 
VME VMetro 
HEX Hexagon Composites ORK Orkla VOI Voice 
HJE Hjellegjerde OSH OfficeShop Holding VSBG SpareBanken 
Vestfold 
HNA Hafslund ser. A OTR Otrum WWI Wilh. Wilhelmsen ser. 
A 
HND Hands PDR Petrolia Drilling VVL Voss Veksel- og 
Landmandsbank 
HSPG Hland Sparebank PEL Pan Pelagic     
HSU Havila Supply PFI P4 Radio Hele Norge     
            
Total 157 Companies 
        
Table 21: Companies with 4 announcements in 2002 
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Companies with 4 announcements in 2003 
            
AAV Adresseavisen HOLG Hol Sparebank PRO Profdoc 
ACTA Acta Holding HSPG Hland Sparebank PRS Prosafe 
AFG AF Gruppen IFN 
Industrifinans 
Nringseiendom PSI PSI Group 
AFK 
Arendals 
Fossekompani IGE Int. Gold Exploration QFR Q-Free 
AIK Aktiv Kapital IGNIS Ignis RANG Sparebanken Rana 
ALX Altinex IMSK I.M. Skaugen RAU Raufoss 
APP Apptix INM Inmeta RCL 
Royal Caribbean 
Cruises 
ASC ABG Sundal Collier ISSG 
Indre Sogn 
Sparebank RGT Rocksource 
ATG 
Andvord Tybring-
Gjedde ITE 
Itera Consulting 
Group RIC Rica Hotels 
AURG Aurskog Sparebank JIN 
Jinhui Shipping and 
Transport RIE Rieber & Sn 
AVA Avantor KBK KredittBanken RING Ringerikes 
Sparebank 
BEL Belships KDP Kristiansand 
Dyrepark 
ROGG Sparebanken 
Rogaland 
BIRD Birdstep Technology KEN Kenor SADG Sandnes Sparebank 
BLO Blom KIT Kitron SANG Sandsvr Sparebank 
BMA Byggma KLI Klippen Invest SCH Schibsted 
BNB Bolig- og 
Nringsbanken 
KOG Kongsberg Gruppen SCI Scana Industrier 
BON Bonheur KOM Komplett SFM Synnve Finden 
BOR Borgestad KVE Kverneland SIN Sinvest 
COV ContextVision KVI Kvrner SKI Skiens Aktiemlle 
DAT Data Respons LIN Linde-Group SME Smedvig ser. A 
DNBNOR DnB NOR LSG Lery Seafood Group SOFF Solstad Offshore 
DNO DNO LUX Luxo SOI Software Innovation 
DOF DOF MEF Mefjorden SOLV Solvang 
DOM Domstein MELG Melhus Sparebank SPOG Sparebanken st 
EKO Ekornes MHG Pan Fish SRI Star Reefers Inc. 
ELK Elkem MING Sparebanken Midt-
Norge 
SST Steen & Strm 
ELT Eltek MORG Sparebanken Mre STA Stavanger Aftenblad 
EME Ementor NAM Namsos 
Trafikkselskap 
STB Storebrand 
EXE Exense NEC Norse Energy Corp. STL Statoil 
EXPERT Expert NER Nera STP Stepstone 
FAR Farstad Shipping NESG Nes Prestegjelds 
Sparebank 
SUB Subsea 7 
FAST Fast Search & 
Transfer 
NHY Norsk Hydro SUO SuperOffice 
FDR Frontier Drilling NOD Nordic 
Semiconductor 
SVEG Sparebanken Vest 
FJO Fjord Seafood NOF Northern Offshore TAA Tandberg 
FOE Fred. Olsen Energy NONG Sparebanken Nord-
Norge 
TAD Tandberg Data 
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FOS Fosen Trafikklag NOR Norman TAT Tandberg Television 
FRO Frontline NOV Norsk Vekst TCO TeleComputing 
FSL Fesil NSG Norske 
Skogindustrier 
TEC Technor 
GGS Global Geo Services NUT Nutri Pharma TEL Telenor 
GOD Goodtech OCR Ocean Rig TGS TGS-NOPEC 
Geophysical 
Company 
GOL Golar LNG ODF Odfjell ser. A TOM Tomra Systems 
GRE Gresvig OFL Office Line TOTG Totens Sparebank 
GRO Ganger Rolf OLT Olav Thon 
Eiendomsselskap 
TTS TTS Marine 
GRR Green Reefers OPC Opticom UTO Unitor 
GYL Gyldendal ORK Orkla VEI Veidekke 
HAG HG OTR Otrum VIS Visma 
HELG Helgeland Sparebank PDR Petrolia Drilling VME VMetro 
HEX Hexagon Composites PFI P4 Radio Hele Norge VSBG SpareBanken 
Vestfold 
HJE Hjellegjerde PGS Petroleum Geo-
Services 
WWI Wilh. Wilhelmsen ser. 
A 
HNA Hafslund ser. A PHO PhotoCure VVL Voss Veksel- og 
Landmandsbank 
HND Hands PLUG Sparebanken Pluss     
            
Total 152 Companies 
        
Table 22: Companies with 4 announcements in 2003 
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Companies with 4 announcements in 2004 
            
AAV Adresseavisen HNA Hafslund ser. A RCL Royal Caribbean 
Cruises 
ACTA Acta Holding HND Hands RIC Rica Hotels 
AFG AF Gruppen HSPG Hland Sparebank RIE Rieber & Sn 
AFK Arendals 
Fossekompani 
IGE Int. Gold Exploration RING Ringerikes 
Sparebank 
AIK Aktiv Kapital IGNIS Ignis ROGG Sparebanken 
Rogaland 
ALX Altinex IMSK I.M. Skaugen SADG Sandnes Sparebank 
APP Apptix INM Inmeta SANG Sandsvr Sparebank 
ASC ABG Sundal Collier ISSG Indre Sogn 
Sparebank 
SCH Schibsted 
ATG Andvord Tybring-
Gjedde 
ITE Itera Consulting 
Group 
SCI Scana Industrier 
AURG Aurskog Sparebank KIT Kitron SFM Synnve Finden 
BEL Belships KOG Kongsberg Gruppen SIN Sinvest 
BIRD Birdstep Technology KOM Komplett SKI Skiens Aktiemlle 
BLO Blom KVE Kverneland SME Smedvig ser. A 
BMA Byggma KVI Kvrner SOFF Solstad Offshore 
BNB Bolig- og 
Nringsbanken 
LSG Lery Seafood Group SOI Software Innovation 
BON Bonheur LUX Luxo SOLV Solvang 
BOR Borgestad MELG Melhus Sparebank SPOG Sparebanken st 
COV ContextVision MHG Pan Fish SRI Star Reefers Inc. 
DAT Data Respons MING Sparebanken Midt-
Norge 
SST Steen & Strm 
DNBNOR DnB NOR MORG Sparebanken Mre STB Storebrand 
DNO DNO NAM Namsos 
Trafikkselskap 
STL Statoil 
DOF DOF NAS Norwegian Air Shuttle STP Stepstone 
DOM Domstein NEC Norse Energy Corp. SUB Subsea 7 
EID Eidsiva Rederi NER Nera SUO SuperOffice 
EKO Ekornes NESG Nes Prestegjelds 
Sparebank 
SVEG Sparebanken Vest 
ELK Elkem NEXT NextGenTel Holding TAA Tandberg 
ELT Eltek NHY Norsk Hydro TAD Tandberg Data 
EME Ementor NOD Nordic 
Semiconductor 
TAT Tandberg Television 
EXE Exense NONG Sparebanken Nord-
Norge 
TCO TeleComputing 
EXPERT Expert NOV Norsk Vekst TEC Technor 
FAR Farstad Shipping NSG Norske 
Skogindustrier 
TEL Telenor 
FAST Fast Search & 
Transfer 
NUT Nutri Pharma TFDS Troms Fylkes 
Dampskibsselskap 
FJO Fjord Seafood OCR Ocean Rig TGS TGS-NOPEC 
Geophysical 
Company 
FOE Fred. Olsen Energy ODF Odfjell ser. A TOM Tomra Systems 
FOS Fosen Trafikklag OFL Office Line TOTG Totens Sparebank 
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FRO Frontline OLT Olav Thon 
Eiendomsselskap 
TST Tandberg Storage 
FSL Fesil OPC Opticom TTS TTS Marine 
GOD Goodtech ORK Orkla UTO Unitor 
GOL Golar LNG OTR Otrum VEI Veidekke 
GRE Gresvig PFI P4 Radio Hele Norge VIS Visma 
GRO Ganger Rolf PHO PhotoCure VME VMetro 
GYL Gyldendal PLUG Sparebanken Pluss VSBG SpareBanken 
Vestfold 
HAG HG PRO Profdoc WWI Wilh. Wilhelmsen ser. 
A 
HELG Helgeland Sparebank PRS Prosafe VVL Voss Veksel- og 
Landmandsbank 
HEX Hexagon Composites PSI PSI Group     
HJE Hjellegjerde QFR Q-Free     
            
Total 136 Companies 
        
Table 23: Companies with 4 announcements in 2004 
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Companies with 4 announcements in 2005 
            
AAV Adresseavisen HOLG Hol Sparebank QFR Q-Free 
ACTA Acta Holding HSPG Hland Sparebank RCL Royal Caribbean 
Cruises 
AFG AF Gruppen IBAS IBAS Holding RGT Rocksource 
AFK Arendals 
Fossekompani 
IGNIS Ignis RIC Rica Hotels 
AIK Aktiv Kapital IMSK I.M. Skaugen RIE Rieber & Sn 
AKER Aker INM Inmeta RING Ringerikes 
Sparebank 
AKY Aker Yards ISSG Indre Sogn 
Sparebank 
ROGG Sparebanken 
Rogaland 
ALX Altinex ITE Itera Consulting 
Group 
SADG Sandnes Sparebank 
APP Apptix KIT Kitron SANG Sandsvr Sparebank 
ASC ABG Sundal Collier KOG Kongsberg Gruppen SCH Schibsted 
ATG Andvord Tybring-
Gjedde 
KOM Komplett SCI Scana Industrier 
AURG Aurskog Sparebank KVE Kverneland SEVAN Sevan Marine 
BEL Belships LSG Lery Seafood Group SFM Synnve Finden 
BIRD Birdstep Technology LUX Luxo SIN Sinvest 
BJORGE Bjrge MAMUT Mamut SKI Skiens Aktiemlle 
BLO Blom MEC Medicult SME Smedvig ser. A 
BMA Byggma MEDI Medi-Stim SNI Stolt-Nielsen 
BON Bonheur MELG Melhus Sparebank SOFF Solstad Offshore 
BOR Borgestad MHG Pan Fish SOI Software Innovation 
CNS Conseptor MING Sparebanken Midt-
Norge 
SOLV Solvang 
COV ContextVision MORG Sparebanken Mre SPOG Sparebanken st 
DAT Data Respons NAM Namsos 
Trafikkselskap 
SRI Star Reefers Inc. 
DNBNOR DnB NOR NAS Norwegian Air Shuttle SST Steen & Strm 
DNO DNO NEC Norse Energy Corp. STB Storebrand 
DOF DOF NER Nera STL Statoil 
DOM Domstein NESG Nes Prestegjelds 
Sparebank 
STP Stepstone 
EID Eidsiva Rederi NEXT NextGenTel Holding SUB Subsea 7 
EKO Ekornes NHY Norsk Hydro SUO SuperOffice 
ELT Eltek NOD Nordic 
Semiconductor 
SVEG Sparebanken Vest 
EME Ementor NONG Sparebanken Nord-
Norge 
TAA Tandberg 
EXE Exense NORMAN Norman TAD Tandberg Data 
EXPERT Expert NOV Norsk Vekst TAT Tandberg Television 
FAR Farstad Shipping NSG Norske 
Skogindustrier 
TCO TeleComputing 
FAST Fast Search & 
Transfer 
NUT Nutri Pharma TEC Technor 
FJO Fjord Seafood OCR Ocean Rig TEL Telenor 
FOE Fred. Olsen Energy ODF Odfjell ser. A TFDS Troms Fylkes 
Dampskibsselskap 
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FOS Fosen Trafikklag OFL Office Line TGS TGS-NOPEC 
Geophysical 
Company 
FRO Frontline OLT Olav Thon 
Eiendomsselskap 
TOM Tomra Systems 
FSL Fesil OPC Opticom TOTG Totens Sparebank 
GGS Global Geo Services OPERA Opera Software TST Tandberg Storage 
GOD Goodtech ORK Orkla TTS TTS Marine 
GOL Golar LNG OTR Otrum UTO Unitor 
GRE Gresvig PDR Petrolia Drilling VEI Veidekke 
GRO Ganger Rolf PFI P4 Radio Hele Norge VIS Visma 
GRR Green Reefers PGS Petroleum Geo-
Services 
VME VMetro 
GYL Gyldendal PHO PhotoCure VSBG SpareBanken 
Vestfold 
HAG HG PLUG Sparebanken Pluss WWI Wilh. Wilhelmsen ser. 
A 
HEX Hexagon Composites PRO Profdoc VVL Voss Veksel- og 
Landmandsbank 
HJE Hjellegjerde PRS Prosafe YAR Yara International 
HNA Hafslund ser. A PSI PSI Group     
            
Total 149 Companies 
        
Table 24: Companies with 4 announcements in 2005 
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Companies with 4 announcements in 2006 
            
AAV Adresseavisen GOD Goodtech PGS Petroleum Geo-
Services 
ACTA Acta Holding GOGL Golden Ocean Group PHO Photocure 
AFG AF Gruppen GOL Golar LNG PLUG Sparebanken Pluss 
AFK Arendals 
Fossekompani 
GRO Ganger Rolf PRO Profdoc 
AIK Aktiv Kapital GRR Green Reefers PRS Prosafe 
AKASA Aker American 
Shipping 
GYL Gyldendal PSI PSI Group 
AKER Aker HAVI Havila Shipping QFR Q-Free 
AKS Aker Seafoods HEX Hexagon Composites RCL Royal Caribbean 
Cruises 
AKY Aker Yards HJE Hjellegjerde REVUS Revus Energy 
ALX Altinex HNA Hafslund ser. A RGT Rocksource 
APL APL HOLG Hol Sparebank RIE Rieber & Sn 
APP Apptix HSPG Hland Sparebank RING Ringerikes 
Sparebank 
ASC ABG Sundal Collier IGNIS Ignis SADG Sandnes Sparebank 
AURG Aurskog Sparebank IMAREX IMAREX NOS SANG Sandsvr Sparebank 
AWO Awilco Offshore IMSK I.M. Skaugen SCH Schibsted 
BEL Belships INM Inmeta SCI Scana Industrier 
BIOTEC Biotec Pharmacon ISSG Indre Sogn 
Sparebank 
SDRL Seadrill 
BIRD Birdstep Technology ITE Itera Consulting 
Group 
SEVAN Sevan Marine 
BJORGE Bjrge KIT Kitron SFM Synnve Finden 
BLO Blom KOA Kongsberg 
Automotive Holding 
SIN Sinvest 
BLU Bluewater Insurance KOG Kongsberg Gruppen SIT Simrad Optronics 
BMA Byggma KOM Komplett SKI Skiens Aktiemlle 
BON Bonheur KVE Kverneland SOFF Solstad Offshore 
BOR Borgestad LSG Lery Seafood Group SOI Software Innovation 
CECO Camillo Eitzen & Co MAMUT Mamut SOLV Solvang 
CEQ Cermaq MEDI Medi-Stim SRI Star Reefers Inc. 
CNS Conseptor MELG Melhus Sparebank SST Steen & Strm 
COV ContextVision MHG Pan Fish STA Stavanger Aftenblad 
DAT Data Respons MING Sparebanken Midt-
Norge 
STB Storebrand 
DEEP DeepOcean MORG Sparebanken Mre STL Statoil 
DIAG DiaGenic NAM Namsos 
Trafikkselskap 
STP Stepstone 
DNBNOR DnB NOR NAS Norwegian Air Shuttle SUB Subsea 7 
DNO DNO NEC Norse Energy Corp. SUO SuperOffice 
DOF DOF NESG Nes Prestegjelds 
Sparebank 
SVEG Sparebanken Vest 
DOM Domstein NHY Norsk Hydro TAA Tandberg 
EDRILL Eastern Drilling NOD Nordic 
Semiconductor 
TAD Tandberg Data 
EID Eidsiva Rederi NONG Sparebanken Nord-
Norge 
TAT Tandberg Television 
EKO Ekornes NORD NorDiag TCO TeleComputing 
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ELT Eltek NORGAN Norgani Hotels TEL Telenor 
EME Ementor NORMAN Norman TGS TGS-NOPEC 
Geophysical 
Company 
EXE Exense NOV Norsk Vekst TOM Tomra Systems 
EXPERT Expert NSG Norske 
Skogindustrier 
TOTG Totens Sparebank 
FAR Farstad Shipping NUT Nutri Pharma TST Tandberg Storage 
FARA Fara OCR Ocean Rig TTS TTS Marine 
FAST Fast Search & 
Transfer 
ODF Odfjell ser. A VEI Veidekke 
FOE Fred. Olsen Energy ODIM Odim WILS Wilson 
FOS Fosen Trafikklag OLT Olav Thon 
Eiendomsselskap 
VME VMetro 
FRO Frontline OPERA Opera Software VSBG SpareBanken 
Vestfold 
FSL Fesil ORK Orkla WWI Wilh. Wilhelmsen ser. 
A 
GAS Bergesen Worldwide 
Gas 
OTR Otrum VVL Voss Veksel- og 
Landmandsbank 
GGG Grenland Group PDR Petrolia Drilling YAR Yara International 
            
Total 153 Companies 
        
Table 25: Companies with 4 announcements in 2006 
 120 
 
Companies with 4 announcements in 2007 
            
AAV Adresseavisen GAS BW Gas PGS Petroleum Geo-
Services 
ACTA Acta Holding GGG Grenland Group PHO Photocure 
AFG AF Gruppen GGS Global Geo Services PLUG Sparebanken Pluss 
AFK Arendals 
Fossekompani 
GOD Goodtech POWEL Powel 
AGR AGR Group GOGL Golden Ocean Group PRO Profdoc 
AIK Aktiv Kapital GOL Golar LNG PRS Prosafe 
AKASA Aker American 
Shipping 
GRO Ganger Rolf PSI PSI Group 
AKBM Aker BioMarine GRR Green Reefers QFR Q-Free 
AKD Aker Drilling GYL Gyldendal RCL Royal Caribbean 
Cruises 
AKER Aker HAVI Havila Shipping REC Renewable Energy 
Corporation 
AKFP Aker Floating 
Production 
HELG Helgeland Sparebank REPANT Repant 
AKS Aker Seafoods HEX Hexagon Composites REVUS Revus Energy 
AKVA AKVA Group HJE Hjellegjerde RGT Rocksource 
AKY Aker Yards HNA Hafslund ser. A RIE Rieber & Son 
APP Apptix HOLG Hol Sparebank RING Ringerikes 
Sparebank 
ASC ABG Sundal Collier HRG Hurtigruten ROGG SpareBank 1 SR-
Bank 
AURG Aurskog Sparebank HSPG Holand Sparebank RVSBG Rygge-Vaaler 
Sparebank 
AUSS Austevoll Seafood IGNIS Ignis SADG Sandnes Sparebank 
AWO Awilco Offshore IMAREX IMAREX SANG Sandsvar Sparebank 
BEL Belships IMSK I.M. Skaugen SBX SeaBird Exploration 
BIOTEC Biotec Pharmacon INM Inmeta SCH Schibsted 
BIRD Birdstep Technology IOX InterOil Exploration 
and Production 
SCI Scana Industrier 
BJORGE Bjorge ISSG Indre Sogn 
Sparebank 
SDRL Seadrill 
BLO Blom ITC Intelecom Group SEVAN Sevan Marine 
BLU Bluewater Insurance ITE Itera Consulting 
Group 
SFM Synn?ve Finden 
BMA Byggma JACK Petrojack SIT Simrad Optronics 
BON Bonheur KIT Kitron SKI Skiens Aktiem?lle 
BOR Borgestad KOA Kongsberg 
Automotive Holding 
SOFF Solstad Offshore 
BWG BWG Homes KOG Kongsberg Gruppen SOI Software Innovation 
BWO BW Offshore Limited KOM Komplett SOLV Solvang 
CECO Camillo Eitzen & Co KVE Kverneland SONG Songa Offshore 
CEQ Cermaq LSG Leroy Seafood Group SPOG Sparebanken Ost 
CLAVIS Clavis Pharma LUX Luxo SRI Star Reefers Inc. 
COD Codfarmers MAFA Marine Farms STA Stavanger Aftenblad 
COMROD Comrod 
Communication 
MAMUT Mamut STB Storebrand 
CONF Confirmit MEDI Medi-Stim STL StatoilHydro 
COP Copeinca MELG Melhus Sparebank STP Stepstone 
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COV ContextVision MHG Marine Harvest SUB Subsea 7 
DAT Data Respons MING Sparebanken Midt-
Norge 
SUO SuperOffice 
DEEP DeepOcean MORG Sparebanken M?re SVEG Sparebanken Vest 
DIAG DiaGenic NAM Namsos 
Trafikkselskap 
TAA Tandberg 
DNBNOR DnB NOR NAS Norwegian Air Shuttle TAD Tandberg Data 
DNO DNO International NAVA Navamedic TCO TeleComputing 
DOF DOF NEC Norse Energy Corp. TECO Teco Maritime 
DOFSUB DOF Subsea NESG Nes Prestegjelds 
Sparebank 
TEL Telenor 
DOLP Dolphin Interconnect 
Solutions 
NHY Norsk Hydro TELIO Telio Holding 
DOM Domstein NOD Nordic 
Semiconductor 
TGS TGS-NOPEC 
Geophysical 
Company 
ECHEM Eitzen Chemical NONG Sparebanken Nord-
Norge 
TIDE Tide 
EID Eidsiva Rederi NORD NorDiag TOM Tomra Systems 
EIOF Eidesvik Offshore NORMAN Norman TOTG Totens Sparebank 
EKO Ekornes NPRO Norwegian Property TPO Teekay Petrojarl 
ELT Eltek NSG Norske 
Skogindustrier 
TREF Trefoil 
EME Ementor NSTAT Norstat TROLL Trolltech 
EMS Eitzen Maritime 
Services 
NUT Nutri Pharma TST Tandberg Storage 
FAIR Fairstar Heavy 
Transport 
OCR Ocean Rig TTS TTS Marine 
FAKTOR Faktor Eiendom ODF Odfjell ser. A VEI Veidekke 
FAR Farstad Shipping ODIM Odim WILS Wilson 
FARA Fara OILRIG Odfjell Invest VME VMetro 
FAST Fast Search & 
Transfer 
OLT Olav Thon 
Eiendomsselskap 
VSBG SpareBanken 
Vestfold 
FOE Fred. Olsen Energy OPERA Opera Software WWI Wilh. Wilhelmsen ser. 
A 
FOS Fosen Trafikklag ORK Orkla VVL Voss Veksel- og 
Landmandsbank 
FRO Frontline OTR Otrum YAR Yara International 
FUNCOM Funcom PDR Petrolia Drilling     
            
Total 188 Companies 
        
Table 26: Companies with 4 announcements in 2007 
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Figure 2: Figure 3 in Frazzini and Lamont (2007) – Cumulated Abnormal 
Returns and volume around earnings announcements, 1973–2004 
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7.2 Excess Returns L/S Portfolios Based on Previous Year 
Method 
Arithmetic averages of simple returns: 
All Stocks Expected Non-announcers Excpected Announcers L/S
1999-2007
Mean -0.416% -0.046% -0.772% -0.640%
t-stat 0.58 0.06 0.91 0.91
Std deviation 0.075 0.074 0.089 0.073
Skewness -0.718 -0.729 -0.046 0.055
Kurtosis 1.264 1.404 0.403 2.134
Sharpe Ratio -0.056 -0.006 -0.087 -0.087
1999-2000
Mean -1.221% -0.168% -2.062% -1.722%
t-stat 0.67 0.10 0.95 1.02
Std deviation 0.089 0.083 0.107 0.083
Skewness -0.091 -0.193 0.002 0.044
Kurtosis -0.844 1.755 -0.747 -0.569
Sharpe Ratio -0.137 -0.020 -0.193 -0.207
2001-2007
Mean -0.186% -0.011% -0.388% -0.331%
t-stat 0.22 0.01 0.43 0.43
Std deviation 0.078 0.071 0.083 0.071
Skewness -1.004 -0.957 0.013 0.064
Kurtosis 2.627 2.422 1.077 3.108
Sharpe Ratio -0.024 -0.002 -0.047 -0.047
All Stocks With 4 Announcements the Previous Year
 
Table 27: All Stocks with 4 Announcements the Previous Year – Previous 
Year Method 
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All Stocks Expected Non-announcers Excpected Announcers L/S
1999-2007
Mean 0.208% 0.624% -0.772% -1.395%
t-stat 0.31 0.95 0.85 1.78
Std deviation 0.066 0.065 0.089 0.077
Skewness -0.273 -0.184 -0.046 -0.512
Kurtosis -0.020 -0.265 0.403 1.910
Sharpe Ratio 0.031 0.097 -0.087 -0.182
1999-2000
Mean -0.691% 0.457% -2.062% -2.519%
t-stat 0.15 0.45 0.41 0.85
Std deviation 0.088 0.081 0.107 0.082
Skewness -0.112 -0.178 0.002 -0.052
Kurtosis -0.797 -0.603 -0.747 -0.740
Sharpe Ratio -0.078 0.057 -0.193 -0.308
2001-2007
Mean 0.475% 0.673% -0.388% -1.061%
t-stat 0.27 0.83 0.75 1.56
Std deviation 0.059 0.060 0.083 0.076
Skewness -0.245 -0.169 0.013 -0.668
Kurtosis 0.167 -0.229 1.077 3.143
Sharpe Ratio 0.081 0.113 -0.047 -0.140
Months with zero expected Announcements Deleted
 
Table 28: Months with Zero Expected Announcements Deleted – Previous 
Year Method 
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All Stocks Expected Non-announcers Excpected Announcers L/S
1999-2007
Mean -0.416% -0.018% -0.117% -0.099%
t-stat 0.54 0.25 1.14 1.02
Std deviation 0.075 0.007 0.010 0.010
Skewness -0.718 -0.830 -1.671 -0.631
Kurtosis 1.264 2.598 8.984 10.802
Sharpe Ratio -0.056 -0.025 -0.117 -0.104
1999-2000
Mean -1.221% -0.059% -0.266% -0.208%
t-stat 0.27 0.12 0.57 0.51
Std deviation 0.089 0.007 0.010 0.008
Skewness -0.091 -0.623 -0.620 -0.613
Kurtosis -0.844 1.860 0.005 0.699
Sharpe Ratio -0.137 -0.086 -0.274 -0.245
2001-2007
Mean -0.186% -0.006% -0.075% -0.069%
t-stat 0.51 0.23 1.07 0.95
Std deviation 0.071 0.007 0.010 0.010
Skewness -1.004 -0.895 -1.968 -0.668
Kurtosis 2.627 2.921 11.579 12.357
Sharpe Ratio -0.026 -0.009 -0.074 -0.069
Managed L/S Portfolio
 
Table 29: Managed L/S Portfolio – Previous Year Method 
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All Stocks Expected Non-announcers Excpected Announcers L/S
1999-2007
Mean -1.416% -0.795% -1.740% -0.945%
t-stat 1.31 0.79 1.20 0.69
Std deviation 0.065 0.061 0.087 0.082
Skewness -0.353 -0.224 -0.641 -0.405
Kurtosis -0.725 -0.655 1.065 1.707
Sharpe Ratio -0.219 -0.131 -0.201 -0.115
1999-2000
Mean -3.663% -0.368% -5.385% -5.017%
t-stat 1.75 0.16 2.11 1.66
Std deviation 0.059 0.064 0.072 0.086
Skewness -0.091 -0.345 -0.682 -0.398
Kurtosis -1.984 2.366 0.313 -1.060
Sharpe Ratio -0.620 -0.057 -0.746 -0.587
2001-2007
Mean -0.774% -0.918% -0.698% 0.219%
t-stat 0.51 0.80 0.53 0.15
Std deviation 0.081 0.061 0.070 0.079
Skewness -0.502 -0.209 -0.841 -0.425
Kurtosis -0.423 -1.040 1.687 3.157
Sharpe Ratio -0.096 -0.151 -0.099 0.028
L/S Portfolio Traded in February, May, August and October
 
Table 30: L/S Portfolio Traded in February, May, August and October – 
Previous Year Method 
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7.3 Excess Returns L/S Portfolio Based on Fiscal Year 
Method 
Arithmetic averages of simple returns: 
All Stocks Expected Non-announcers Excpected Announcers L/S
1999-2007
Mean -0.416% 0.050% -0.484% -0.533%
t-stat 0.58 0.06 0.77 0.74
Std deviation 0.075 0.065 0.038 0.075
Skewness -0.718 -1.058 -1.327 0.669
Kurtosis 1.264 4.127 4.428 1.630
Sharpe Ratio -0.056 0.008 -0.129 -0.071
1999-2000
Mean -1.221% -0.011% -1.228% -1.217%
t-stat 0.67 0.01 0.93 0.67
Std deviation 0.089 0.081 0.037 0.089
Skewness -0.091 -0.428 -1.843 0.560
Kurtosis -0.844 4.913 2.663 -0.430
Sharpe Ratio -0.137 -0.001 -0.330 -0.136
2001-2007
Mean -0.186% 0.067% -0.271% -0.338%
t-stat 0.30 0.08 0.07 0.44
Std deviation 0.057 0.060 0.038 0.071
Skewness -1.004 -1.457 -1.256 0.790
Kurtosis 2.627 7.054 5.260 2.981
Sharpe Ratio -0.033 0.011 -0.072 -0.048
All Stocks With 4 Announcements the Previous Year
 
Table 31: All Stocks with 4 Announcements the Previous Year – Fiscal 
Year Method 
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7.4 Excess Returns L/S Portfolios Based on Actual 
Announcement Dates 
All Stocks  Non-announcers Announcers L/S
1999-2007
Mean -0,416% -0,468% 0,153% 0,600%
t-stat 0,58 0,57 0,17 0,73
Std deviation 0,075 0,086 0,093 0,085
Skewness -0,718 -0,331 0,483 0,374
Kurtosis 1,264 1,002 1,113 1,387
Sharpe Ratio -0,056 -0,055 0,016 0,070
1999-2000
Mean -1,221% -1,412% 0,935% 2,191%
t-stat 0,67 0,67 0,43 1,04
Std deviation 0,089 0,103 0,107 0,104
Skewness -0,091 -0,085 0,151 0,398
Kurtosis -0,844 1,413 -0,406 -0,312
Sharpe Ratio -0,137 -0,136 0,088 0,212
2001-2007
Mean -0,186% -0,196% -0,053% 0,145%
t-stat 0,21 0,22 0,05 0,17
Std deviation 0,083 0,080 0,090 0,080
Skewness -1,004 -0,410 0,600 0,312
Kurtosis 2,627 2,206 1,899 2,344
Sharpe Ratio -0,022 -0,024 -0,006 0,018
All Stocks With 4 Announcements Each Calendar Year
 
Table 32: All Stocks with 4 Announcements Each Calendar Year – Actual 
year method 
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All Stocks Non-announcers Announcers L/S
1999-2007
Mean -0,059% -0,216% 0,154% 0,368%
t-stat 0,08 0,26 0,16 0,36
Std deviation 0,070 0,082 0,093 0,100
Skewness -0,314 -0,018 0,483 0,234
Kurtosis -0,337 0,369 1,113 1,297
Sharpe Ratio -0,008 -0,026 0,017 0,037
1999-2000
Mean -1,324% -2,414% 0,823% 3,237%
t-stat 0,04 0,12 0,08 0,17
Std deviation 0,084 0,104 0,104 0,124
Skewness -0,098 0,052 0,160 0,397
Kurtosis -0,708 -0,898 -0,419 -0,540
Sharpe Ratio -0,158 -0,232 0,079 0,261
2001-2007
Mean 0,317% 0,446% -0,045% -0,485%
t-stat 0,07 0,22 0,14 0,32
Std deviation 0,066 0,074 0,090 0,091
Skewness -0,341 0,185 0,609 -0,104
Kurtosis -0,197 1,094 1,953 2,201
Sharpe Ratio 0,048 0,060 -0,005 -0,053
Months with Zero Actual Announcements Deleted
 
Table 33: Months with Zero Actual Announcements Deleted – Actual year 
method 
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All Stocks Non-announcers Announcers L/S
1999-2007
Mean -0,416% -0,080% -0,063% 0,018%
t-stat 0,54 0,78 0,75 0,15
Std deviation 0,075 0,010 0,008 0,011
Skewness -0,718 -0,888 -1,058 1,602
Kurtosis 1,265 4,952 4,481 10,839
Sharpe Ratio -0,056 -0,080 -0,077 0,016
1999-2000
Mean -1,220% -0,183% -0,112% 0,071%
t-stat 0,27 0,39 0,37 0,08
Std deviation 0,089 0,014 0,009 0,016
Skewness -0,091 -0,530 -0,353 1,875
Kurtosis -0,844 4,511 1,586 8,711
Sharpe Ratio -0,137 -0,133 -0,130 0,044
2001-2007
Mean -0,186% -0,051% -0,049% 0,002%
t-stat 0,51 0,73 0,70 0,14
Std deviation 0,071 0,009 0,008 0,010
Skewness -1,004 -1,050 -1,290 0,992
Kurtosis 2,627 3,891 5,736 9,248
Sharpe Ratio -0,026 -0,058 -0,060 0,002
Managed L/S Portfolio
 
Table 34: Managed L/S Portfolio – Actual year method 
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All Stocks Non-announcers Announcers L/S
1999-2007
Mean -1,416% -2,910% -0,565% 2,264%
t-stat 1,31 2,04 0,48 1,47
Std deviation 0,065 0,085 0,070 0,092
Skewness -0,353 -0,145 -0,363 0,726
Kurtosis -0,725 -0,566 0,032 1,127
Sharpe Ratio -0,219 -0,340 -0,081 0,245
1999-2000
Mean -3,663% -5,122% -2,147% 2,975%
t-stat 1,75 1,25 1,01 0,60
Std deviation 0,059 0,116 0,060 0,141
Skewness -0,091 0,480 0,108 0,703
Kurtosis -1,984 0,325 -0,701 0,024
Sharpe Ratio -0,620 -0,440 -0,356 0,211
2001-2007
Mean -0,774% -2,254% -0,112% 2,061%
t-stat 0,59 1,58 0,08 1,42
Std deviation 0,070 0,076 0,074 0,077
Skewness -0,502 -0,330 -0,510 0,582
Kurtosis -0,423 -1,201 0,275 1,311
Sharpe Ratio -0,111 -0,298 -0,015 0,268
L/S Portfolio Traded in February, May, August and October
 
Table 35: L/S Portfolio Traded in February, May, August and October – 
Actual year method 
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7.5 Robustness Checks 
7.5.1 Geometric Averages of Logaritmic Returns Previous Year 
Method 
All Stocks Expected Non-announcers Excpected Announcers L/S
1999-2007
Mean -1.970% -1.370% -2.268% -1.286%
t-stat 2.44 1.77 2.38 1.68
Std deviation 0.085 0.081 0.100 0.080
Skewness -1.356 -1.377 -1.047 -0.226
Kurtosis 3.777 4.285 3.928 5.167
Sharpe Ratio -0.233 -0.169 -0.226 -0.160
1999-2000
Mean -3.444% -2.166% -3.684% -1.828%
t-stat 1.82 1.22 1.66 1.03
Std deviation 0.095 0.088 0.111 0.088
Skewness -0.257 -0.460 -0.256 -0.151
Kurtosis -0.836 4.976 -0.487 0.022
Sharpe Ratio -0.364 -0.246 -0.332 -0.208
2001-2007
Mean -1.540% -1.140% -1.855% -1.130%
t-stat 1.56 1.33 1.77 1.33
Std deviation 0.091 0.079 0.097 0.078
Skewness -1.799 -1.725 -1.364 -0.274
Kurtosis 6.374 6.516 6.334 6.464
Sharpe Ratio -0.169 -0.144 -0.191 -0.144
All Stocks With 4 Announcements the Previous Year
 
Table 36: All Stocks with 4 Announcements the Previous Year – Geometric 
Previous Year Method 
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All Stocks Expected Non-announcers Excpected Announcers L/S
1999-2007
Mean -1.032% -0.344% -2.544% -2.305%
t-stat 1.41 0.51 2.52 2.58
Std deviation 0.072 0.066 0.100 0.089
Skewness -0.837 -0.504 -1.047 -1.365
Kurtosis 1.603 0.068 3.928 5.269
Sharpe Ratio -0.143 -0.052 -0.254 -0.260
1999-2000
Mean -2.477% -1.053% -4.006% -3.086%
t-stat 0.67 0.24 1.21 1.24
Std deviation 0.091 0.082 0.111 0.088
Skewness -0.381 -0.562 -0.256 -0.414
Kurtosis -0.618 -0.136 -0.487 -0.076
Sharpe Ratio -0.271 -0.128 -0.361 -0.350
2001-2007
Mean -0.594% -0.131% -2.101% -2.071%
t-stat 1.24 0.45 2.21 2.27
Std deviation 0.066 0.061 0.097 0.089
Skewness -1.017 -0.400 -1.364 -1.652
Kurtosis 3.315 -0.083 6.334 7.070
Sharpe Ratio -0.091 -0.021 -0.216 -0.232
Months with Zero Expected Announcers Deleted
 
Table 37: Months with Zero Expected Announcers Deleted – Geometric 
Previous Year Method 
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All Stocks Expected Non-announcers Excpected Announcers L/S
1999-2007
Mean -1.970% -0.080% -0.256% -0.177%
t-stat 2.30 1.06 1.92 1.41
Std deviation 0.085 0.007 0.013 0.012
Skewness -1.356 -1.228 -4.119 -3.196
Kurtosis 3.777 3.194 28.986 25.677
Sharpe Ratio -0.233 -0.108 -0.195 -0.143
1999-2000
Mean -3.444% -0.143% -0.398% -0.257%
t-stat 1.15 0.53 0.96 0.70
Std deviation 0.095 0.007 0.011 0.009
Skewness -0.257 -1.062 -0.899 -0.866
Kurtosis -0.836 2.428 0.233 1.255
Sharpe Ratio -0.364 -0.204 -0.376 -0.274
2001-2007
Mean -1.540% -0.062% -0.215% -0.154%
t-stat 2.15 0.99 1.79 1.32
Std deviation 0.082 0.008 0.014 0.013
Skewness -1.799 -1.293 -4.543 -3.402
Kurtosis 6.374 3.536 31.663 26.438
Sharpe Ratio -0.188 -0.082 -0.156 -0.118
Managed L/S Portfolio
 
Table 38: Managed L/S Portfolio – Geometric Previous Year Method 
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All Stocks Expected Non-announcers Excpected Announcers L/S
1999-2007
Mean -2.857% -1.637% -3.984% -2.479%
t-stat 2.28 1.57 2.21 1.43
Std deviation 0.076 0.063 0.110 0.105
Skewness -1.115 -0.377 -2.020 -1.777
Kurtosis 2.033 -0.603 7.088 6.555
Sharpe Ratio -0.374 -0.259 -0.361 -0.236
1999-2000
Mean -5.006% -1.343% -7.097% -6.133%
t-stat 2.25 0.58 2.46 1.80
Std deviation 0.064 0.066 0.085 0.099
Skewness -0.415 -0.769 -1.136 -0.694
Kurtosis -1.428 2.760 1.775 -0.032
Sharpe Ratio -0.777 -0.205 -0.840 -0.617
2001-2007
Mean -2.224% -1.721% -3.055% -1.382%
t-stat 1.50 1.44 1.42 0.70
Std deviation 0.079 0.064 0.116 0.106
Skewness -1.372 -0.308 -2.354 -2.241
Kurtosis 2.995 -0.985 8.717 9.844
Sharpe Ratio -0.281 -0.270 -0.264 -0.131
L/S Portfolio Traded in February, May, August and October
 
Table 39: L/S Portfolio Traded in February, May, August and October – 
Geometric Previous Year Method 
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7.5.2 Geometric Averages of Logarithmic Returns Fiscal Year 
Method 
All Stocks Expected Non-announcers Excpected Announcers L/S
1999-2007
Mean -1.969% -1.046% -0.982% -0.469%
t-stat 2.44 1.24 1.31 0.57
Std deviation 0.085 0.072 0.045 0.086
Skewness -1.356 -2.032 -2.772 0.930
Kurtosis 3.777 8.589 12.845 4.634
Sharpe Ratio -0.232 -0.145 -0.216 -0.055
1999-2000
Mean -3.442% -1.792% -1.737% -0.698%
t-stat 1.82 0.83 1.15 0.34
Std deviation 0.095 0.087 0.043 0.100
Skewness -0.257 -0.769 -2.222 0.668
Kurtosis -0.836 9.718 4.153 -0.261
Sharpe Ratio -0.364 -0.205 -0.404 -0.070
2001-2007
Mean -1.539% -0.830% -0.765% -0.404%
t-stat 2.15 0.93 0.17 0.45
Std deviation 0.066 0.067 0.046 0.082
Skewness -1.799 -2.713 -2.991 1.034
Kurtosis 6.375 14.422 15.695 7.204
Sharpe Ratio -0.233 -0.123 -0.166 -0.049
All Stocks With 4 Announcements the Previous Year
 
Table 40: Geometric Averages of Logarithmic Returns Fiscal Year Method 
– Geometric Fiscal Year Method 
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7.5.3 Geometric Averages of Logaritmic Returns Actual Dates 
All Stocks Non-announcers Announcers L/S
1999-2007
Mean -1,970% -1,976% -1,313% 0,050%
t-stat 2,44 2,20 1,42 0,06
Std deviation 0,085 0,094 0,096 0,094
Skewness -1,356 -0,859 -0,159 0,512
Kurtosis 3,777 2,431 1,443 2,156
Sharpe Ratio -0,233 -0,210 -0,136 0,005
1999-2000
Mean -3,444% -3,882% -0,599% 2,529%
t-stat 1,82 1,74 0,28 1,10
Std deviation 0,095 0,111 0,107 0,111
Skewness -0,257 -0,309 -0,101 0,458
Kurtosis -0,836 3,110 -0,086 -0,332
Sharpe Ratio -0,364 -0,349 -0,056 0,227
2001-2007
Mean -1,540% -1,417% -1,515% -0,636%
t-stat 1,59 1,48 1,49 0,67
Std deviation 0,089 0,089 0,094 0,088
Skewness -1,799 -1,079 -0,201 0,451
Kurtosis 6,374 4,581 2,145 3,434
Sharpe Ratio -0,172 -0,160 -0,161 -0,072
All Stocks With 4 Announcements Each Calendar Year
 
Table 41: All Stocks with 4 Announcements Each Calendar Year – 
Geometric Actual Method 
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All Stocks Non-announcers  Announcers L/S
1999-2007
Mean -1,457% -1,464% -1,475% -0,460%
t-stat 1,90 1,66 1,51 0,43
Std deviation 0,076 0,087 0,096 0,104
Skewness -0,758 -0,338 -0,159 0,155
Kurtosis 0,939 0,647 1,443 1,399
Sharpe Ratio -0,192 -0,168 -0,153 -0,044
1999-2000
Mean -3,162% -4,702% -0,838% 3,129%
t-stat 0,91 0,79 0,72 0,21
Std deviation 0,087 0,113 0,104 0,131
Skewness -0,354 -0,278 -0,076 0,554
Kurtosis -0,575 -0,835 -0,103 -0,411
Sharpe Ratio -0,363 -0,415 -0,080 0,239
2001-2007
Mean -0,938% -0,457% -1,662% -1,480%
t-stat 1,67 1,44 1,32 0,38
Std deviation 0,072 0,076 0,095 0,093
Skewness -0,897 0,026 -0,205 -0,499
Kurtosis 1,906 1,119 2,177 1,763
Sharpe Ratio -0,131 -0,060 -0,176 -0,160
Months with Zero Actual Announcers Deleted
 
Table 42: Months with Zero Actual Announcers Deleted – Geometric Actual 
Year Method 
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All Stocks  Non-announcers Announcers L/S
1999-2007
Mean -1,970% -0,162% -0,171% -0,018%
t-stat 2,30 1,44 1,67 0,14
Std deviation 0,085 0,011 0,010 0,013
Skewness -1,356 -1,584 -3,061 1,261
Kurtosis 3,777 6,437 18,207 11,562
Sharpe Ratio -0,233 -0,147 -0,171 -0,014
1999-2000
Mean -3,443% -0,321% -0,211% 0,090%
t-stat 1,15 0,72 0,84 0,07
Std deviation 0,095 0,015 0,009 0,017
Skewness -0,257 -1,218 -0,809 2,091
Kurtosis -0,836 5,094 1,865 8,943
Sharpe Ratio -0,364 -0,214 -0,236 0,051
2001-2007
Mean -1,540% -0,116% -0,160% -0,049%
t-stat 2,15 1,34 1,57 0,13
Std deviation 0,082 0,010 0,010 0,011
Skewness -1,799 -1,678 -3,465 0,286
Kurtosis 6,374 6,169 20,780 11,918
Sharpe Ratio -0,188 -0,120 -0,154 -0,043
Managed L/S Portfolio
 
Table 43: Managed L/S Portfolio – Geometric Actual Year Method 
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All Stocks Non-announcers Announcers L/S
1999-2007
Mean -2,857% -4,176% -2,121% 1,515%
t-stat 2,28 2,70 1,52 0,83
Std deviation 0,076 0,095 0,084 0,108
Skewness -1,115 -0,464 -1,552 0,492
Kurtosis 2,033 -0,356 4,941 1,708
Sharpe Ratio -0,374 -0,441 -0,251 0,140
1999-2000
Mean -5,006% -7,414% -3,136% 2,931%
t-stat 2,25 1,67 1,47 0,52
Std deviation 0,064 0,130 0,061 0,157
Skewness -0,415 0,082 0,038 0,783
Kurtosis -1,428 -0,341 -1,054 -0,285
Sharpe Ratio -0,777 -0,570 -0,512 0,187
2001-2007
Mean -2,224% -3,208% -1,827% 1,118%
t-stat 1,50 2,09 1,08 0,63
Std deviation 0,079 0,083 0,091 0,093
Skewness -1,372 -0,552 -1,733 -0,060
Kurtosis 2,995 -0,718 5,276 3,042
Sharpe Ratio -0,281 -0,389 -0,202 0,120
L/S Portfolio Traded in February, May, August and October
 
Table 44: L/S Portfolio Traded in February, May, August and October – 
Geometric Actual Year Method 
